( 1 ) BOTH these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution have been filed from the orders of fee First Additional District Judge at Indore on two election petitions, fee first (41) is an order of dismissal of fee petitioners' election petition under Rule 43 of fee Cantonment Electoral Rules in regard to an ejection to the Cantonment board at Mhow. The other petition (No. 43 of 1965) is by fee elected member whose election to the same cantonment board has been set aside on an election petition by the defeated candidate who is opposite party No. 1 in this Court. While the facts in controversy in the two cases are different they have one common point of law which has been raised as a preliminary issue here and which alone is being decided at this stage.

( 2 ) THE question is whether a petition under Rule 43 of the Cantonments Electoral rules can be enquired into and disposed of under Rule 45 by an Additional District judge to whom the District Judge transfers it, there having been no notification by the State Government prescribing the rank of fee "subordinate Judicial Officer" to whom the petition can be so transferred.

( 3 ) THIS resolves into consideration of, firstly, whether the purport of the phrase "district Judge" used in Rules 43 and 45 is fee same as that of the words "district court" used in certain other enactments, m particular, the Hindu Marriage Act of 1956, which has been the subject-matter of some rulings in this High Court; secondly, whether Rule 45 automatically empowers the District Judge without any notification by State Government to transfer to an Additional District Judge who may be of equal status m judicial matters though subordinate in respect of steps of a ministerial nature, or whether fee notification is necessary not only to prescribe the status of fee subordinate judicial officer to whom a transfer might be made, but to enable the transfer itself.

( 4 ) ALL that need be stated of the facts for our purpose is that after the test elections be the Mhow Cantonment Board there were these two petitions with the results already mentioned. It is of interest to note that in one of them, that is fee one out of which Petition No. 43 arises, objection was taken before fee inquiry itself to fee competency of the Additional District Judge, while in the other no such objection was taken. This is of no practical significance now because the position taken by the petitioners in both fee cases is that the Additional District Judge was basically incompetent to hold fee inquiry and accordingly acquiescence could not have given him any jurisdiction. That Court, however, assumed jurisdiction on the ground feat it was functioning under fee Civil Courts Act, Section 7 (2) of which runs thus: "7 (2) An Additional District Judge shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge, including the functions of fee Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which fee District Judge may by general or special order assign to him and in the discharge of such functions he shall exercise fee same powers at fee District Judge. " the position taken here is that this is an ad hoc tribunal outside fee ambit of fee civil Courts Act and fee powers of fee District Judge under the Civil Courts Act have no application; the powers to transfer fee petitions, if any, have to be derived from the special statute itself or the statutory rules made thereunder. Even the contesting opposite party in Petition No. 41 has agreed with the petitioners that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction. The opposite party in Petition No. 43, however, has supported his jurisdiction on the analogy of the "similar" provisions in the Hindu Marriage Act under which this High Court has held that the Additional District Judge is competent to hear the cases transferred to him by the District Judge.

( 5 ) THE first point to note in this connection is that the words used in Rules 43 and 45 are not "district Court" or "the Principal