( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Indore, dismissing the appellant's application for compensation on a preliminary ground.

( 2 ) THE alleged accident took place on 29th September 1964 and the application for claim was filed on 2nd September 1965. The applicant-appellants contended that at the time of the accident they were minors and that the appellant No. 1 attained majority on 21st July 1965 and, therefore, he filed the claim petition within two months of the date of attainment of majority. On these grounds, the appellants prayed for condonation of delay.

( 3 ) THE learned Judge of the Claims Tribunal framed two preliminary issues, namely:-" 1. Whether the applicant No. 1 attained the age of majority on 21-71965? 2. If so, whether the applicants were prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time?" in regard to the first issue, the learned Judge found in favour of the appellants. Regarding the other issue he came to the conclusion that Section 6 of the limitation Act. 1963, would not apply to the proceedings before him and, therefore, the appellant-applicants could not set the benefit of the provisions of that section and that, under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939, the minority of the appellants could not be said to be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Consequently, the learned Judge dismissed the claim petition.

( 4 ) SHRI D. K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that in view of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act Section 6 thereof would be applicable to the present case, according to which provision the period during which the appellant remained minor shall be excluded. In the alternative, he contended that all the applicants in the case were minors and, therefore, the delay in the filing of the claims petition deserved to be condoned under the proviso to Section 110-A (3)because the fact that minority of the applicants prevented them from making an application would be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. He also relied on m. P. S. R. T. Corporation v. Smt. Munnabai, (1967 MPLJ 963 ).

( 5 ) SECTION 29 (2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows:--

"where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit appeal or application by any special or local law. the provisions -- contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. "

This provision makes it clear that to all proceedings under any special or local law. so long as the operation of the Limitation Act is not specifically excluded. Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the limitation Act provides that:--

( 6 ) " (1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule. " Thus under the provisions of Section 6 the appellant No. 1 is entitled to the exclusion of time upto the date of attainment of majority, if the word "suit", occurring in Section 6 (1) includes an application of the kind in question. The word "suit" has not been defined in the Limitation Act but Section 2 (1) states that "suit" does not include an appeal or an application. Section 2 (1)only excludes an appeal or an application- The word "suit" as contemplated in the provisions of the Limitation A