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1971 Supreme(MP) 63
High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
Shiv Dayal, J.
UNION OF INDIA (UOI) - Appellant
Versus
SHANKERLAL - Respondents
Civil Revn. 843 Of 1970
Decided On : 04/22/1971
B.K.PANDEY, N.C.JAIN
Headnote:(1) Railways Act, 1890 - Ss. 74 (3) & 76 - nature of the provisions of section 76 - is a proviso to section 74 (3) - goods booked at owners' risk - goods reaching late and getting damaged - detention admitted by Railway - burden of proof of want of negligence is on the Railway.
On an examination of the scheme of the Railways Act and the provisions contained in sections 73, 74 (3) and 76, it is clear that section 76 is a proviso to section 74 (3) which is a general provision. Section 74 (3) governs all cases of loss, destruction damage etc. whatever may be the cause while section 76 is a special provision which applies only to cases of delay and detention. Therefore, the rule of construction of statutes, generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae anrea specialitersunt comprehensa (a general clause does not extend to those things which are included in previous special words), or shortly stated generalibus specialia derogant (special things derogate from general) comes into play. AIR 1961 SC 1170 relied on. [Para 6]
The law on this point is this - Section 76 carves out an exception to section 74 (3) in cases of loss, etc., being caused by delay or detention in the carriage of animals or goods. This is irrespective of whether the goods or animals are booked at, the railway risk rate or the owner's risk rate. The combined effect of sections 74 (3) and 76 is this. Where goods or animals are bonked at the owner's risk rate: (a) in the first instance, the owner must prove (unless it is admitted) that there was delay or detention which caused loss, destruction, damage or deterioration; (b) if such delay or detention is admitted or proved, then it is for the railway administration to prove that the delay or detention arose without negligence or misconduct on the part of the railway administration or of any of its servants; and (c) If such delay or detention is neither admitted nor proved, the owner must prove that the loss, destruction, damage or deterioration was due to negligence or misconduct on the part of the railway administration or of any of its servants. [Para 12]
Where the Railway admits delay in transit, but has not proved want of negligence and misconduct it is liable for the loss. Here pleading is not sufficient, it should be proved that there was no negligence or misconduct. [Para 13]
(2) Precedents - is binding only for the point decided and not for any fact - what is ratio decidendi.
(3) Words and phrases - ratio decidendi - what is.
It is axiomatic that a decision is an authority for the question of law which it decided and not for a question which was not considered or raised. A case cannot be an authority on a point of fact; each case bas to be examined in the light of the circumstances existing in it. AIR 1963 SC 499 and AIR 1960 SC 195, relied on.
A precedent, therefore, is a judicial decision which contains in itself a principle. The underlying principle which thus forms its authoritative element is often termed the ratio decidendi. The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it; but it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards the world at large.
( 1 ) THIS revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act is from a decree for Rs. 117/- passed by the 1st Civil Judge, Class II, Seoni.
( 2 ) ON November 2, 1967, two baskets containing 30 Kgs. of betel leaves were consigned from Golanthara railway station (South Eastern Railway) to Seoni (South Eastern Railway ). Actually they reached Seoni on November 6, 1967, The plaintiff's case is that there was abnormal delay owing to which the betel leaves became rotten. The plaintiff claimed Rs. 117/- as damages.
( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge held that the betel leaves which were booked were in good condition and the defence to the contrary could not be accepted. On the evidence of Shankarlal (P. W. 1), the plaintiff himself, a decree for Rupees 117/was passed.
( 4 ) IN this revision it is contended for the defendant that the plaintiff did not prove any misconduct or negligence on the part of the railway administration without which a decree in favour of the plaintiff could not be passed. Reliance is placed on section 74 (3) of the Railways Act. It is not in dispute that the goods were booked at the owner's risk rate. Section 74 (3) enacts:-- "when any animals or goods are deemed to have been tendered to be carried, or are carried, at the owner's risk rate, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 73, the railway administration shall not be responsible for any loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery from whatever cause arising, except upon proof that such loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery was due to negligence or misconduct on the Dart of the railway administration or any of its servants".
It is not contended on behalf of the plaintiff that any evidence was given to prove negligence or misconduct on the part of the railway administration. In fact that case was not even pleaded.
( 5 ) SHRI Jain, learned counsel for the respondent, relies on Section 76 of the railways Act, which provides as follows:
"a railway administration shall be responsible for loss, destruction, damage or deterioration of animals or goods proved by the owner to have been caused by delay or detention in their carriage unless the railway administration proves that the delay or detention arose without negligence or misconduct on the part of the railway administration or of any of its servants".
( 6 ) ON an examination of the scheme of the Railways Act and the provisions contained in Sections 73. 74 (3) and 76, it is clear that Section 76 is a proviso to section 74 (3), which is a general provision. Section 74 (3) governs all cases of loss, destruction, damage, etc. whatever may be the cause, while Section 76 is a special provision which applies only to cases of delay and detention. Therefore, the rule of construction of statutes, generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae antea specialiter sunt comprehensa (a general clause does not extend to those things which are included in previous special words), or shortly stated generalibus specialia derogant (special things derogate from general) comes into play. In J. K. C. S. and W. Mills v. State of U. P. . AIR 1961 SC 1170 their Lordships, recalling the well-known rule of construction that general provitions yield to special provisions observed that this rule is applicable to resolve not only a conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, but also the conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument, their Lordships said:--
"the rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them, his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should
