S. M. N. RAINA, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 8 of the Partition Act.

( 2 ) IT is not disputed that the house in suit which is situated in Gopalganj, Sagar, originally belonged to the joint Hindu family. The plaintiff-respondent purchased 1/5th share of Rishikumar, appellant No. 1, one of the members of the family at a Court auction in 1960. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a suit for partition and for possession of his 1/5th share against the appellants and certain other members of the family. The suit was decreed and a preliminary decree for partition was passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. During the proceedings for final decree, the appellants and some others filed an application under Section 4 of the Partition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for purchasing the share of the plaintiff. This application was opposed by the plaintiff-respondent and was dismissed by the trial Court in appeal, the learned Additional District Judge set aside the order of the trial Court and allowed the application. Being aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal.

( 3 ) FROM the material on record, it appears that the house in suit is a dwelling house. Shri P. R. Padhye, learned counsel for the appellants, however, urged that the family had lost its character as an undivided family and, therefore, the members of the family were not entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Act In support of his contention, he pointed out that, as would appear from the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 3 in the partition suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent (Civil Suit No. 45-A of 1963), some of the members had earlier filed a suit for partition of the suit house against one Bhagwati Prasad, one of the members of the family and in the said partition, Bhagwati Prasad got possession over 1/5th portion of the suit house from the date of preliminary decree. It was urged that in view of the earlier suit for partition it is obvious that there had been disruption of the joint status of the family and as such the family ceased to be undivided family within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act.

( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, it is necessary to examine carefully the provisions of the Act. It would appear from the preamble of the Act that it was enacted to amend the law relating to partition. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that it is applicable only to partition of the property belonging to a joint Hindu family. It is quite clear from the provisions of the Act that it is of a general nature and is applicable to partition of property irrespective of the consideration whether it belongs to Hindus, Muslims, Parsis or members of any other community. It would, therefore, not be correct to construe the various provisions of the Act treating it as a part of the Hindu Law itself.

( 5 ) THE expression 'undivided family' as used in Section 4 of the Act means a family not divided qua the dwelling house. The essence of the matter is that the house itself should be undivided among the members of the family who are its owners. The emphasis being on the undivided character of the house the expression merely means a family the members of which have not effected a partition of the dwelling house belonging to it. Where the members of a family are in joint occupation of a dwelling house and there has been no partition by metes and bounds by allotting distinct portions of the house to different members of the family who are co-owners thereof, the family would be an undivided family with respect to such house within the meaning of said section.

( 6 ) SHRI P. R. Padhye, learned counsel for the appellants, referred to a number of authorities; but they do not support the view propounded by him. In Chaudhari mohammed Sulaiman Khan v. Mr. Amir Jan AIR 1941 All 281, it was held that the phrase "undivided family" in Section 4 is used in a very wide and general sense and two Ma

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