( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the dismissal of their suit for recovery of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.

( 2 ) THE facts are that the deceased Dharamwati Bai was the wife of Mano-harlal gupta, plaintiff No. 1 aged 32 years, and mother of plaintiffs 2 and 3, Ramesh kumar aged 10 years and Brijmohan aged 3 years. The family lived in Ram nagar Ward, Raipur. On 2nd October 1968 at about 6. 30 p. m. Dharamwati Bai went to a nearby tap to fetch water in a pitcher. While she was returning to her house her foot came in contact with a live electric wire and she got electrocuted and died. It appears that a naked copper wire used for conducting high voltage electric energy had snapped between two poles and the deceased came in contact with one of the ends of this wire and died. The plaintiffs instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal for recovery of Rs. 25. 000 as damages on the ground that the defendant, the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, was negligent in not taking proper precautions for the maintenance of the elec ric line and for the safety of the passers-by. The defendant in its written statement denied the allegation of negligence. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove negligence on the part of the defendant.

( 3 ) IT is not disputed before us that the accident happened because the copper wire conducting high tension electric energy had snapped and the deceased came in contact with the live wire which touched the ground, Rama Rao (D. W. 1), who is an employee of the defendant, went on the spot after receiving information of the accident In examination-in-chief he stated that according to his enquiry he found that the wire had been cut or damaged by string used for flying kite. In paragraph 5 of his cross-examination he, however, admitted that there was, in fact, no enquiry as to the cause of the accident and that he did not make any report excepting what is contained in Ex. D-1. Ex. D-1 does not make any reference to any enquiry or as to the reason how the wire had snapped and the accident happened.

( 4 ) THE defendant has a statutory authority under the Electricity Act, 1910, read with the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 to transmit electric energy. The defendant, therefore, cannot be made liable for nuisance for the escape of electrical energy on the principle accepted in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866) LR 1 Ex 265. The defendant, however, is still liable for negligence. It is negligence to omit to use all reasonable known means to keep the electricity harmless; (see clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 13th Edition, paragraph 1536), The burden of proving that there was no negligence is on the de- fendant and there is no obligiation on he plaintiff to prove negligence. Further, the standard of care required is a high one owing to the dangerous nature of electricity; (see Charlesworth on negligence, 5th Edition, p. 531 ). If the defendant produces no material and offers no evidence to negative negligence, negligence will be presumed. This result will also follow on the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Live broken electric wires carrying, high tension energy are generally not found in a public place, street or road and, therefore, if such a thing happens a prima facie inference can be drawn that there has been some carelessness on the part of the defendant in transmitting electric energy or in properly maintaining the transmission lines. This inference is further supported by Rule 91 of the Indian electricity Rules, 1956. This rule provides that every over head line which is not covered with insulating material and which is erected over any part of a street or other public place or any factory or mine or on any consumer's premises shall be protected with a device approved by the Inspector for rendering the line electrically harmless in ease it breaks. If the precaution under this rule is aken the line in case it breaks would become dead a