High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
S. M. N. Raina and R. L. Murab, JJ.
LACCHI ALIAS LAXMINARAYAN - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF M.P. - Respondents
Case 123 Of 1975
Decided On : 06/11/1975
There is a clear distinction between a mere contravention of law and disturbance of public order AIR 1966 SC 740 referred to. [Para 6
Breaches of law and order are to be distinguished from disturbances of public order; and the distinction between the two is to be made on the basis of the following principles:
(1) A contravention of law always affects order; but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or public at large.
(2) Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality.
(3) It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in general or in a particular locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order or a disturbance of public order.
(4) It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
(5) If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only. AIR 1975 SC 603, AIR 1974 SC 1214. AIR 1973 SC 197 & AIR 1970 SC 1228 referred to. [Para 9
(2) Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 - S. 3 - delay - matters to be seen.
The question of delay is material only for the purpose of determining whether the alleged criminal activities of the detenue can be considered as a reasonable basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards necessity of detention. The satisfaction must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future bebavior of the detenue based on his past conduct. AIR 1975 SC 473 and AIR 1974 SC 1336 relied on. [Para 21
(3) Maintenance of internal Security Act, 1971 - S. 3 - truth or otherwise of the grounds - power of the Court to examine - affidavits by the detenue - value of.
It is not necessary for the High Court to embark on an enquiry into the truth or otherwise of the allegations forming the subject-matter of the grounds. All that has to he seen is that the action of the detaining authority is bonafide and that the alleged incidents are not purely imaginary. AIR 1975 SC 90 relied on. [Para 23
It is not difficult for a person, who is a fully and of a desperate character, to obtain affidavits of his choice from persons who are afraid of him. It appears that police reports were lodged in respect of these incidents and criminal prosecutions were started, but the proceedings terminated as the complainants compounded the offences or settled the matters amicably for fear of the petitioner. [Para 28
(4) Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 - S. 3 - previous acquittal on a ground - when material.
The mere fact that the prosecution ended in acquittal is no bar to action being taken by the detaining authority for the alleged criminal activities of the detenue.
The basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply the 'subjective satisfaction' component of imprisonment for reasons of internal security.
Where a Court has held a criminal case to be false, the detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may not reasonably claim to be satisfied about the prospective prejudicial activities based on what a Court has found to be baseless. AIR 1973 SC 207 and AIR 1972 SC 1670 relied on. [Para 29
(5) Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 - S. 3 - grounds - when not vague - names of associates need not be given.
Where the date, time and place of the incidents were specified and the particulars regarding the nature of the activities of the detenue were mentioned in the grounds, the grounds cannot be said to be suffering from the infirmity of vagueness. AIR 1974 SC 1214 relied on. [Para 30
Merely because the names of the associates of the detenue have not been specified in the grounds of detention, they cannot be said to suffer from the vice of vagueness. AIR 1972 SC 1294 relied on. [Para 32
(6) Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 - S. 3 - detention under - prosecution for an offence - no bar for preventive detention.
Merely because a detenue was liable to be tried in a criminal Court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing an offence under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure it would not debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that an order of preventive detention can be made with or without prosecution, and even in anticipation, or after discharge or acquittal; and the pendency of a prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. AIR 1974 SC 1254, AIR 1974 SC 1171 and AIR 1972 SC 2561 referred to. [Para 33
( 1 ) THIS is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the constitution.
( 2 ) THE petitioner carries on the. business of embroidery at Naya Sarafa, lashkar, Gwalior. On 29-10-1974, the District Magistrate, Gwalior, passed an order of detention against tbe petitioner under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') vide An-nexnre P-1. On 29-10-74, the petitioner was furnished with the grounds of detention vide Annexure P-2, He submitted a representation against the order of detention to the Government. Thereupon, the case of the petitioner was referred to the Advisory Board. The board approved the order of detention and, after considering the report of the advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the order of detention. So far, the facts are not in dispute.
( 3 ) THE petitioner has challenged the order of detention on a number of grounds in this petition and has prayed that the order be quashed and the petitioner be set at liberty. ( 4 ) IN the return filed on behalf of the State it is submitted that tbe order of detention is definitely valid and justified and the petition is liable to be dismissed.
( 5 ) SHRI S. K, Dube, learned counsel for the petitioner, has challenged the detention on a number of grounds. The first point urged by him was that the alleged activities of the petitioner referred to in the grounds of detention may be considered as breaches of law and order, but they cannot be considered as prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the meaning of Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. There can be no doubt that there is a clear distinction between a mere contravention of law and the disturbance of public order. While dealing with a case of detention under rule 31 (a) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 in Ram Manohar v. State of bihar AIR 1966 SC 740, their Lordships observed in paragraph 5. 1 as under:
"the contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the- community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order loading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India act but disturbances, which subvert the public order, are. "
( 6 ) IN Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commr. of Police Calcutta (AIR 1970 SC 814), their lordships, while dealing with a case of detention under the Preventive detention Act, 1950, hold that maintenance of 'law and order' is a conception much wider than the conception of maintenance of 'public order'. Every act that affects 'law and order' need not affect 'public order'. 'public order' is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality; and disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity.
( 7 ) IN Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 1228 their Lordships, while dealing with a case of detention under the Act, held that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cau. se a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society; and an individual act can be a ground for detention only if it leads to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order and not if it affects merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed. This decision was followed by their Lordships in Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal (ATR 1973 SC 1. 97 ).
( 8 ) IN Milan Banik v. The State of West Bengal (AIR 1974 SC 1214) their lordships observed as under in paragraph 3, while dealing with the question of public order: "the test fo
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REFERRED TO : Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar
Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commr. of Police Calcutta
Milan Banik v. The State of West Bengal
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