High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
G. P. Singh, C. J. , U. N. Bhachawat and C. P. Sen, JJ.
MOHANLAL - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH - Respondents
Misc. First Appeal 52 Of 1972
Decided On : 08/21/1979
(2) Limitation - State Government recovering dues - period of limitation starts from every threat of recovery - limitation under the residuary clause is three years from each threat.
(3) Arbitration Act, 1940 - S. 20-recovery of forest dues from the plaintiff-cause of action is a recurring one-starts from each threat to realise the arrear.
There is no separate Article provided under the limitation Act for a suit for injunction. So a suit for injunction has to be governed by the residuary Article i.e. Article 113. Under this Article, a suit can be filed within 3 years from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The cause of action for a suit for injunction arise each time when there was a threat of recovery by the respondents Every threat of recovery gives a fresh cause of action. Until the recovery is made it cannot be said that a suit for injunction becomes barred. AIR 1941 Mad. 81 & AIR 1914 PC 72 relied on. [Para 5]
The plaintiff appellant got fresh cause of action in respect of each threat of recovery. His right to file such a suit is not barred unless and until the recovery is made. If the recovery of the amount is not justified under the terms of the contract, the appellant could challenge the same. Though a demand notice was issued by the revenue authorities on 19-8-59 but they took no further act on and so the appellant kept quiet but when a second notice was issued on 21-10-65 the appellant thought the danger to be imminent and so he filed the application under section 20. He was fully justified in basing his cause of action for this suit on the notice dated 21-10-65 and this application filed on 19-8-66 could not be said to be barred by limitation. [Para 6]
(4) Arbitration Act, 1963 - Ss. 30 & 33 - error of law appearing from face of the record - what is-award when can be set aside or remitted because of such error.
If an error of law appears on the face of the award it is a ground for remitting it or setting it aside An error of law on the face of the award means you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto. But this rule does not apply where questions of law are specifically referred to the arbitrator for the decision; the award of the arbitrator on those questions is binding upon the parties, for by referring the specific questions the parties desire to have a decision from the arbitrator on those questions rather than from the Court, and the Court will not unless it is satisfied that the arbitrator had proceeded illegally, interfere with the decision. AIR 1963 SC 1685 relied on.
( 1 ) THIS case has been referred to the Full Bench by the learned single Judge for decision. In the order of reference no specific question has been framed but it appears that the learned single Judge had doubts about the decision of the division Bench of this Court in Badriprasad v. State of Madh. Pra. Misc. First appeal No. 156 of 1971, D/- 18-2-1975.
( 2 ) IN the auctions held on 24-8-1956 the appellant took on lease coupe No. 1 in tumadabra for Rs. 3100/- and coupe No. 1 in Bundela Kachhar for Rupees 8200/- for extracting timber from these coupes. Both these coupes were in north Bilaspur Forest Division. The amounts of the lease money were payable by instalments and the time of payment of the instalments was the essence of the contract. Regarding the lease of Tumadabra coupe, the appellant deposited the first instalment on 4-10-1956 instead of on 24-8-1956 but the lease deed was executed by the D. F. O. He further defaulted in paying the other instalments. Accordingly, the lease was cancelled. Regarding the lease of bundela Kachhar coupe, the appellant failed to pay even the first instalment and, therefore, no lease deed was executed and the tender was cancelled and it was re-auctioned for Rs. 5200/ -. Since the appellant failed to pay the balance amounts of the lease money, he was served with demand notices calling upon to pay Rs. 2325/-for the first lease and Rs. 2900/- for the second lease. The appellant raised dispute that he was not permitted to work the first lease and so the State is not entitled to recover the balance amounts of the lease money. It appears that thereafter revenue recovery proceedings were started and notices were issued to the appellant on 19-8-1959 but then no further step was taken. Again by notice dated 21-10-1965 the revenue authorities again asked the appellant to deposit the amounts. The appellant, therefore, filed a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, on 19-8-1966 contending that in the lease-deed there is an arbitration clause that all disputes and differences should be decided by the Conservator of Forest. Unless the dispute is decided and award is made, the State is not entitled to recover the balance amount of the lease money. The application was opposed by the respondents. They ' denied that the balance amounts of the lease money could not be recovered without referring the disputes to the Arbitrator. They also denied that the appellant was not permitted to work the lease of Tumadabra coupe. Since time of payment of instalments was the essence of the contract, the D. F. O. was justified in cancelling both the leases in default of payment of instalments. In fact, in respect of Bundela-Kachhar coupe, no lease deed was executed and so there is no question of referring any dispute to Arbitrator.
( 3 ) THE Additional District Judge by his award D/- 20-10-1970 referred all the disputes between the parties in respect of the two leases to the Arbitrator, i. e. Conservator of Forest. The Arbitrator gave 2 separate awards. In respect of tumadabra coupe, he held that the claim was barred by limitation as the cause of action arose on 19-8-1959 when the notice for recovery of arrears as land revenue was issued by the revenue authorities, while the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act was made on 19-8-66. Regarding the lease of buhdela-Kachhar coupe, he held that there was no written agreement and there being no provision for arbitration in the sale condition, nothing can be arbitrated. The appellant filed objection under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside of the award in respect of the lease of tumadabra coupe alone on the ground that the claim has been wrongly rejected as being barred bylimitation. No challenge was made re garding the award in respect of the lease of Bundela-Kachhar coupe. The learned Addl. District Judge made the award rule of the Court and rejected the application for setting aside of the awar
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