A quit notice is valid if it satisfies both the requirements of 15 days' notice and termination of tenancy with the expiry of the last day of the month of tenancy, even if the language used in the notice states that the tenancy stands terminated with effect from the following day.

( 1 ) THE appellant in this case succeeds if I am td turn on the splitting of a straw and read the quit notice in a hyper-critical manner. He must fail if I read the same in common sense way. The fate of this appeal is, therefore, obvious.

( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to the suit out of which this appeal arises are that the respondent plaintiff-landlord instituted a suit against the appellant-tenant claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises for non-residential purposes of his own. The courts below have concurrently found it as a fact that the plaintiff landlord did require the suit shop for the purposes of his own need and that he had no other alternative reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the township for the said purpose. The claim was contested on various allegations before the courts below. It was also suggested that the partition was effected with the ulterior motive to create a situation that the other house belonging to the family of the plaintiff did not remain of his ownership and, as such he became entitled to lay a claim for eviction on the ground under Section 12 (1) ff) of the M. P. Accommodation control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by showing that he had no other alternative accommodation of his own. It was also suggested that the need was not bona fide. Various technical objections were taken regarding the admissibility of the decree passed by the Civil Court declaring that a partition had already been effected amongst the members of the family including the plaintiff-landlord and that the suit premises fell to the share of the plaintiff. The objection raised was that the aforesaid decree required registration. However, all those objections were found to be frivolous and without any basis. The decree in question was not a decree itself effecting partition. It was nothing but a purely declaratory decree holding that earlier there had been already a partition and in that partition the suit shop had fallen to the share of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the decree was rightly held to be admissible in evidence even in the absence of any registration of the same according td the provisions of the Indian Registration Act. This appeal was entertained by this Court only on the question of validity of the quit notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the T. P. Act. Under these circumstances no other point was urged.

( 3 ) THE only point which needs determination is about the validity of the quit notice. It was not disputed that the tenancy commenced from the 10th of every english calendar month and ended with the expiry of 9th day of the next month according to the said calendar. The language used in the quit notice was that the tenancy will stand determined with effect from the 10th day of the English calendar month instead of saying that it was being determined by the expiry of the 9th day of the said month. The objection raised was that in view of the language used in the quit notice the same did not determine the tenancy with the expiry of the month of tenancy and as such, was bad in law though the other requirement of giving 15 days' notice stood fully satisfied.

( 4 ) IT would be significant to point out that the validity of the quit notice was not objected by raising this ground specifically in the written statement. The general bare allegation was that the quit notice was invalid. In any case, even if the objection as raised by the defendant is taken into consideration, it is ultimately found to be of no material consequence for the reasons stated below. It is true that the landlord, instead of saying that the tenancy was being determined on the expiry of the 9th day, i. e. the midnight of 9th had said in the quit notice that the same stood determined with effect from the 10th. As matter of fact, it ddes not make much difference. It appears that the notice was construed in the same manner by the defenda