( 1 ) HAVING lost in both the Courts below, the defendants have preferred the present appeal.

( 2 ) THE plaintiffs, claiming their title with respect to the suit land, sued the defendants for possession of the land in question. This claim was based on the premise that the defendants were in permissive possession under licence for the last several years; but when asked to deliver back, they refused. The defendants denied the story of licence or permissive possession and equally denied the plaintiffs' title. The trial Court held that the title to the suit land vested in the plaintiffs and that the defendants were in long and continuous possession; but their such possession was not under any licence nor was it permissive to any extent. The trial Court, principally held the view that the suit for possession was governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (corresponding Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963), and as such, decreed the plaintiff's claim, On appeal, being preferred, the lower Appellate Court upheld all the findings of fact of the trial Court and so also the finding on law pertaining to the applicability of Article 144 to the facts and circumstances of the case; and as such, the appeal was dismissed. Hence, now, the present appeal by the defendants.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants-defendants has vehemently urged before me the solitary point that both the Courts below were wrong in applying Article 144 to the facts and circumstances of the case. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the facts and circumstances of the case actually attracted Article 142, inasmuch as, the plaintiffs' story of permissive possession having not (been) accepted by the Courts below, it was a case of "dispossession" of the plaintiffs from the suit land or in the alternative, it was a case of the plaintiffs' "discontinuance in possession". The appellants' learned counsel in support of his arguments has cited Official Receiver v. Govindaraju (AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB)), followed later on by this Court also in Daryaosingh v. Kalma Nihala (1960 MPLJ 1146) : (AIR 1961 Madh Pra 179 ).

( 4 ) BEFORE taking up the crucial question whether in the light of the facts and circumstances proved on record Article 142 applied, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants or Article 144 applied as held by both the Courts below, it would be fruitful to state the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below. These concurrent findings of fact are :

(i) that the plaintiffs were the owners of suit land; (ii) that the defendants are in continuous possession of the suit land for the last, at least, 40 years, and (iii) that the plaintiffs' story regarding licence and permissive possession is without any proof.

( 5 ) THESE concurrent findings of fact are not assailed to any extent before me nor they could be so assailed. It is in the background of these concurrent findings of fact that this Court has to determine, whether the Courts below had rightly applied Article 144 or whether actually it was Article 142 alone which was attracted, as has been now argued by the learned counsel for the appellants. The lower appellate Court, after citing certain rulings, laying down the principles governing the applicability of Article 142 or 144, has ruled out the applicability of Article 142 to the facts and circumstances of the present case on the ground that there was no "discontinuance of possession", i. e. , 'abandonment of title' on the part of the plaintiffs since the plaintiff's had all along been anxiously taking steps to get back the possession by referring the matter to revenue authorities by successive proceedings as detailed and discussed in para 8 of its judgment. It was, hence, held that "discontinuance of possession" being, thus, not deducible from the facts and circumstances, as pleaded and proved on the side of the plaintiffs. Article 142 was not applicable, and that, only Article 144 alone was applicable wh