Section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 does not bar the court from considering applications for interim reliefs.

( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order dated 29-1-1980, whereby the trial Judge has ordered stay of trial of the suit under Section 32 of the Madhya Pradesb Public Trust Act, 1951 and has also stayed consideration of the application for issuance of a temporary injunction and/or appointment of receiver.

( 2 ) NO exhaustive statement of facts is necessary for the decision of this revision. Suffice it to state that the revision-applicants-herein have brought the suit for declaration of title and issuance of a permanent injunction against the defendant-non-applicants on cause of action laid in detail in the plaint. In the suit the applicants submitted two applications (1) for issuance of a temporary injunction for restraining the defendant-non-applicants 2 to 5 from paying rent to defendant-non-applicant No. 1 and (2) for appointment of receiver for collection of the rent of the property in dispute. This application was opposed by the defendant No. 1 inter alia on the grounds that the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit in view of the bar enacted by Section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 (for short, the Act) and for the same reason the Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order on any application for grant of temporary injunction and/or appointment of receiver.

( 3 ) THE trial Court by the impugned order directed stay of the suit holding that the suit is for and on behalf of a public trust. Accordingly Section 32 of the Act precludes hearing and decision of the suit as also stay of hearing of the application for grant of temporary injunction and/or appointment of receiver. The present revision is directed against that part of the order, which concerns itself with stay of hearing of the application for grant of the aforesaid interim reliefs.

( 4 ) IN this revision it was contended by Shri Harbans Singh Oberai, learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicants that the impugned order manifests a clear case of illegal exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court that Section 32 of the Act does not put a bar to hearing of applications for interim reliefs, as claimed by the applicants that Section 32 only bars hearing or decision of the suit and cannot be construed to bar consideration of an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 and/or under Order 40, Rule I, C. P. C.

( 5 ) SHRI Section Rule Joshi, learned counsel for the defendants non-applicant No. 1 argued in support of the impugned order. None appeared for non-applicants 2 to 5.

( 6 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that this revision deserves to be allowed. ( 7 ) SECTION 32 (1) of the Act, which is relevant to the situation, reads as under: "s. 32. Bar to hear or decide suits:-- No rait to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act, shall be heard and decided in any Court" The Legislative prohibition so enacted in Section 32 (1) appears to be restricted in its operation, inasmuch as what is barred by the afore-| said provision is hearing or decision of the suit Accordingly the prohibition so enacted cannot be construed as to preclude Courts from entertaining and adjudicating upon applications for interim reliefs. In order to hold so, further restriction will have to be imported in the Section to the effect that the Courts will be precluded even from proceeding to grant interim reliefs when a stay is ordered under the Section. The provisions placed in Section 32 appear to enact with regard to stay matter a statute in pari materia with Section 10, C. P. C. Section 10 omitting its Explanation, which is not relevant for the present purposes, reads as under: "section 10. Stay of suit.-- No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim