( 1 ) THE plaintiff, Rahando-inal, filed a suit for eviction of the defendant, Asif Ali, from the suit accommodation on the ground specified in Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 of the MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). The trial Court dismissed the suit. On an appeal having been filed by the plaintiff, the first appellate Court allowed the same and decreed the suit. It is being aggrieved by it that the defendant has filed the present appeal in this Court.

( 2 ) IT was found by the first appellate Court that the suit accommodation which had been let by the plaintiff to the defendant for a non; residential purpose was required bona fide by the plaintiff for starting his business. It was also found by the first appellate Court that the plaintiff had no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the town concerned. The said two findings of the first appellate Court are findings of fact and do not suffer from any error of law. In the circumstances, the question of this Court interfering with the said findings in the present second appeal does not arise.

( 3 ) HOWEVER, there is one particular aspect of the case which raises an important question of law. The plaintiff had obtained lease of a plot of land from the Municipal Council a few years prior to the institution of the suit. He had built a Tapra (wooden shed) over the said plot of land. It was in respect of the said Tapra that he obtained the abovesaid decree for eviction of the defendant from the first appellate Court on the ground specified in Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 of the Act as mentioned above.

( 4 ) NOW, Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 of the Act reads as follows :"12 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: *** *** (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major son or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. "

( 5 ) IT is argued by the learned counsel for the defendant that the words "if he is the owner thereof occurring in Cl. (f) of S. 12 (1) of the Act are of great significance. According to the learned counsel, for claiming eviction of a tenant under the said Clause, it is not sufficient for a person to be a 'landlord' - it is further necessary that he must also be the owner of the accommodation. It is argued by the learned counsel that it is clear from the manner in which the word 'owner' has been used in the abovesaid Clause that it is synonymous with 'absolute owner' i. e. it means a person who has the paramount title to the accommodation. It is contended by him that though it is true that in spite of his being a 'tenant' in relation to the Municipal Council the plaintiff was a landlord' in relation to the defendant, who was his subtenant, he was not entitled to evict the defendant under the abovesaid Clause for the reason that he was not the 'owner' of the plot of land on , which the accommodation stood.

( 6 ) IN the opinion of this Court, there are quite a few good reasons to think that the word 'owner' as used in Cls. (e) and (f) of S 12 (1) of the Act does not postulate 'absoluteownership' in the sense that he has an absolutely 'unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes. It is to be borne in mind that the Act was enacted to provide for the regulation and control of letting and rent of accommodation and the eviction of the tenants therefrom. In the context of the said objects of the Act, it is reasonab