( 1 ) THEY are heard on an application under section 482, Cr. P. C. for return of the motor-cycle seized.

( 2 ) CASE-DIARY produced and perused.

( 3 ) THE Narcotics Inspector is also present in person.

( 4 ) HE is also heard.

( 5 ) BY this application the petitioner prays for release of his motor-cycle, bearing registration No. MPU-4738, of which he is the registered owner.

( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY the motor-cycle in question was ordered to be released in favour of the applicant by the trial court, but when the applicant after fulfilling the terms imposed by the trial court was taking it out, it was seized by the Narcotics Inspector. Although the Narcotics Inspected present denied having any knowledge about the release order by the learned Magistrate, but this denial does not help him. The manner in which the above named Inspector effected the seizure of the motorcycle is indicative of the lade of regard for the judicial orders passed by the trial court. This tendency on the part of the, officers, who are supposed to be custodians of law, needs to be curbed but also condemned. If an order passed by the competent court is not acceptable, it does not behave any public servant to defy the order instead of taking legal steps for getting it altered or modified or corrected. What happened in this case is that after having seized the motorcycle in question, the same was produced in another court in connection with another offence. It does not appear from the record that the Inspector concerned had in fact brought to the notice of the court that it was ordered to be released by the learned Magistrate and it was in defence of the said order, while the vehicle was being actually taken out by the applicant that it was seized.

( 7 ) THE applicant moved the court of Addi. Sessions Judge for release of the motorcycle, but his prayer was refused on two grounds: (i) that it was liable to be confiscated as it was seized in connection with an offence punishable under section 8/18 of the Psychotropic Drugs Act and (ii) that the motor cycle was not seized from the possession of the registered owner, the applicant. As such, although the applicant is a registered owner, he was not entitled to interim custody of the vehicle. Both these grounds do not justify the order passed by the Addi. Sessions Judge. Merely because a property is liable to be confiscated, it should not be released during pendency of trial, is not a justifiable ground for refusing the interim custody of a vehicle seized. Needless to add that a vehicle is meant for user and the owner should not be deprived of such user. It is also equally true that for want of user the vehicle is likely to rot and rust. If a vehicle has been seized as an article of evidence and is liable to be confiscated, while passing an order on the question of interim custody, the primary consideration which should weigh with the court is whether when called upon the vehicle would be produced for the purposes of evidence and if in the event of a confiscation order, the same would be available for confiscation There are numerous laws providing for confiscation of vehicles. It does not necessarily mean that vehicles must always be confiscated and there can be no order for interim custody nor does it mean that no order as regards its interim custody can be passed, Unless there are grounds to believe that the seized vehicle is not going to be produced when required for purposes of evidence, after affording reasonable opportunity to the person to whom the interim custody of any vehicle is given. The impugned order is silent on this aspect of the matter. The learned Judge has nowhere indicated that in case the interim custody of the vehicle is given to the registered owner, the same would not be produced when required. No such apprehension, much less reasonable ground is borne out from the impugned order. Making of sweeping generalisation to the effect that the property being liable to confiscation, it is not