The detaining authority must consider the possibility of prosecuting the detenu under the ordinary criminal law before passing a detention order under the National Security Act, 1980. The grounds for detention must be specific and must disclose sufficient material to show that the detenu is a person who has been habitually indulging in activities prejudicial to public order. Activities which impinge on law and order are not necessarily related to public order.

( 1 ) UNDER an order passed on 9-9-1983 under S. 3 (3) of the National Security Act, 1980, for short, the 'act', by the District Magistrate. Gwalior, the petitioner came to be detained with the object of preventing him from indulging in activities prejudicial to public order. It appears from Annexure-R/3 that he was taken into custody on 11-9-1987 and has since suffered detention under the Act after he was heard by the Advisory Board and his detention was confirmed for a period of twelve months as per orders Annexures R/8 and R/9.

( 2 ) THOUGH counsel has pressed several contentions to contest the validity of the detention order as also the continued detention of the petitioner in violation of constitutional and statutory injunction, we propose to deal only with such of his contentions as we have found substantial and unanswerable. Our attention is drawn by Shri Madhukar Rao, appearing for the petitioner as State Defence, appointed by us, to the "grounds" Annexure-R/4 (A) in pressing the threefold contention with sufficient force, conviction and merit. Indeed, all the three "grounds" providing basis for the detention order speak of incidents which occurred on the same date, namely, 25-8-1987, at 4. 30 p. m. , 8. 30 p. m. and 9. 00 p. m. respectively. While the last two incidents occurred in Sewanagar locality of Gwalior, the first incident is said to have taken place in Ramtapura locality of the town.

( 3 ) LAW of preventive detention, counsel submits, invests jurisdiction in the Central government, the State Government as also the delegate of the State Government to pass an order of detention against any person preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial, among other, to maintenance of public order, on being genuinely satisfied that unless that person was so detained, there was likelihood of public order being disturbed. Therefore, when his detention is questioned, Detaining Authority would be required to satisfy the Court that it had passed the impugned order on being genuinely satisfied about the necessity of the person concerned being detained on materials available regarding only past life and conduct of the detenu on which a reasonable man is able to take the reasonable view that the person concerned was man of desperate character and was in the habit of indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because that past activities of such person could very well form "grounds" for his detention to prevent him from continuing the same activities. We do not think if there can be any dispute about that proposition because courts have held from time to time, indeed, at the highest level even, that detention made on a vague stale or irrelevant ground is not to be tolerated as Detaining Authority would otherwise have unlimited power and jurisdiction to deprive a person of his personal liberty in violation of the constitutional injunction of Art. 21. 3a. Not very long ago, their Lordships of the Apex Court reiterated the law in Wasi Uddin Ahmed's, AIR 1981 SC 2166 that the prejudicial conduct or antecedent history of the detenu should be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary. One of us Dr. T. N. Singh took the view in R. Lallawama, 1984 Cri LJ 101(Gauhati) that whether the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to detain any person under the Act is "real" (or genuine) is to be ascertained from the manner of treatment by the authority of the materials ("objectives" and "grounds") before him when he passed the order of detention. It has to be seen if he has formed his opinion with the due care and caution and not in a caveliar manner. In Joynath Sharma, 1984 0 Crlj 92, speaking for the Court, it was observed by one of us (Dr. T. N. Singh) that though the Court cannot substitute its own satisfaction for that of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, when the order is challenged