K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) THIS order shall dispose of the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act') filed by the applicants.

( 2 ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the application are these. The Non-applicants instituted Civil Suit No. 3-A/82 against the applicants and one Nandibai (since deceased) for separate possession of property and mesne profits and in the alternative for partition, possession and mesne profits. The learned Ist Additional Judge to the District Judge, Ratlam, Camp Jaora, in the said suit, passed a preliminary decree dt. 21-3-86 for partition.

( 3 ) THE applicants on 19-6-86, after excluding time as provided under S. 12 of the Act, within 70 days of the decree, filed an application under O. 44, R. 1, C. P. C. accompanied by the memorandum of appeal for permission to appeal against the decree as indigent persons. The office note is to the effect that the proposed appeal is barred by 9 days as the period prescribed for an application for leave to appeal as indigent person is 60 days as provided by Art. 130 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE applicants have later on 19-2-88 filed an application under S. 5 of the Act for. condonation of delay stating that acting under the advice of their counsel in the trial Court, they preferred the appeal within 90 days as provided by Art. 116 of the Act and in the circumstances the delay deserves to be condoned.

( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicants is that advice by a counsel which is contrary to the express provision of law cannot be urged as constituting sufficient cause for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Act.

( 6 ) THE point for consideration is whether the application under S. 5 of the Act deserves to be allowed.

( 7 ) SECTION 5 of the Act together with its explanation is in these terms : -"any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. "it may be noted that the provision makes no reference to any suit.

( 8 ) UNDER the provision extracted above the question essentially is one of satisfaction of the Court that the applicants had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. As pointed out in the decision in State of W. B. v. Hawrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal interpretation so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.

( 9 ) THE Legislature has left undefined the expression 'sufficient cause' so that the court is free to determine the sufficiency of the cause in the context of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It may be noted that there is a difference between the two expressions 'good cause' and 'sufficient cause. '

( 10 ) IT is true that a party is entitled to wait till the last date of limitation for filing appeal but when limitation expires, he has to establish sufficient cause as required by S. 5 of the Act for not filing it before the limitation expired. That cause is certainly something mere than that sufficient according to the express provisions of the Act for if any case fell within the express provisions it would be covered by them as in the case of suits and there would be no scope for the application of the section. Delay which could be avoided by due care and attention cannot constitute sufficient cause.

( 11 ) WHEN the prescribed time lapses, a very valuable right accrues in favour of the successful party and

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