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1989 Supreme(MP) 262

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
K. L. SHRIVASTAVA
JAIN TRANSPORT CO. - Appellant
Versus
SAKINABAI - Respondents
C. R. 128 Of 1987
Decided On : 08/22/1989

Advocates Appeared:
K.S.SHARMA, S.P.Sastri

The presumption of bona fide requirement under Section 23-D(3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, is limited to the bona fide nature of the requirement and does not extend to the other ingredients involved in the ground for grant of relief of eviction.

Headnote:

EVICTION - M. P. ACCOMMODATION CONTROL ACT, 1961 - SECTION 23-D(3) - PRESUMPTION OF BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT - BURDEN OF PROOF - SHIFTING OF ONUS - INTERPRETATION.

Fact of the Case:

In an eviction proceeding under Section 23-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the Rent Controlling Authority directed the tenant to lead evidence first, relying on the presumption of bona fide requirement under Section 23-D(3) of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the presumption under Section 23-D(3) of the Act is limited to the bona fide nature of the requirement and does not extend to the other ingredients involved in the ground for grant of relief of eviction. The court further held that the landlord is entitled to a finding on the point of bona fide requirement in his favor in the event there is no evidence on the point or the evidence thereon is conflicting or is evenly balanced.

Issues: 1. Whether the presumption under Section 23-D(3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, relieves the landlord of the burden of proving all the ingredients for eviction, except the bona fide nature of the requirement? 2. Whether the burden of proof shifts to the tenant to rebut the presumption of bona fide requirement under Section 23-D(3) of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The presumption under Section 23-D(3) of the Act is only partial and is confined to the bona fide nature of requirement and does not extend to the other ingredients involved in the ground for grant of relief of eviction. 2. The law does not by the presumption aforesaid seek to relieve the landlords of the special category of the burden of proving by adducing evidence the ingredients except that of bona fide nature of the requirement and there is no question of shifting of onus in respect thereof merely on the pleadings as distinct from proof.

Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition, set aside the impugned order, and directed the Rent Controlling Authority to require the landlord to adduce evidence first, keeping in view the observations made in the judgment.

K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision petition by the tenant is directed against the order dated 24-3-1987 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Ujjain (for short 'the Authority') whereby in proceedings under Section 23-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') it has been directed that the burden of proof being on him, he has to lead evidence first.

( 2 ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to this revision petition are these. The non-applicant filed an application under S. 23-A of the Act against the petitioner for the latter's eviction. During inquiry, when one of the witnesses for the non-applicant had already been examined it was contended on behalf of the non-applicant that in view of the presumption under Section 23-D (3) of the Act the burden of proof being on the petitioner it should be required to produce its evidence first. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that the N. A. must first complete her evidence. The learned Authority, in the light of the presumption under Section 23-D (3) of the Act, passed the impugned order.

( 3 ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be allowed.

( 4 ) CHAPTER III-A containing Ss. 23-A to 23-F was inserted in the Act of 1961 by Act No. 27 of 83 and in place of civil court special forum of the Rent Controlling Authority was created for speedy remedy of eviction to the landlords on the ground of bona fide requirement of the tenanted accommodation. As the landlords misused the provision later by Act No. 7 of 85 Section 23-J, containing the restrictive definition of the term 'landlord' for the purpose of the said chapter was inserted and the benefit of the forum was restricted to the handicapped landlords included in the definition and Section 23-D (3) was also consequently amended making the presumption thereunder available only to the said special category of landlords.

( 5 ) THE crucial question involved in this case pertains to the import of the provision in Section 23-D (3) of the Act embodying the rebuttable presumption of law in favour of the landlord. ( 6 ) THE provision referred to above is in these terms :-"in respect of an application by a landlord it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to clause (a) or clause (b) as the case may be, of Section 23-A is bona fide. "it may be pointed out that the term 'proved' is defined in' Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Evidence Act' ). Reference at this very stage may also be made to the definition of the expression 'shall presume' as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act in which the term disposed has been used.

( 7 ) IT has to be conceded that the Authority can have jurisdiction to order tenant's eviction only on the fulfilment of the requirements of the Act under which it has been created. The Landlord, before he is entitled to the relief of eviction under either of the clauses of Section 23-A of the Act, has to plead that he is within the ambit of the restrictive definition of landlord as embodied in Section 23-J of the Act and that the accommodation is required in the circumstances contemplated under the relevant provision and further that the requirement is bona fide. It may be stated here that even in respect of the eviction order contemplated under Section 23-C of the Act in any of the three contingencies at the very initial stage of leave to contest the application, based not on any oral evidence but on the statutory fiction of admission of the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction, the Authority must ensure that the legal requirements for eviction are satisfied. Reference in this connection may usefully be made to the observation in paragraph 18 of the Division Bench decision in B. Johnson's case 1985 MPLJ 675 : 1985 Jab LJ 793 ).

( 8 ) AT this stage it is pertinent to advert to Rule 16 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Rules, 1966. It reads thus :- "cod
















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