A retired government servant can invoke the special provisions of Chapter III-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement, even if he has taken up a stray employment after retirement.

( 1 ) THIS revision under Section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, as amended (for short, the 'act') has been preferred by the landlord-petitioner against an order dated 2-4-1986, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, (for short 'rent Controller') in Case No. 56/ 8485 / 90-7.

( 2 ) BRIEF facts leading to this revision are the petitioner is a retired Government servant, who retired on 31-5-1980 from the post of U. D. C. in the office of Joint Director, Veterinary Departent, Gwalior. The petitioner filed an application on 21-11-1984 under Section 23-A (b) of the Act before the Rent Controller invoking special provision for eviction of the respondent from the suitshop, averring that the respondent is his tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/- in the suit-shop; the suit-shop was let out by the petitioner to the respondent as owner initially in the year 1971; the petitioner filed a regular Civil Suit No. 13-A/ 1976 for eviction of the respondent on the ground under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act in the Court of Third Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior, wherein a compromise was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent. In that compromise dated 10-8-1978 the respondent accepted the petitioner as landlord owner and agreed to enhance the rent of the suit-shop from Rs. 50/- to Rs. 75/- per month on the condition that in the suit shop necessary repairs costing about Rs. 2,000/- would be carried out by the petitioner. The petitioner claimed eviction on the ground of "bona fide" requirement for starting his own business of general merchant and for that, petitioner alleged, he had got sufficient funds and there is no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city of Gwalior. The petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller by virtue of the amendment in the M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 27 of 1983), whereby special provisions in Chapter III-A in relation to eviction of tenants on ground of (bona fide) requirement were inserted, which came into force from 16-8-83. During the pendency of this application before the Rent Controller, the principal Act was further amended by M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act No. 7 of 1985), which came into force from 26-4-1985, whereby besides other provisions, Section 23-J was also inserted, which defines 'landlord' for the purposes of Chapter III-A of the Act, wherein five categories of landlords have been specified, one of them is a retired servant of any Government, who can invoke the special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of "bona fide" requirement under Chapter IIIA. It is not disputed that the petitioner being a retired Government servant fell within the definition of "landlord" under Section 23-J (i) of the Act. When the Act was amended by Act No. 7 of 1985 the Rent Controller transferred the application to the Civil Court for deciding the same. The District Judge, Gwalior, vide his Endt. No. 1842 dated 6-7-1985 returned the application that as the application has been filed by a retired Government servant, the Rent Controller does not lose his jurisdiction and the application for eviction will have to be decided by the Rent Controller. The parties also did not dispute either before the Rent Controller or before this Court that the petitioner being a retired Government servant, the Rent Controller has not lost the jurisdiction to try the application despite subsequent amendment in the Act by Act No. 7 of 1985, which restricted the benefit of Section 23-A of the Act to specified landlords.

( 3 ) AFTER return of the application by the District Judge to the Rent Controller, the respondent was granted on 18-10-1985 leave to defend under Section 23-C of the Act the application for eviction under Section 23a (b) of the Act. The respondent, thereafter, filed his written statement and contended therein that the petitioner is not the only