The main legal point established in the judgment is that serious irregularities and faults committed by the investigating agency and trial court can render a conviction unsustainable.

( 1 ) THE appellant Raju alias Rajendra Prasad has preferred this appeal against the conviction and sentence passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Agar in S. T. No. 60/92 convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC, R. I. for 4 years with fine of Rs. 100/- in default S. I. for 15 days.

( 2 ) THE Police of Police Station, Agar Distt. Shajapur filed a charge-sheet against the appellant and one another co-accused Shri Ram (who expired during the course of trial) for offences under Sections 498-A, 506, 306 and 304-B of I. P. C.

( 3 ) THE prosecution case in short was that deceased Manjula Bai was married before six to seven months from the date of incident i. e. 19-7-90 at 4. 00 p. m. After marriage, she was ill-treated by appellant oftenly, after consuming liquor without any reason. The appellant also used to beat her. On 19-7-90 she was beaten by the appellant and also instigated her for commission of suicide.

( 4 ) THE deceased was taken to the Hospital where her report Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13 was recorded by Investigating Officer and Naib Tehsildar PW/9 respectively. The deceased was initially medically examined by PW/2 Dr. G. L. Gupta. Her Medical report is Ex. P/2 and after death autopsy was performed by PW/10 Dr. S. D. Garg. Deceased suffered 99% burn injury.

( 5 ) IT is also alleged by the prosecution that first wife of appellant named Krishna Bai had also committed suicide for which Crime No. 223/89 was registered against the appellant. The deceased Manjulabai was the second wife of appellant.

( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant submitted that Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13 could not have been relied upon by the trial Court because there is no evidence on record to establish that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give statement. According to the learned counsel for the appellant there are material contradictions between the contents of both these documents and dying declaration Ex. P/13 recorded by Naib Tehsildar PW/9 has not proved the contents of dying declaration because of this infirmity, contents of dying declaration Ex. P/13 could not have been relied upon. It has also been argued on behalf of appellant that independent witnesses PW/1 Chunnilal, PW/3 Durga Prasad father of deceased PW/4 Govind Kumar brother of deceased and PW/5 Arun Mathur Advocate have not supported the prosecution case, hence without corroboration by independent material particulars to the dying declaration, same should not have been relied upon by learned trial Court. In opposition, learned panel lawyer has contended that the deceased herself has lodged the report vide Ex. P/7 in the Hospital duly recorded by PW/7 S. K. Shukla, Town Inspector in presence of Block Medical Officer who has given certificate about burn condition of both the fingers and thumb because of which signature or thumb impression of deceased could not have been taken. It has also been contended that Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 could be considered as dying declaration after the death of its lodger. Dying declaration P/13 and Dehati Nalishi P/7 are on the same line. Both have been duly corroborated by the medical evidence and other substantial evidence. In view of positive clinching evidence, appellant has no way to escape from conviction.

( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties and after careful perusal of entire record and minute visualisation of evidence oral and documentary, this Court is of the opinion that because of serious illegality, irregularity, fault and lapse committed by investigating agency, non-discharge of onerous duty by the A. G. P. Shri Yadavrao Dhadge and improper and careless conduction of trial by trial Court, this Court has left with no option but to acquit the appellant.

( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY deceased Manjulabai was married with the appellant before 6 to 7 months from the date of incident. She was the second wife of the appellant.