The concept of inherent lack of jurisdiction and nullity of a decree was clarified by the court.

( 1 ) THE question of law being common in both the cases they were heard analogously and disposed of by this singular order. For the sake of clarity and convenience the facts stated in W. P. No. 452 of 2005 are adumbrated herein.

( 2 ) THE petitioner is the owner of bus bearing registration No. MPA 6529. The said vehicle, as pleaded, was insured with oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. , respondent no. 3, met with an accident on 19. 1. 1986 as a consequence of which two persons were injured who succumbed to the same. Petitioner on 26. 1. 1986 intimated about the accident to the Branch Manager of the insurance company.

( 3 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioner the legal representatives of the deceased filed an application under section 166 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') after expiry of the period of limitation as provided under section 166 (3) of the Act. Motor Accidents claims Tribunal (in short 'the Tribunal')proceeded ex parte against the petitioner and passed an award on 22. 2. 2000.

( 4 ) AFTER the award was passed execution proceeding was initiated for realisation of the same. On 18. 6. 2004 the petitioner submitted an application raising an objection that the claim petition had not been filed within the period of limitation and, therefore, the award was a nullity. It was also urged that the award was a nullity because of deletion of necessary party, namely, the insurance company which has the obligation to indemnify the insured. It was also asserted that though the owner was set ex parte he was entitled to be noticed after the death of the original claimant when an application was filed for substitution of legal representatives. In this backdrop a prayer was made before Tribunal to declare the award as a nullity. After calling of a reply from the claimants and upon hearing the counsel for the parties, Tribunal passed the impugned order on 7. 12. 2004 rejecting the objection and declined to declare the award and the recovery proceedings as null and void.

( 5 ) I have heard Mr. Sudhir Rawat, the learned counsel for petitioner. It is submitted by him that the Tribunal has absolutely erred in law by rejecting the objection in the execution case, though the award which was sought to be executed could not have been executed being passed ignoring the peremptory period of limitation; there was impleadment of legal representatives in an illegal manner; and further there was deletion of a necessary party, the insurer.

( 6 ) IN this context I may refer with profit to paras 8 and 9 of the decision rendered in the case of Budhia Swain v. Copinath deb, AIR 1999 SC 2089. They read as under:" (8) In our opinion, a Tribunal or a court may recall an order earlier made by it if: (i) the proceedings culminating into an order suffer from the inherent lack of jurisdiction and such lack of jurisdiction is patent; (ii) there exists fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment; (iii) there has been a mistake of the court prejudicing a party or; (iv) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for reopening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available to be pleaded in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppel or acquiescence. (9) A distinction has to be drawn between lack of jurisdiction. The former strikes at the very root of the exercise and want of jurisdiction may vitiate the proceedings rendering them and the orders passed therein a nullity. A mere error in exercise of jurisdiction does not vitiate the legality and validity of the proceedings and the order passed thereon unless set aside in the manner known to law by laying a challe