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2006 Supreme(MP) 615

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
W. A. SHAH, J.
KAMAL B.CHAUHAN - Appellant
Versus
MOHAMMAD JAMIL - Respondents
Civil Revn 66 Of 2006
Decided On : 05/03/2006

Advocates Appeared:
G.M.CHAPHEKAR, S.K.Pawnekar, S.M.Dagaonkar

The main legal point established in the judgment is that the execution application should be moved within 12 years from enforceability, and the doctrine of merger does not apply when the appeal concerns a collateral proceeding and not the original decree itself.

Headnote:

Limitation - Civil Procedure - Code of Civil Procedure - Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Order IX Rule 13 of the Code - Doctrine of Merger - [38-A/82, Civil Execution Case No. 38-A/82x2000] - [Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, Order IX Rule 13 of the Code]

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners filed a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, aggrieved by the rejection of their application to challenge the execution application as barred by limitation. The deceased Mohammad Jamil had filed a Civil Suit No. 38-A/82 against deceased Bherulal for ejectment and possession of a disputed house in 1982. The suit was decreed ex parte on 27-7-1982. An application for execution of the decree was filed on 22-6-2000. The defendants/judgment-debtors filed an appeal against the dismissal of their application to set aside the decree, which was decided on 14-8-2001. The petitioners filed objections to the execution on 4-9-2003, claiming it was time-barred.

Finding of the Court:

The learned Execution Court concluded that the execution application was not barred by limitation, but the High Court allowed the revision, quashing the impugned order and holding the execution application to be barred by time.

Issues: The main issue was whether the execution application was barred by limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the doctrine of merger.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the execution application should be moved within 12 years from enforceability, not from executionability, and that the doctrine of merger did not apply in this case as the appeal concerned a collateral proceeding and not the ex parte decree itself.

Final Decision: The revision was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and the execution application was held to be barred by time and ordered to be dismissed.

( 1 ) THE petitioners have filed this revision under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure ("code" hereafter) as they are aggrieved by the order dated 7-3-2006 passed by learned XIIth Civil Judge, Class-I, indore, in Civil Execution Case No. 38-A/82x2000, whereby the application of the petitioners to challenge the execution application as barred by limitation has been rejected. The present petition arises out of the following facts :-

( 2 ) THE deceased Mohammad Jamil had filed a Civil Suit No. 38-A/82 against deceased bherulal for ejectment and possession of the disputed house in 1982. In the said suit deceased Bherulal was proceeded ex parte and the suit was decreed ex parte on 27-7-1982. An application for execution of the said decree was filed on 22-6-2000. Meanwhile on behalf of the deceased /defendant misc. Judicial Case No. 21/84 for setting aside the said decree under Order ix Rule 13 of the Code was filed on 14-12-1984 and the same was dismissed on 25-11-1989. Against the said dismissal, the defendants/judgment-debtors filed appeal. That appeal was registered as Misc. Appeal no. 10/89 and the same was re-registered later at No. 1/01 and was decided on 14-8-2001 on the ground that it was preferred beyond period of limitation i. e. 30 days from the date of the order dated 25-11-1989. The petitioners filed objections to the execution on 4-9-2003. They raised several objections. They also submitted that there was no stay of execution of the decree dated 27-7-1982, hence the execution application was time barred. They had also submitted that the disputed land has been acquired by Indore vikas Pradhikaran for Scheme No. 38 and the decree holders have no right to take possession from the petitioners. The learned Execution Court rejected the same on 20-2-2004 and found that the application for execution was filed within limitation as according to the learned Executing Court the exparte decree under reference became final only on 14-8-2001 the date on which the appeal against the order rejecting the application to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed. The petitioners, therefore, filed a Revision Petition No. 96 of 2004 before this Court. This Court vide order dated 13-10-2005 directed the learned Execution court to inside the matter afresh after going through the records and on consideration of relevant provisions of law and keeping in view the decisions of the apex Court vide AIR 2001 SC 3404. The learned Execution Court heard the matter and vide order dated 7-3-2006 reached the conclusion that the execution application was not barred by limitation. Hence the present revision.

( 3 ) LEARNED senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the circumstances of the case the learned Execution court was in error when it reached the conclusion that the execution application was within limitation. In support of his contention he relied upon (2001) 7 SCC 573 : (AIR 2001 SC 3404) Hameed Joharan (Dead) and others v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by L. Rs. and others, and AIR 2005 SC 2564 Dr. Chiranji lal (D) by L. Rs. v. Hari (D) by L. Rs. In his counter arguments, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the face of doctrine of merger the order under attack does not suffer any illegality. In support of his argument, he relied upon (2004) 8 SCC 724 (Chandi Prasad and others v. Jagdish prasad and others ).

( 4 ) IT is appropriate to refer to Hameed joharan (AIR 2001 SC 3404) (supra) first at this stage, therein it is held that Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that limitation period for execution of decree begins to run from the date of decree which is the date when rights stand crystallized and decree becomes enforceable. The same view has been reiterated by a Larger Bench in dr. Chiranji Lal (AIR 2005 SC 2564) (supra ).

( 5 ) NOW I proceed to mention what Chandi prasad and others (supra) lays down, therein it is stated that the doctrine of merger postulates





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