The main legal point established is that cross-objection is maintainable in an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the appellate court has the power to enhance compensation even in the absence of cross-objection, in the interest of justice, equity, and conscience.

( 1 ) THESE appeals are filed by the insurance company against the common order passed by the learned single judge in Misc. Appeal No. 138 of 1996 and misc. Appeal No. 139 of 1996.

( 2 ) APPELLANT insurance company has filed appeals against the award passed by ii Additional Motor Accidents Claims tribunal, Gwalior, challenging therein that the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation as the driver of the vehicle did not possess driving licence. Cross-objection under Order 41, rule 22, Code of civil Procedure was filed by the claimants. The learned single Judge dismissed the appeal, but allowed the cross-objection and enhanced the quantum of compensation. Yearly income of the deceased was assessed at Rs. 6,000 and after deducting '/3rd amount, dependency was assessed at rs. 4,000 per year and applying the multiplier of 16 compensation was enhanced to rs. 64,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.

( 3 ) ONLY contention raised by the counsel for the appellant that in an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')there is no scope for cross-objection under order 41, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' ). In support of his contention, counsel for appellant has relied upon the judgment of single Bench of this court in the case of Vaidyanath Singh v. Gulabkali, 1997 ACJ 428 (MP ). In this case, it is held that the provisions of Order 41, rule 22 of the Code have not been made applicable to the Act, therefore, cross-objection is not tenable. He further referred to the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of united India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajammal, 1993 ACJ 486 (Madras ). In that case, it has been considered that the appeal filed by the insurance company was limited to the question of its liability and the insurance company in that appeal had neither questioned the finding regarding negligence nor the quantum of compensation. It was held that in such appeal, cross-objection by claimants for enhancement of compensation is not admissible.

( 4 ) COUNSEL for appellant then referred to the judgment in the case of United India insurance Co. Ltd. v. M. R. Subramanian, 1996 ACJ 1260 (Madras) and submitted that the insurance company has wrongly been held liable to pay compensation, since the driver of the vehicle did not possess valid licence, which is an admitted position. In such case, the courts below were not justified in holding that the insurance company is jointly and severally liable with the owner of the vehicle. In this judgment, judgment in the case of United India insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajammal, 1993 ACJ 486 (Madras), was followed wherein it is held that the cross-objection under Order 41, rule 22 of the Code is not maintainable.

( 5 ) COUNSEL for appellant then referred to the judgment in the case of Superintending Engineer v. B. Subba Ready, AIR 1999 sc 1747. In this case, the Apex Court held that in an appeal under section 39 of the arbitration Act, cross-objection by respondent is not maintainable. He submitted that if there is no right of cross-objection given under section 39 of the Arbitration act, it cannot be read into section 41 of the aforesaid Act. In this judgment, it is held that appeal is a substantive right. It is a creation of the statute. Right to appeal does not exist unless it is specifically conferred. Regarding cross-objection, it is held that cross-objection is like an appeal. It has all the trappings of an appeal. It is filed in the form of memorandum and the provisions of rule 1 of Order 41 of the Code, so far as these relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, apply to the cross-objection as well. Cross-objection is nothing but an appeal, a cross-appeal at that. Filing of cross-objection is not procedural in nature. In this judgment, scope of sections 39 and 41 of the Arbitration act was considered and it was held that since section 39 does n