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1999 Supreme(MP) 395
High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
A. K. MATHUR, S. K. KULSHRESTHA
RAYMOND CEMENT WORKS, BILASPUR - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH - Respondents
L. P. A. 141 Of 1999
Decided On : 06/22/1999
B.L.NEMA, RAVINDRA SHRIVASTAVA, V.K.TANKHA
An interlocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, no L. P. A. is maintainable against such an order.
Headnote:
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL - INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - MAINTAINABILITY - ORDER PASSED BY SINGLE JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION - NOT A JUDGMENT - L. P. A. NOT MAINTAINABLE.
Fact of the Case:
Appellants filed L. P. A. against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge in pending writ petitions, directing the appellants to deposit 50% of the demanded amount and furnish a bank guarantee for the balance of 50%. The issue was whether these appeals against the interim order were maintainable.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the appeals were not maintainable as the order in question was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Court relied on the definition of 'judgment' in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the order did not decide the controversy finally and was, therefore, not appealable.
Issues: Whether the appeals against the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in pending writ petitions were maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that an L. P. A. will only lie in case where there is adjudication of the rights of parties or controversy involved in the matter. Such interlocutory orders do not decide the controversy finally.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed all the Letters Patent Appeals and vacated the interim order passed by the Court.
( 1 ) ALL these L. P. A's arise out of the common order and are being disposed of by this common order. Facts given in L. P. A. No. 119/99 have been taken into consideration for disposal of all these appeals. The learned Single Judge modified the interim order passed earlier and directed that during the period of six weeks from the date of the order, i. e. 6-4-99, all the petitioners shall deposit 50% of the demanded amount and shall furnish bank guarantee for the balance of 50%. The matter was posted to be listed for 25-6-99 for further hearing. Aggrieved against this interim order, the present L. P. A. has been filed by the appellants.
( 2 ) IT is not necessary to dilate on the detailed facts. Suffice it to say that certain mining demands were raised by State against the petitioners. Therefore, they filed writ petitions challenging that demand and prayed for stay. Initially whole demand was stayed by learned Single Judge. Thereafter the learned Single Judge modified the earlier stay order and directed payment of 50% of the amount by order dated 6-4-1999. These appeals arise out of this interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in pending writ petitions. The question before us is whether these appeals against interim order are maintainable or not.
( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties submitted that since the order in question will operate harshly against the appellants and will seriously prejudice their rights, therefore, the order dated 6-4-99 deserves to be quashed by this Court.
( 4 ) THE appeals have been filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent reads as under :"10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Courts -And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Nagpur from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence under the provisions of section one hundred and seven of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a Judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section one hundred eight of the Government of India Act made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgment of Judge of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs and Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided. "clause 10 clearly says that an appeal shall lie against the judgment of a learned Single Judge. The question is whether the present order is within the definition of 'judgment' or not. 'judgment' has been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure u/s. 2 (9) as under :"judgment" means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of decree or order. "'decree' has been defined in Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as under :" (2) 'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determina
