The right to continue a claim for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, survives to the legal representative of the deceased claimant under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (henceforth 'the Act of 1939'), arising out of the order dated 26,7. 89, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, in Claim Case No. 19 of 1988.

( 2 ) IT appears that one Jamuna Yadav died in a motor accident on 7. 1. 1988. Thereupon, his mother Piraniya filed an application under section 110-A of 'the act of 1939', claiming compensation for the death of Jamuna, from the owner and driver of the vehicle. The claim was valued at Rs. 65,000 (Rs. sixty-five thousand ).

( 3 ) IT appears that during the pendency of the claim case, Piraniya also died and, therefore, an application, purporting to be under Order 22, rule 3 of the Code of Civil procedure, was filed for substituting the name of Ram Sewak, son of Gangadeen chamar and Ghanshoo Chamar, son of gajji Chamar. So far as Ghanshoo Chamar was concerned, he is son of Piraniya and so far as Ram Sewak was concerned, he is nephew of Piraniya. No objection appears to have been raised regarding continuance of the claim case, filed by Piraniya, after her death, by Ram Sewak and Ghanshoo chamar. Despite this fact, the Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim petition filed by Piraniya, for the reason, it held that the aforesaid two persons Ram Sewak and ghanshoo Chamar could not continue the claim case filed by Piraniya. It was held that after the death of Piraniya, the claim abated.

( 4 ) IN this appeal against that order, it is being argued that at least Ghanshoo Chamar was entitled to continue the claim of piraniya after her death, as he represented her estate.

( 5 ) AS against this, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellants could not be said to be the persons dependent upon Jarnuna yadav and, therefore, the claim abated in toto.

( 6 ) IN the opinion of this court, this appeal deserves to be allowed on the short ground that the claim did not abate with the death of Piraniya. It is true that Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been made applicable by rule 240 of the motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 and, therefore, order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked for considering the case at hand. The common law principle shall govern the case of the appellants. It has been held that the common law principle was that as a general rule the death of either party would result in abatement of the suit based on tort affecting the plaintiff personally. It cannot be disputed that the claim based on the tort of negligence except the claim under section 92-A of 'the act of 1939' (Sic. abates ). The maxim that was applied to the cases of tort in common law of England is the well-known maxim, i. e. , actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal action dies with the person ). This common rule has been modified by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970 in England. So far as India is concerned, section 306 of the Indian succession Act lays down under the rule regarding the survival of the action after the death of a person. Section 306 of the indian Succession Act, 1925, is reproduced as under:"s. 306: Demands and rights of action of, or against deceased survive toand against executor or administrator. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. "it is clear from section 306 of the Indian succession Act, 1925 that so far as causes of action which are limited to defamation or assault or other injuries not causing death of the parties cannot be proceeded against the executor or the administrator. S