The main legal principle established in the judgment is that the jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court cannot be ousted by Tribunals not constituted under Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution.

( 1 ) THIS matter has been placed before this full Bench on a reference made by one of us (Honourable DIPAK MISRA, J.) on the following question framed by him :"whether the decision rendered in the cases of Neo Sacks Limited v. CEGAT, New delhi, 1999 (114) ELT 826 (MP) and Kedia distilleries Limited v. Sumit Usha Martin finance Limited and others, L. P. A. No. 332/1999, decided on January 11, 2000, lay down the correct law to the effect that the matters arising out of all the Tribunals are to be heard by a Division Bench of this Court ?"

( 2 ) THE petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is against the award made by the Industrial Court (Bench at Raipur), on a reference made by the State Government under Section 51 (1) of Madhya Pradesh industrial Relations Act, 1960, which was placed before a single Bench of this Court as per the roster prepared by Honourable the chief Justice. It appears that the learned counsel for the petitioner-management raised an objection to the effect that according to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Neo Sacks Limited v. CEGAT, New delhi, (supra) and in Kedia Distilleries Limited v. Sumit Usha Martin Finance Limited and others, L. P. A. No. 332/1999, decided on january 11, 2000 the matter cannot be heard by a single Judge. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and other counsel mentioned in the orders, amicus curiae, the learned single Judge referred the above question for constitution of a larger. Bench and that is how this matter comes before us.

( 3 ) FROM the facts indicated above, it is clear that the matter arose from an award passed by a Tribunal which was constituted under an enactment much prior to the 42nd amendment in the Constitution of India, whereby Articles 323-A and 323-B were added with effect from January 3, 1977. The industrial Court, which delivered the award, under challenge in this case, is a Tribunal constituted under Madhya Pradesh Industrial relations Act, 1960 It is obvious that it is a pre-existing Tribunal and was not constituted under Article 323-B of the Constitution by the state Legislature.

( 4 ) THE answer to the question framed, before us will depend upon if the view taken in the two cases-Neo Sacks Limited (supra) and kedia Distilleries Limited (supra) is correct in holding that all the Tribunals constituted under article 323-A or under Article 323-B of the constitution are subjected to jurisdiction of a division Bench of a High Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125 : 1997 (3) SCC 261 : 1995-II-LLJ-640.

( 5 ) WE have heard Sarvashri R. K. Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri A. G. Dhande, Advocate with Shri Sujoy Paul, counsel for the respondent No. I and Shri Ajay mishra, Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No. 3-State. We also requested Shri g. M. Chaphekar and Shri P. S. Nair, Senior counsel, who were present in the Court, amicus curiae, to address us on the question involved in this case. They kindly acceded to our request for which we are very grateful. All the counsel in this case, however, argued that the reference should be accepted.

( 6 ) THE precise question for determination is - If the Constitution Bench of the Supreme court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra)directed that the matters arising out of orders passed by all the Tribunals irrespective of the fact that they were constituted under Article 323-A or under Article 323-B of the constitution, should be heard by a Division bench, or the directions of their Lordships were confined only to orders of those Tribunals which were specifically constituted under article 323-A or under Article 323-B of the constitution. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the issues which were considered by the constitution Bench. Thus, it would be apt to quote the broad issues outlined in paragraph 1 of that order as fo