The court established the principle that the cause of action and the applicability of specific legal provisions, including the requirement of deposit for appeal, are crucial factors in determining territorial jurisdiction and the legal framework applicable to a case.

( 1 ) BEREFT of unnecessary details, facts which are necessary for the decision of the present writ petition are that respondent No. 1 Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) filed Civil Suit No. 6-A/95 in the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur, for recovery of an amount of Rs. 35,05,522/ -. After the constitution of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, suit filed by the respondent Bank was transferred to the former as provided under Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. By order dated 17-5-1999 the Debt Recovery Tribunal allowed the application filed by the Bank and held that the Bank is entitled to recover its dues from the petitioner along with interest. Aggrieved by the same, one of the petitioners namely petitioner No. 2 Sanjiv Kumar Jain preferred appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, impleading other petitioners as respondents in the appeal. Appeal preferred by petitioner No. 2 was registered as Appeal No. 54/99. Before the Debts Recovery Tribunal he filed application for waiver of the deposit as required under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the 'act'. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal by order dated 25-10-1999 (Annex. P/4) held that as per calculation submitted by the appellant himself, dues come to Rs. 43,00,000/- and odd and after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal directed the appellant to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- within 8 weeks failing which appeal shall not be entertained. As stated earlier, from the memo filed before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, it appears that appeal has been filed only by petitioner No. 2 but this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by all the defendants and their prayer is to quash the order dated 25th October, 1999 (Annexure P/4) of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal.

( 2 ) MR. Ravindra Shrivastava appears on behalf of the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 is represented by Mr. S. K. Mukherjee. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the petitioner raises a preliminary objection in regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to hear and adjudicate the writ petition. He submits that the order impugned in the present writ petition has been passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai and in that view of the matter, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to hear the writ petition. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, however, appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and in view of the clear language of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, this Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

( 3 ) HAVING appreciated the rival submissions, I find substance in the submission of Sri Shrivastava. It is not in controversy that petitioner No. 1 applied to the respondent Bank to grant the Cash Credit Limit for meeting the working capital requirement at Ashirwad Market, Jabalpur Branch of the respondent Bank. Respondent Bank filed the suit in the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur which lateron, transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur. It is against the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal dated 17-5-1995 passed at Jabalpur that petitioner No. 2 had preferred appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, whose order has been impugned in the present writ petition. From the facts stated above, it is evident that part of cause of action has arisen in the territory over which this Court exercises jurisdiction, hence, in view of plain language of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, this Court does not lack territorial jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the writ petition.

( 4 ) AS pointed out by Sri Shrivastava, the view which I have taken finds support from the Jud