The appellate authority has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal for default under Section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

( 1 ) IN this matter elaborate and strenuous arguments have been advanced arduously before us by petitioner's counsel Shri Tomar on the validity of the order (Annexure P-6) passed on 11- 1 -1990 by the appellate authority, respondent No. 3, assailing it to be an order passed without jurisdiction. Counsel submitted that the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order refusing to restore to file the appeal dismissed for default. Counsel contended that such a disposal was not contemplated in law, because the appellant had to be heard for exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. Admittedly, the appeal was dismissed for default on 2-9-1986, and for restoration the application was made on 26-5-1988, which was disposed of by the impugned order. The appeal had been preferred against an order passed on 28-6-1983 by Competent Authority (respondent No. 2) under Section 8 (4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, for short, the 'act', declaring as surplus 9996. 13 sq. metres of land and settling accordingly the final draft statement by disposing of the objection preferred by petitioner. ( 2 ) THE proposition canvassed by learned counsel we found wholly unacceptable despite counsel's reliance on Shivlal Thakershi v. The Competent Authority, AIR 1987 Gujarat 155 for that purpose. In our view, the law is clear and beyond any pale of controversy. The jurisdiction exercised in the impugned order, in appeal, under Section 33 of the Act has its source, origin and basis in the provision itself and its ambit is to be determined by the language used by the legislature. The provision is accordingly quoted (Para 9):"33. Appeal.- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under this Act, not being an order under Section 11 or an order under sub-section (1) of Section 30, may, within thirty days of the date on Which the order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed (hereinafter in this section referred to as the appellate authority); provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) On receipt of an appeal under subsection (1), the appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. (Emphasis added)

( 3 ) COUNSEL has endeavoured to impress us by drawing our attention to the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, which exercise we consider futile. We do not see any substance in the submission of learned counsel that we must read in the provision aforequoted the prohibition or inhibition thereunder contemplated and determine the scope of the appellate power contemplated under Section 33 in that context. It is true that to the appeals contemplated thereunder, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made expressly applicable but the nature of the right agitated in those appeals is entirely different. Against determination of compensation under Section 11 by Competent Authority payable for "the vacant land deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under Section 10 (3)", a first appeal lies under Section 12 (2) to the Tribunal constituted thereunder; and a second appeal to the High Court under Section 13. We have no doubt that appropriate measure taken for compensation for the expropriated interest is finale of the several proceedings taken for that purpose under the Act and, therefore, the scope of order passed by the Competent Authority under Section 11 or by the Tribunal under Section 12 in respect to the right of compensation is entirely of a different complexion and purport.

( 4 ) IT may be rewarding to have a bird's eye view of the legislative landscape under the guiding light of the elaborate preamble. It speaks of the Act's object "of p