The Court held that a lease is a contractual transaction between a lessor and lessee and that the terms of the lease must be proved by the agreement between the parties.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter the CPC for short) filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 26-7-86, passed by the First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Hoshangabad in Civil Appeal No. 53-A/81 arising out of judgment and decree dated 1-5-81, passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Sohagpur in Civil Suit No. 40-A/8o.

( 2 ) THE appellant filed a suit for declaration of his title and for permanent injunction restraining the respondent No. 1 from interfering with his possession or the land. It was also claimed that the order passed by the competent authority and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sohagpur in Revenue Case No. 735/a/90 B (3) 74-75 u/s. 11 of the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter the Act for short) be declared void. The appellant claimed that he was holding Khasra No. of 80,8. 87 acres of land situate in village Dhadhiyakishore, Tahsil Sohagpur, District Hoshangabad from respondent No. 3 Aman Singh on lease as a 'shikmi Kashtkar' from the year 1966-67. Therefore, he became an occupancy tenant of the suit land and thereafter under the provision of Section 190a of the M. P. L and Revenue Code (hereinafter the Code for short), 1959 a Bhumiswami prior to 1-1-71. He has also paid the compensation for the land in question to respondent No. 3 by executing a sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 3 and paying him compensation of Rs. 7,000/ -. The date of execution of the sale deed was 6-4-72. It was further alleged that the respondent No. 1 through competent authority under the Act started proceedings for declaration of land belonging to respondent No. 3 as surplus. The respondent No. 2 in Revenue Case No. 735/ A/90b (3) 74-75 declared the land in suit as surplus belonging to respondent No. 3 and a final order was passed. He further rejected the objection of the appellant u/s. 11 (4) of the Act. Thereupon the appellant brought this suit against the order dated 31-8-70 under Section 11 (5) of the Act after giving notice u/s. 80 of the C. P. C. The suit was filed on 29-11- 77 within three months of the date of order rejecting objection of the appellant u/s. 11 (4) of the Act.

( 3 ) THE respondent No. 3 admitted the case of the appellant. However, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 contested the case of the appellant denying the allegations made in the plaint. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 claimed that the real owner of the suit land was the respondent No. 3 and not the appellant. They claimed that the sale deed was executed for defeating the provisions of the Act. They also claimed that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in this matter as per Section 46 of the Act.

( 4 ) THE trial Court held that the appellant was the Bhumiswami of the land in dispute from before 1-1-71 and, therefore, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute. According to trial Court, land belonged to the appellant and not to the respondent No. 3. Therefore, Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the case. The trial Court did not consider it necessary to decide the point whether the sale deed dated 6-4-72 was made with a view to defeat the provisions of the Act because in its opinion the appellant had become Bhumiswami by the operation of law prior to 1-1-71. The finding of the trial Court was that the respondent No. 3 had given the appellant suit land on lease from 1966-67. Since that lease was contrary to Section 168 of the Code, the appellant acquired status of occupancy tenant and by virtue of Section 190a of the Code became a Bhumiswami. Therefore, the trial Court granted a decree in favour of the appellant to the effect that appellant had entitled to Khasra No. 80, area 8. 87 acres, situate in village Dhadhiyakishore and it also passed a decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the possession of the appellant.

( 5 ) IN coming to the conclusion as it did, the trial Court found that the