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1996 Supreme(MP) 1

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
SHACHEENDRA DWIVEDI
RAMABAI - Appellant
Versus
HARBILAS - Respondents
C. S. A. 16 Of 1994
Decided On : 01/02/1996

Advocates Appeared:
K.N.Gupta, M.M.Kaushik

A court to which a case is remanded must comply with the order of remand and cannot consider matters other than those specified in the remand order.

Headnote:

AMENDMENT OF PLAINT - ORDER OF REMAND - BYE-PASSING DIRECTIONS - ILLEGALITY - RESTORATION OF POSSESSION - SUIT DECREED ON SAME EVIDENCE - APPEAL ALLOWED.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for restoration of possession of two rooms and mesne profits, alleging purchase from defendant's father. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiff was allowed to amend the plaint to implead one Panat as a defendant. After amendment, the case was remanded to the trial court for fresh proceedings. Before the trial court could proceed, the plaintiff again amended the plaint to drop Panat as a defendant, bringing the suit back to its original position. The trial court then decreed the suit on the same evidence.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to amend the plaint after the remand order, and in decreeing the suit on the same evidence on which it was earlier dismissed. The appellate court also erred in confirming the trial court's judgment and decree.

Issues: Whether the trial court could bypass the directions of the remand order and decree the suit on the same evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: The trial court had limited jurisdiction under the remand order and could only decide the suit in view of the directions issued by the appellate court. The trial court acted contrary to the remand order by allowing the plaintiff to amend the plaint and by decreeing the suit on the same evidence on which it was earlier dismissed. The appellate court also erred in confirming the trial court's judgment and decree.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the judgments and decrees of the two courts below were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court with the direction to act according to the remand order passed earlier by the appellate court.

SHACHEENDRA DWIVEDI, J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred by the defendants against the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court which has confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court.

( 2 ) RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF Harbilas had filed a suit against deceased defendant Baboo Lal, the father of the appellants and respondent No. 2, for the restoration of possession of the two rooms and for mesne profits with the allegation that he had purchased the suit house from Baboo Lal. It was alleged that in the suit house at that relevant time one Devi Shankar was occupying two rooms. Later on those two rooms having been vacated by Devi Shankar, it was alleged in the plaint that the two rooms were taken possession of by defendant Babu Lal. Since possession was not being handed over, hence the suit was filed.

( 3 ) THE suit of the pliaintiff-respondent was. dismissed by the trial Court and, therefore, an appeal bearing No. 89-A/71 was preferred by the respondent-plaintiff. The plaintiff had later on moved an application in the appeal under Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. stating that since one Panat was in actual possession of the rooms and was not impleaded as defendant in the suit, he be allowed amend the plaint. The prayer of the plaintiff-respondent was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court was set aside remanding the case back to the trial Court to proceed in accordance with law after the suit was amended by the plaintiff; and to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity to the parties of leading evidence.

( 4 ) CONSEQUENT, to the order of remand; the plaintiff in the trial Court had amended his suit on 24-4-1973. After the consequential amendment by the defendant-appellants, the learned trial Court had framed additional issues on 10-1-1974. On 16-2-1974, the case was fixed for the evidence of the parties for 29-4-1974. On the same date, i. e. 16-2-1974, itself the plaintiff had moved an application again under Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. seeking to amend his plaint and thereby to withdraw the earlier amendment. The application of the plaintiff-respondent was allowed by the trial Court on 9-7-1974. Curiously under the later amendment, his plaint was brought back to its original position by dropping defendant Panat from the array of defendants and the learned trial Court had thereafter proceeded to pass the fresh order and the suit of the respondent-plaintiff was decreed this time.

( 5 ) THE appeal preferred by the defendant appellants was also dismissed, hence this second appeal.

( 6 ) IT is disturbing to note in this case, that earlier when the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed, he succeeded in getting the judgment and decree set aside by the appellate Court on the ground that the plaint was required to be amended for impleading one Panat as defendant. After the amendment of the plaint, but before the trial Court could proceed to record the further evidence in the light of remand order, the plaintiff-respondent again amended his plaint by dropping Panat from the array of defendants and brought the suit back to its original position which had existed before the order of remand was passed whereby the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit was set aside.

( 7 ) THE trial Court thereafter decreed the suit on the same evidence and in the same circumstances in which it was earlier dismissed by it.

( 8 ) THE basic question, therefore, which is the substantial question of law involved in this appeal is whether it was open or was permissible to the trial Court to bye-pass the directions under the order of remand and the reason for which its earlier judgment and decree of dismissal of suit was set aside and then further to decree the suit on the same evidence. It would amount to allowing the premium to the plaintiff for his abusing the process of law. The plaintiff sought the setting aside of the judgment from the appellate Court by praying the amendment of plaint but he later on remend







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