A fracture of a bone simpliciter (without there being any permanent impairment or weakness of body on account of it) would not amount to a permanent disability within the meaning of the definition of "permanent disability" given in Section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

( 1 ) THIS appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act') arises out of an order passed on 6th December, 1994, in Claim Case No. 71/92, by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Hoshangabad, whereby the application under Section 140 of the Act, for grant of quantified fixed amount under Section 140 of the Act for the fracture of Right 4th and 5th metacarpals received by the appellant in accident by the use of truck No. MP 04-F/8405 was dismissed holding that appellant has not suffered permanent disability as defined in Section 142 of the Act.

( 2 ) THE appeal came up for hearing before R. P. Awasthy, J. who did not concur with the view taken by D. M. Dharmadhikari, J. in Mahendra Prasad Mishra v. Mohammad Sabbir, 1994 ACJ 942, that fracture of bones in a motor accident can be called "privation of any member or joint". Awasthi, J. was of the opinion that the words "privation of any member or joint" appearing in clause (a) of Section 142 means loss of any member or joint, therefore, referred the case before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute a bench of two Judges for deciding the following question :"whether fracture of a bone simplicitor (without there being any permanent impairment or weakness of body on account of it), would amount to a permanent disability within the meaning of the definition of "permanent disability" given in Section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ?"

( 3 ) SECTION 140 of Chapter X of the Act corresponding provisions in Sections 92-A to 92-E of Chapter VII-A of the repealed Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'act of 1939') deal with liability without fault in certain cases. The underlying idea behind Section 140 of the Act corresponding provision in Section 92-A in Act of 1939 is that where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death an amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 and in respect of permanent disablement a fixed sum of Rs. 25,000 by way of immediate relief without proof of negligence in an application filed for compensation under Section 166 of the Act. Section 144 of the Act, corresponding provision. S. 92-E in Act of 1939, provides that the provisions contained in Chapter X of the Act corresponding Chapter VII-A of Act 1939, shall have overriding effect, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Chapter X of the Act is a clear departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. See Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Raman Bhai Prabhat Bhai, AIR 1987 SC 1690; K. Nandkumar v. Managing Director, Thonthal Periyar Transport Corporation, (1996) 2 SCC 736 : (AIR 1996 SC 1217 ).

( 4 ) THE Supreme Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, AIR 1991 SC 1769 enunciated the principle of law that no fault provision as is propounded in Section 92-A of Act of 1939, corresponding to Section 140 of the Act, is in the nature as of a measure of social justice a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious statutory payment of fixed amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. The underlying object of the provision would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under Section 110-A of Act of 1939 corresponding Section 166 of the Act, but before ordering compensation under this provision the Tribunal