The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the duty of the court to scrutinize the trappings of the order to decide the maintainability of an appeal.

Dipak Misra, J.

1. In this appeal preferred under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay-peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 the appellant, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Bada Maihara, Chhatarpur, has called in question the legal validity of the order dated June 19, 2007 passed in W.P. No. 2600/2007.

2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that the respondent No. 1was appointed on daily wages on September 1, 1998 as Sahayak Up-Nirikshak and was paid the salary at the rate of Rs. 2163/-. His services were terminated by order dated December 28, 1999. Accordingly, he approached the Labour Court and submitted his statement of claim which was denied by the appellant stating that his services were not satisfactory and his employment was casual in nature for a particular period of time and, therefore, his termination was in accordance with the terms of appointment. It averred that when the services of the respondent No. 1 were discontinued a writ petition was filed before this Court which was disposed of with the direction to consider the case of the respondent No. 1 as per the guidelines contained in circulars dated February 14, 2000 and February 26, 2000 as also in order passed in W.P. No. 842/2000. The case of the respondent No. 1 was considered by the Enquiry Committee which did not found him suitable for continuing in service and, therefore, the present case came to be filed before the Labour Court. As pleaded, the Labour Commissioner, respondent No. 2 did not take note of the fact that the respondent No. 1 was a daily waged employee and without application of mind made a reference to the Labour Court. The Labour Court passed an award dated June 20, 2006 directing the appellant to reinstate the respondent No. 1.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid award the appellant filed a W.P. No.2600/2007 and prayed for quashing of the award dated June 20, 2006. The respondent No. 1 in the said writ petition filed an application under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and prayed for direction to the appellant to comply with the provisions of the Section 17-B from the date of award till disposal of the writ petition. Such application formed the subject-matter of I.A. No. 4176/2007.

4. The learned single Judge considered the aforesaid interlocutory application and by order dated June 19, 2007 directed the appellant to comply with the provisions of Section 17-B either by reinstating or by paying last wages drawn by the employee with a further stipulation the amount be paid within 30 days from the date of filing the writ petition failing which the writ petition would stand dismissed without further reference to the Bench.

5. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of the learned single Judge the appellant has preferred the present writ appeal on the grounds that application under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act being LA. No. 4176/2007 was not served on it and, therefore, no reply to the same could be filed, it is also urged that the aforesaid fact could not be brought to the notice at the time of hearing and, therefore, present impugned order came to be passed and hence, the same amounts to violation of principle of natural justice. It is also urged that since there is no finding of the Labour Court the respondent No. 1 has no source of earning, therefore, enquiry is necessary

before passing an order and, therefore, the appellant may be permitted to file counter-affidavit. It is also canvassed that the question of regularizing daily wage employee has been decided by the Apex Court and Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable and has placed reliance on the decision MPSLR 2007 76. In the aforesaid backdrop a prayer has been made for setting aside the order of the learned single Judge.

6. We have heard D.N. Shukla, learned Counsel for the appellant and Arvindvastava, learned Counsel for the respondents.

7. It is submitted by D.N. Shukla, learned Counsel for the appellant that