The main legal point established in the judgment is that once the Electricity Board has made provision for the grant of interest on the security deposit, it cannot be unilaterally withdrawn, and the Board is obligated to pay interest as per the agreement and general terms and conditions of the agreement.

DIPAK MISRA, J. :- In this appeal preferred under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent the appellant has called in question the pregnability and penetrability of the order dated 30-4-1997 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 4723/96 where he has declined to grant relief to the appellant and upheld the action of the M.P. Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board').

2. The facts which are requisite to be stated are that the appellant-company is a consumer of electricity and had entered into an agreement with the Board. In the agreement a stipulation was made in Cl. 27(a) that if the appellant would be required to deposit certain sum as security deposit it would be adjusted in the regular bill amount. In the said clause there was a postulate that the Board would pay interest on the aforesaid security deposit. It is relevant to mention here that the rate of interest was provided therein. When the matter stood thus the Board in exercise of its powers vested in it under S. 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 (for brevity 'the Act') issued a notification dated 24-1-1996. After the notification was issued the authority of the Board communicated to the appellant that no interest would be payable on the security deposit.

3. Before the learned single Judge it was contended by the writ petitioner, the present appellant, that when a condition of this nature had been incorporated in the agreement the same cannot be extinguished by virtue of notification inasmuch as the same has nothing to do with the fixation of tariff or supply of power. It was also contended that once a bilateral agreement had been entered into between the parties the same could not have been amended in a unilateral manner as that is not permissible, moreso in the obtaining factual matrix. It was also the argument that the Board has no jurisdiction to issue such a notification under S. 49 of the Act as basically and essentially the aforesaid provision deals with tariff and supply of electricity and such other ancillary matters and has nothing to do with the cash deposit which is called 'security amount.'

4. On behalf of the Board upon placing reliance on the counter-affidavit, it was contended before the learned single Judge that S. 49 confers power on the Board which is legislative in nature and, therefore, the Board can, by issue of such notification delete the clause from the general conditions of contract. It was also canvassed that though the notification did not convey the meaning that the agreement would stand amended, but for all practical purposes such notification will apply mutatis mutandis and get the agreement amended. A reference was made to R. 27 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 which provides for model conditions of supply and the Board having adopted model form of conditions which is in consonance with the rules the deletion of certain clauses by issue of notification cannot be flawed and such withdrawal is permissible in law and does not smack of any kind of arbitrariness.

5. Before the learned single Judge reliance was placed on the decisions rendered in the cases of Indian Aluminium Company v. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1975 SC 1967; Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board, AIR 1976 SC 127; M/s. Jagdamba Paper Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Haryana State Electricity Board, AIR 1983 SC 1296 and Fertilisers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. v. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1988 SC 1989. It is worth noting here that before the learned single Judge both the parties place reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. v. A. P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1993 SC 2005. The learned single Judge after considering the ratio of the aforesaid judgment came to hold that the Board had the jurisdiction and authority to delete the said condition and there is no impropriety in the decision-making process.

5A. Assailing the aforesaid judgment it is submitted by Mr. Kishore Shrivasta