The freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(2), which includes defamation. The court has the discretion to grant an injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory matter.

ORDER :- This is a revision against the order dated 24-8-1979 passed by Second Addl. District Judge Gwalior in Misc. Civil Appeal No.54/1979 reversing the order dated 14-5-1979 passed by Third Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior in Civil Suit No.15-A/1979,

2. The facts giving rise to this petition are thai the non-petitioner No.1 is the Editor and Publisher of "Weekly Gwalior Reporter" and the non-petitioners Nos.2 to 5 are the printers of the newspaper. The non-petitioner started from 24-3-79 to publish false and defamatory news against the petitioner in every issue of the newspaper. The news was being published in the defamatory and insulting way, and intention behind it was to blackmail the petitioner and extort money from him. The issues of "Weekly Gwalior Reporter" have been submitted in the trial Court along with the plaint. The petitioner, therefore, filed a suit against the non-petitioners for the damages and for injunction to restrain from publishing such false and defamatory news against the petitioner.The trial Court looking to the contents of the newspapers in which defamatory and insulting words were used against the petitioner, issued an ex parte temporary injunction restraining the non-petitioners from publishing news against the petitioner. The non-petitioners Nos.1 and 2 went in appeal against the order of the trial Court and the appellate Court allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate Court, the present revision is filed.

3. Before taking into consideration the merits of the case, it will be proper to see as to why the appellate Court has allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction order passed by the trial Court. In para 5 of the judgement, the learned appellate Court has observed that in the present case normal procedure for hearing on injunction application by issuing notice to the other side was not followed. It can certainly be issued if there are compelling reasons for passing an order in the absence of the other party, and it was also held that there were no compelling reasons in this particular case to pass an ex parte order. As the appeal has been allowed, the point discussed above loses much of its importance. The other submission made before the appellate Court is that there is a fundamental right vested in non-petitioner No.1, who is Editor and Publisher, and non-petitioners Nos.2 to 5, who are publishers of the non-petitioner No.1, of freedom of press and free expression, and if an injunction is granted, the fundamental rights will be arrested. Lastly, the appellate Court has observed that there can be compensation to the plaintiff/petitioner and injury cannot be said to be irreparable. Therefore, no blanket injunction can be granted in favour of the plaintiff. In para 8 of his judgement, the learned appellate Court has also observed that when a defamatory matter is published against an individual respectable citizen it gives rise to two types of actions. One of them is a civil wrong which may justify a suit for damages, and the other remedy is a criminal prosecution for defamation. The plaintiff has chosen the first category. Further, the learned appellate Court has observed that it is an established law that whenever an injury is reparable by damages, no injunction is to be issued. Similarly, no injunction is to be issued to prevent an act which tantamounts to commission of an offence. Discussing the matter in this way, the appellate Court has observed that there is no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, he allowed the appeal and dissmised the application filed by the petitioner in the trial Court for issuing andinjunction asking the non-petitioners not to publish the defamatory matters against him.

4. After hearing the arguments on both sides. I am of the view that the order passed by the learned appellate Court should be set aside and that of the learned trial Court should be restored. The reasoning of the appellate Court that the repu