SEN, J. : - This is a petition by Shri L. N. Trivedi, under Article 226 of the Constitution, directed against an order of the State Government dated the 25th June, 1970, for his removal as a councillor of the Municipal Council, Mahidpur, under the provisions of Section 41 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.

2. Shortly stated, the facts are these: The petitioner is an Advocate of this Court, practising at Mahidpur. He was appearing as counsel against the Municipal Council in a suit wherein the plaintiff had claimed the relief of perpetual injunction against the Council. That suit was eventually decreed and the petitioner, as counsel, had put the decree into execution. He was elected as a councillor in December, 1968. Despite his election as councillor, he continued to appear as a counsel for the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. These proceedings were taken by the decree-holder under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Meanwhile the decree-holder died and the petitioner applied for substitution of the names of his legal representatives under Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code. He also filed a vakalatnama on their behalf on 5th April, 1969. While these proceedings were pending, the Collector Ujjain served the petitioner with a show-cause notice dated 22-12-1969, as to why he should not be removed from his office as a councillor under the provisions of Section 41 (2) of the Act. Upon service of the notice, the petitioner withdrew from the execution proceedings on 5-1-1970. He then submitted his answer to the show-cause notice on 9-1-1970. In due course, the State Government gave him a personal hearing on 22-6-1970, and eventually by the impugned order directed his removal.

3. The order of removal has been assailed before us on several grounds. In the first place, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the provisions of S. 41 (2) of the Act were not attracted at all, because the petitioner did not act or appear "in a proceeding relating to a matter in which the Council was concerned", within the meaning of the section; and therefore, the State Government had no power to pass the impugned order. He urges that the proceedings under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code were taken against the Administor and not against the Municipal Council. It is pointed out that there was a breach of the decree for perpetual injunction on the part of the Administrator and his subordinates, and therefore, proceedings had to be taken for violation of the injunction. Such proceedings, learned counsel contends, cannot be construed to be proceedings against the Municipal Council; nor, according to him, was the Municipal Council in any way concerned with the proceedings.

4. The contention cannot be accepted. No doubt, learned counsel is right in contending that there is a distinction between the Administrator and the Municipal Council. But that distinction has no significance. The suit for perpetual injunction was filed against the Municipal Council. That suit was decreed against the Council and the decree was put into execution against it. The Council having been superseded, all powers and duties of the Council under the Act, until the Council was reconstituted, had to be exercised and performed by the Administrator. Although the Administrator was not the Municipal Council, the supersession did not mean that the Municipal Council as a corporate body ceased to exist. Under Section 18 of the Act, the Municipal Council is a body corporate with perpetual succession. The documents on record clearly show that the proceedings under O. 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure were commenced against the Municipal Council and not against the Administrator personally. The contention that Section 41 (2) of the Act was not attracted, therefore fails.

5. The construction placed by learned counsel for the petitioner upon the provisions of Section 41 (2) of the Act cannot also be accepted. The section reads