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1974 Supreme(MP) 56

Madhya Pradesh High Court
G. P. SINGH,K. K. DUBE
Vidya Devi - Appellant
Versus
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation - Respondent
Decided On : 05/02/1974

Advocates:
R.K. Nanhorya, for Appellants; Dilip Naik, for Respondents.

Headnote:(1) Tort – Negligence - negligence contemporaneous - evaluation of evidence – principles - apportionment of blame.

       (2) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S. 78 - duties of a driver of motor vehicle.

       In cases where negligence of the parties is contemporaneous or so nearly contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say that either could have avoided the consequences of the other's negligence, both parties would be held to have substantially caused the accident. (1930) All. ER Rep. 257 (HL) relied on.

       When two vehicles are so moving in relation to one another as to involve risk of a collision the driver of each vehicle owes a duty to move with due care to avoid any collision. (1951) 2 All. ER 448 relied on.

       A reasonably careful driver does not always assume that other users of the road whether drivers or others, will behave with reasonable care and he guards against the negligence of others when experience shows such negligence to be common. (1949) 1 All. ER 60 relied on.

       It is the duty of the driver of a vehicle to keep a good lookout for other traffic especially at road crossings, junctions and bends. [Para 3]

       In the instant case the deceased driver of the Motor Cycle, who was coming from the side road ought to have allowed the bus to pass which was proceeding on the main road. The deceased was driving the Motor Cycle at a speed which was not moderate. The deceased was negligent for his own safety and his negligence substantially contributed to the accident.

       The driver of the bus did not keep a look-out for the traffic coming from the side road while approaching the intersection. Thus he was also negligent.

       Thus, negligence of both the patties was contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say with any definiteness that either could have avoided the consequences of the other's negligence and both parties must be held to have substantially caused the accident.

       The motor-cyclist was far more to blame than the bus driver and he apportioned the blame in the proportion of two-third and one-third. (1959) 1 WLR 1168 relied on. [Para 5]

       (3) Common Law - law of England - applicability to India - 'justice, equity and good conscience' - import of - Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 - section 6.

       The Indian Courts in the absence of any specific law are enjoined to decide cases "according to justice, equity and good conscience." The relevant statutory provision, so far as Mahakoshal region in this State is concerned, is section 6 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875. The expression "justice, equity and good conscience", has been interpreted to mean "the rules of English law if found applicable to, Indian society and circumstances". (1887) 14 IA 89 relied on. [Para 7]

       If the new rules of English law replacing or modifying the common law are more in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience it would be open to Courts in India to reject the outmoded rules of common law and to apply the new rules. 21 MPLC 250 relied on. [Para 7]

       (4) Tort – Negligence - defence of contributory negligence - damages.

       The defence of contributory negligence that a plaintiff who is only partly to blame for, the accident cannot recover any damages is on the face of it illogical.

       The principle of apportionment enacted in the English Act of 1945 is more in consonance with justice, equity and. good conscience and since we can look to the English law as it is, we must apply this principle in place of the old rule of contributory negligence. AIR 1954 VP 17 relied on. [Para 8]

       (5) Tort – damages - principles of calculating - contributory negligence.

       Where the annual dependency comes Rs.18,000, the multiplyer of 18 has to be applied and the total compensation comes to Rs.32,400, 1970 JLJ 310 relied on.

       As the deceased was himself to blame for the accident to the extent one third, the damages reduced to Rs.10,000. [Para 9]

Judgement

G. P. SINGH, J. : - This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. On 24th July, 1968 there was an accident in Jabalpur at the crossing of two roads which will be referred to as Katni road and Stadium road. Katni road goes from bus stand to Katni and Stadium road from Shahid Smarak to the Stadium. The vehicles involved in the accident were Bus No. M. P. K. 5033 owned by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and a motor-cycle driven by Inderjeet Singh. The bus, which at the relevant time was driven by Corporation's driver Abdul Bashir, came from the bus-stand and was proceeding towards Katni. The motor-cycle came from Shahid Smarak side. It collided with the front portion of the bus on the right hand side. Inderjeet Singh sustained fracture of the skull in this accident and died soon thereafter in the hospital. The deceased's widow Vidya Devi and infant son Amarjeet Singh applied to the Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur, for award of compensation. The Tribunal held that the claimants failed to prove negligence on the part of the driver of the bus and the facts and circumstances of the case established that the deceased himself was negligent. On this finding the Tribunal dismissed the claim. The claimants have, therefore, come up in appeal.

2. The first question in this appeal is : whose negligence was the real or substantial cause of the accident? There are three possible answers to this question : (1) The driver of the bus was alone responsible for the accident; (2) the deceased alone was responsible; and (3) both were responsible, as negligence of both substantially caused the accident. The question is essentially a question of fact and the answer must necessarily depend upon the evidence and circumstances of the case.

3. Before evaluating the evidence, certain principles have to be kept in mind. In cases where negligence of the parties is contemporaneous or so nearly contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say that either could have avoided the consequences of the other's negligence, both parties would be held to have substantially caused the accident; Swadling v. Cooper, 1930 All ER 257 at p. 260 (HL). When two vehicles are so moving in relation to one another as to involve risk of a collision, the driver of each vehicle owes a duty to move with due care to avoid any collision; Nance v. Brit. Columbia Elec. Ry Co., (1951) 2 All ER 448 at p. 450 (PC). A reasonably careful driver does not always assume that other users of the road, whether drivers or others, will behave with reasonable care and he guards against the negligence of others when experience shows such negligence to be common; London Transport Executive v. Upson, (1949) 1 All ER 60 at pp. 70, 72 (HL). It is the duty of the driver of a vehicle to keep a good look-out for other traffic, especially at road crossings, junctions and bends; [Charlesworth, Negligence, 5th edition, p. 495]. Every driver of a motor vehicle is required by Section 78 of the Motor Vehicles Act to drive in conformity with the driving regulations contained in the Tenth Schedule to the Act. Regulations 6 and 7, which are relevant for our purposes, read as follows :

"6. The driver of a motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction or a road corner, and shall not enter any such intersection or junction until he has become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons thereon.

7. The driver of a motor vehicle shall on entering a road intersection, if the road entered is a main road designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that 'road, and in any other case give way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand."

4. The evidence relating to the accident produced by the appellants consists of three witnesses, namely, Vijay Singh (P. W. 3), Suraj (P. W. 4) and Nathulal (P. W. 5). The respondents examined two witnesses, the driver Abdul Bashir (D. W. 1) and the conductor S
































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