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2008 Supreme(MP) 45
2008(2) JLJ 19
A.K. Shrivastava and S.C. Sinho, JJ.
Lakhanlal v. State of M.P.
Criminal Appeal No.2348 of 1998 (Jabalpur) : against the judgment of I Additional Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh, passed in Sessions Trial No.63 of 1994; Decided on 10.1.2008.
D.C. Jain for appellant;
R.S. Patel, Additional Advocate General, for State.
Headnote:(1) Penal Code, 1860 -- Ss.302 and 201 -- Evidence Act, 1872 -- S.3 -- offence of murder based on circumstantial evidence -- wife died of burn injuries -- husband not in house at that time -- he cannot be roped in on basis of presumption.
In between the night of 28/29.3.1994 appellant caused marpeet to the deceased. It is the further case of prosecution that in between the night of 28/29.3.1994 at 4:00 a.m. appellant went to evacuate and deceased was preparing tea on the stove. Accidentally her sari caught fire from flame of the stove, as a result of which she shrieked and on hearing her scream Bhaggu Barar (PW2) who is the father of appellant came there and extinguished the fire by dousing the water. However, by the time that fire could be extinguished, the deceased received 95% bum injuries. According to the prosecution, after pouring the kerosene on deceased she was subjected to fire. An FIR (Exhibit P-6) was lodged by Bhaggu Barar (PW2) who is the father of appellant. [Para 3
Held: In the present case, there is no direct evidence available against the appellant and the prosecution has based its case solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It is well settled in law that if the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is obliged to collect each and every piece of evidence in order to form a complete chain unerringly pointing the guilt towards the accused.
On present factual scenario we find that merely on the basis of presumption the appellant cannot be roped in the present case and in that situation, there is danger that suspicions may take place of proof which is not at all permissible under the law.
Merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises, the appellant cannot be convicted under section 302 of IPC. Hence, the conviction of appellant under section 302 of IPC as well as 201 of IPC is hereby set aside. 2002(2) JLJ 373 (SC), AIR 2007 SC 3050 and (2006)3 SCC 161 followed. [Paras 13, 14 & 19
(2) Penal Code, 1860 -- S.498A -- ill-treatment of wife established by evidence -- conviction is legal. [Para 20
¼1½ naM lafgrk] 1860& &/kkjk 302 rFkk 201& &lk{; vf/kfu;e] 1872& &/kkjk 3& &gRk dk vijk/k ifjfLFkfrd lk{; ij vk/kkfjr& &iRuh dh e`R;q ngu {kfr;ksa ls gqbZ& 𝔦 ml le; edku esa ugha& &mls mi/kkj.kk ds vk/kkj ij Q¡lk;k ugha tk ldrkA
28@29-3-1994 dh e/; jkf= dks vihykFkhZ us e`rd ds lkFk ekjihV dhA blds vfrfjDr vfHk;kstu dk i{kdFku gS fd 28@29-3-1994 dh e/; jkf= dks 4-00 cts çkr% vihykFkhZ ‘kkSp ds fy, x;k Fkk rFkk e`rd LVkso ij pk; rS;kj dj jgh FkhA ?kVuko‘k mldh lkM+h us LVkso dh ykS ls vkx idM+ yh] ftlds ifj.kkeLo:i og fpYykbZ rFkk mldh iqdkj lquus ij HkXxw cjkj ¼v lk 2½ tks vihykFkhZ dk firk gS] vk;k rFkk mlus ikuh Mky dj vkx cq>kbZA rFkkfi] tc rd vkx cq>kbZ tk ldh] e`rd dks 95% ngu {kfr;k¡ dkfjr gqbZA vfHk;kstu ds vuqlkj] e`rd ij fdjksflu Mkydj mls vkx yxkbZ xbZA HkXxw cjkj ¼v lk 2½ }kjk tks vihykFkhZ dk firk gS] çFke bfÙkyk fjiksVZ ¼çn‘kZ ih&6½ nkf[ky dh xbZA ¼iSjk 3½
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % bl ekeys esa] vihykFkhZ ds fo#) dksbZ çR;{k lk{; miyC/k ugha gS rFkk vfHk;kstu us viuk i{kdFku vuU; :i ls ikfjfLFkfrd lk{; ij vk/kkfjr fd;k gSA fof/k esa ;g lqLFkkfir gS fd ;fn ekeyk ikfjfLFkfrd lk{; ij vk/kkfjr gS] rc vfHk;qDr gS] rc vfHk;qDr dh vksj nksf"krk v=qfViw.kZ :i ls bafxr djus okyh laiw.kZ ‘k`a[kyk cukus ds fy, vfHk;kstu lk{; ds çR;sd rFkk lHkh Hkkx ,df=r djus ds fy, ck/; gSA
bl rkfF;d n`f"Vdks.k ij ge ikrs gSa fd ek= mi/kkj.kk ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;qDr dks bl ekeys esa Q¡lk;k ugha tk ldrk rFkk ml fLFkfr esa] ;g Hk; gS fd lansg lcwr dk LFkku ys ldrs gSa tks fof/k ds v/khu fdlh Hkh çdkj vuqKs; ugha gSA
ek= vVdyckth vkSj vuqeku ds vk/kkj ij vihykFkhZ dks Hkkjrh; naM lafgrk dh /kkjk 302 ds v/khu fl)nks"k ugha Bgjk;k tk ldrkA vr% Hkkjrh; naM lafgrk dh /kkjk 302 ds lkFk Hkkjrh; naM lafgrk dh /kkjk 201 ds v/khu nks"kflf) ,rn~}kjk vikLr dh tkrh gSA 2002 ¼2½ ts ,y ts 373 ¼mPpre U;k-½] , vkb vkj 2007 ,l lh 3050 rFkk ¼2006½ 3 ,l lh lh 161 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 13] 14 ,oa 19½
¼1½ naM lafgrk] 1860& &/kkjk 498d& &iRuh ds lkFk nqO;Zogkj lk{; }kjk LFkkfir& &nks"kflf) oS/k gSA
Shrivastava, J. -- 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 6.8.1997 passed by learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh in ST No.63/94 convicting the appellant under sections 302, 201 and 498A of PC and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment, 3 years RI respectively, the appellant has preferred this appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. In brief the prosecution's case is that Savitri Bai (hereinafter referred to as deceased) is the wife of appellant. Their marriage took place in the year 1987. The behaviour of appellant was cordial with the deceased upto 3-4 years of the marriage, but, thereafter appellant started ill-treating the deceased and was causing marpeet as well as taunting on her. It is also the case of the prosecution that appellant was making a demand of Rs.5,000/- watch, radio, cycle, etc.
3. In between the night of 28/29.3.1994 appellant caused marpeet to the deceased. It is the further case of prosecution that in between the night of 28/29.3.1994 at 4:00 a.m. appellant went to evacuate and deceased was preparing tea on the stove. Accidentally her sari caught fire from flame of the stove, as a result of which she shrieked and on hearing her scream Bhaggu Barar (PW2) who is the father of appellant came there and extinguished the fire by dousing the water. However, by the time that fire could be extinguished, the deceased received 95% burn injuries. According to the prosecution, after pouring the kerosene on deceased she was subjected to fire. An FIR (Exhibit P-6) was lodged by Bhaggu Barar (PW2) who is the father of appellant.
4. On lodging of the first information report, the criminal law was set in motion. The investigating agency came in the village; prepared the panchnama of dead body in presence of the witnesses; sent the dead body for post-mortem; recorded the statements of witnesses; seized the necessary articles from the place of occurrence and prepared the spot map.
5. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted in the committal Court which on its turn committed the case to the Court of Session from where it was received by trial Court for trial.
6. The learned trial Judge initially framed charge under section 304B as well as under section 498A of IPC on 31.10.1994. Thereafter, after examining some witnesses, again framed a charge under section 302 of IPC and in the alternative charge under section 304B of IPC as well as 201 and 498A of IPC were framed on 24.6.1996. Needless to emphasis the appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded complete innocence.
7. In order to bring home the charges, the prosectuion examined as many as 15 witnesses and placed Exhibit P-1 to Exhibit P-8, the documents on record. The defence of the appellant is that at the time of incident he was not in home and went to evacuate on the hill and when he came back after evacuation he found the mob assembled at his house and his neighbours informed him that his wife has died.
8. The learned trial Judge after appreciating and marshalling the evidence came to hold that appellant has committed the offence under sections 302, 201 and 498A of IPC and hence, convicted the appellant and passed the sentences which we have mentioned hereinabove. In this manner the present appeal has been filed by the appellant assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
9. It has been argued by Shri D.C. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant that as per prosecution's own case the appellant was not in the house at the time of incident as he went to evacuate. Learned counsel for the appellant further argued that since the case of prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence and there is no direct evidence available-against the appellant, the learned trial Court has wrongly convicted him and his conviction is contrary to the prosecution's own case as well as the evidence placed on record.
10. On the other hand Shri R.S. Patel, learned Additiona
