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2003 (2) JLJ 5
(FULL BENCH)
N.K. Jain, A.M. Sapre and S.L. Kochar, JJ.
Wali Mohammed v. Satul Bai Misc.
Cri. Case No. 1527 of 1988; Decided on 6.5.2003.
With regard to High Court, a Single Bench is bound by the decision of another Single Bench. In case he does not agree with the view of other Single Bench, he should refer the matter to Larger Bench. Similarly, Division Bench is bound by the judgment of earlier Division Bench. In case it does not agree with ‘the view of the earlier Division Bench, it should refer the matter to Larger Bench. In case of conflict between the judgments of two Division Benches of equal strength, the decision of earlier Division Bench shall be followed, except when it is explained by the latter Division Bench in which case the decision of latter Division Bench shall be binding. The decision of Larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches. [Para 4
(2) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 -- Ss. 1 and 3(1) (a) -- Criminal P.C. 1973 -- Ss. 125 to 128 -- Act has no retrospective effect -- it would not nullify the orders already made under S. 125 of the Code - remedy of husband -- cancellation of order may be sought in showing his making suitable provisions.
The Act has no retrospective effect, that it would not nullify the orders for maintenance already made u/s 125 CrPC and that mere declaration by the husband during the pendency of any such proceeding that he has divorced his petitioner-wife, would not automatically attest the continuance of the proceedings u/s 125 of CrPC. Any such defence regarding divorce set up by the husband has to be proved like any other fact. As regards the orders already made prior to the coming into force of the Act of 1986, the remedy of the husband lies in making application under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Sec. 127 of CrPC for cancellation of such an order on showing that he has made reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife not only during the iddat period but also beyond thereof in terms of Sec. 3(1) (a) of the Act of 1986. 1985 JLJ 489 (SC), (2001) 7 SCC 740 and (2002) 7 SCC 518 followed. [Para 5
Held: It will be thus, seen that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is neither retrospective in operation nor it will have effect of nullifying the order already made u/s 125 or 127 of CrPC ordering a Muslim husband to pay maintenance to his divorced wife prior to the coming into force of the Act of 1986. We may, however, clarify that any such husband may seek cancellation of such an order by taking recourse to sub-section (3) of Sec. 127 of CrPC, on his showing that he within the iddat period, has made reasonable and fair provision for the future of his divorced wife in terms of Sec. 3(1) (a) of the Act and has also paid the amount of Mahr and returned the properties as contemplated in clauses (c) and (d) of section 3(1). [Para 11
(3) Criminal P.C., 1973 -- S. 125 -- Muslim Women (Protection of‘ Rights on Divorce) Act. 1986 -- Ss. 1 and 3 -- grant of maintenance under S. 125 of the Code -- Magistrate retains jurisdiction even after passing the Act of 1986. JT 2002(7) SC 631 followed. 1998(1) MPWN 173 overruled. [Paras 10 & 13
(4) Interpretation of Statutes -- every statute is prospective unless effectively made retrospective -- it is more so when if affects existing rights.
It is a cardinal principle of construction that every Statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. It- is more so when the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. So unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is "deemed to be prospective" only. Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, J. relied on. [Para 7
(5) Mohammedan Law -- Talaq -- to be effective has to be pronounced -- pronounce means to proclaim -- plea in written statement is not sufficient.
Talaq to be effective has to be pronounced. The term "pronounce" means to proclaim, to utter formally, to utter rhetorically, to declare, to utter and to articulate. Their Lordships further cautioned‘ ‘that mere plea taken in the written statement of a divorce having been pronounced sometime in the past, cannot be treated as effectuating talaq on the date of deli very of the copy of the written statement to the wife. A plea of previous divorce taken in the written statement cannot at all be treated as pronouncement of talaq by the husband on the wife on the date of filing of written statement in the Court followed by delivery of a copy thereof to the wife." (2002) 7 SCC 518 followed. Cri. Revn. Nos. 341/2001 and 200 of 2000 approved. [Paras 12 & 13
¼1½ iwoZ fu.kZ;&dk vkc)dj Lo:i&,d gh la[;k ds U;k;k/kh‘kksa ds fofu‘p;&çFke fofu‘p; vkc)dj gS ;fn i‘pkrorhZ fofu‘p; esa Li"VhÑr ugha gSA
tgk¡ rd mPp U;k;ky; dk ç‘u gS] ,d ,dy U;k;ihB ,d vU; ,dy U;k;ihB ds fofu‘p; }kjk vkc) gSA ;fn og ,d vU; ,dy U;k;ihB ds n`f"Vdks.k ls lger ugha gSa] rc mls ekeyk c`gÙkj U;k;ihB dks fufnZ"V djuk pkfg,A mlh çdkj ls] [kaM U;k;ihB iwoZrj [kaM U;k;ihB ds fu.kZ; }kjk vkc) gSA ;fn og iwoZrj [kaM U;k;ihB ds fu.kZ; ls lger ugha gSa] rc mls ekeyk c`gÙkj U;k;ihB dks fufnZ"V djuk pkfg,A ,d gh la[;k ds nks [kaM U;k;ihBksa ds fu.kZ;ksa ds chp fojks/k gksus ij] iwoZrj [kaM U;k;ihB dk fofu‘p; vuqlfjr fd;k tk,xk tc rd fd og i‘pkrorhZ~ [kaM U;k;ihB }kjk Li"VhÑr ugha fd;k x;k gS] ftl n‘kk esa i‘pkrorhZ [kaM U;k;ihB dk fofu‘p; vkc)dj gksxkA c`gÙkj U;k;ihB dk fofu‘p; y?kqrj U;k;ihBksa ij vkc)dj gSA ¼iSjk 4½
¼2½ eqfLye L=h ¼fookg&foPNsn ij vf/kdkj laj{k.k½ vf/kfu;e] 1986&/kkjk 1 rFkk 3¼1½ ¼d½&naM çfØ;k lafgrk] 1973&/kkjk 125 ls 128&vf/kfu;e dk Hkwry{kh çHkko ugha gSa&mlds {}kjk lafgrk dh /kkjk 125 ds v/khu igys gh fd, x, vkns‘k vÑr ugha gksaxsA ifr dk mipkj&vkns‘k ds jn~ndj.k dh bZIlk mlds }kjk ;Fkksfpr çca/k fd;k x;k gksuk n‘kkZus ij dh tk ldsxhA
vf/kfu;e dk Hkwry{kh çHkko ugha gS] fd mlds }kjk naM lafgrk dh ?kkjk 125 ds v/khu Hkj.k&iks"k.k ds iwoZ esa gh fd, x, vkns‘k vÑr ugha gksaxs rFkk ;g fd ,slh dksbZ Hkh dk;Zokgh yafcr jgus ds nkSjku ifr }kjk ek= ?kks"k.kk }kjk fd mlus viuh ;kph&iRuh ls fookg&foPNsn dj fy;k gS] naM çfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 125 ds v/khu dk;Zokgh dk tkjh jguk Lor% Fke ugha tk,xkA fookg&foPNsn ds laca/k esa ifr }kjk dh xbZ dksbZ Hkh çfrj{kk fdlh Hkh vU; rF; dh Hkk¡fr lkfcr dh tkuk gksrh gSA 1986 ds vf/kfu;e ds iwoZ esa gh fd, x, vkns‘kksa ds laca/k esa] ifr dks mipkj naM çfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 127 dh mi/kkjk ¼3½ ds [kaM ¼[k½ ds v/khu ,sls vkns‘k ds jnn~dj.k ds fy, ;g n‘kkZrs gq, vkosnu djus esa gS fd mlus fofPNUu fookg iRuh ds Hkfo"; ds fy, ;qfDr;qDr rFkk _tq mica/k u dsoy bnn~r vof/k ds nkSjku fd;k gS vfirq mlds i‘pkr ds fy, Hkh 1986 ds vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3¼1½ ¼d½ ds vuqlkj fd;k gSA 1985 ts ,y ts 489¼mPpre U;k;ky;½] ¼2001½ 7 ,l lh lh 740 rFkk ¼2002½ 7 ,l lh lh 518 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 5½
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % vr% ;g Li"V gS fd eqfLye L=h ¼fookg&foPNsn ij vf/kdkj laj{k.k½ vf/kfu;e] 1986 çorZu esa u rks Hkwry{kh gS vkSj u bldk çHkko 1986 ds vf/kfu;e ds çHkko‘khy gksus ls iwoZ naM çfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 125 vFkok 127 ds v/khu igys gh eqfLye ifr ls viuh fofPNUu fookg iRuh dks Hkj.k&iks"k.k lanÙk fd;k tkuk vknsf‘kr djrs gq, vkns‘k dks vÑr djus dk gksxkA ;gk¡ ge] rFkkfi Li"V dj nsa fd ,slk dksbZ Hkh ifr naM çfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 127 dh mi/kkjk ¼3½ dk vkJ; ysrs gq,] mlds }kjk n‘kkZrs gq, fd mlus bn~nr dh vof/k ds Hkhrj] /kkjk 3¼1½ ¼d½ ds vuqlkj viuh fofPNUu&fookg iRuh ds Hkfo"; ds fy, ;qfDr;qDr rFkk _tq mica/k fd;k gS rFkk esgj dh jde Hkh lanÙk dj nh gS rFkk /kkjk 3¼1½ ds [kaM ¼x½ rFkk ¼?k½ esa ;Fkk vuq/;kr laifÙk ykSVk nh gS] ,sls vkns‘k ds jn~ndj.k dh bZIlk dj ldrk gSA ¼iSjk 11½
¼3½ naM çfØ;k lafgrk] 1973&/kkjk 125&eqfLye L=h ¼fookg&foPNsn ij vf/kdkj laj{k.k½ vf/kfu;e] 1986&/kkjk 1 rFkk 3&lafgrk dh /kkjk 125 ds v/khu Hkj.k&iks"k.k çnku fd;k tkuk&1986 ds vf/kfu;e ikfjr gksus ds i‘pkr~ Hkh eftLVªsV dks vf/kdkfjrk gSA ts Vh 2002¼7½ ,l lh 631 vuqlfjrA 1998¼1½ e-ç- ohDyh uksV~l 173 myVk x;kA ¼iSjk 10 ,oa 13½
¼4½ fof/k dk fuoZpu&çR;sd dkuwu Hkfo";y{kh gksrk gS tc rd fd çHkkoh :i ls Hkwry{kh u cuk;k tk,&;g rc vkSj Hkh gS tc mlds }kjk fo|eku vf/kdkj çHkkfor gksrs gSaA
;g vFkkZUo;u dk eq[; fl)kar gS fd çR;sd dkuwu çFken`"V;k Hkfo";y{kh gksrk gS tc rd fd mls vfHkO;Dr :i ls vFkok vko‘;d foo{kk }kjk Hkwry{kh çHkko ugha fn;k tkrkA ;g vkSj vf/kd gksrk gS tc dkuwu dk mn~ns‘; fufgr vf/kdkj dks çHkkfor djus dk vFkok u, Hkkj vf/kjksfir djus dk vFkok fo|eku ck/;rkvksa dk àkl djus dk gksrk gSA vr% tc rd dkuwu esa] fo|eku vf/kdkjksa dks çHkkfor djus dk fo/kku&eaMy dk vk‘k; i;kZIr :i ls n‘kkZus okys ‘‘kCn ugha gks rc] og ^^Hkfo";y{kh gh le>k** tk,xkA U;k-th-ih- flag Ñr fçafliYl vkQ LVs~V;wVjh baVjfçVs‘ku voyafcrA ¼iSjk 7½
¼5½ eqfLye fof/k&rykd&çHkkoh gksus ds fy, mPpkfjr gksuk pkfg,&mPpkfjr djus dk vFkZ gS mn~?kksf"kr djuk&fyf[kr dFku esa vfHkopu i;kZIr ugha gSA
rykd çHkkoh gksus ds fy, mPpkfjr fd;k tkuk gksrk gSA ‘‘kCn ^mPpkfjr djus* dk vFkZ gS mn~?kksf"kr djuk] vkSipkfjd :i ls mPpkj.k djuk] lkfgR;fd :i ls mPpkj.k djuk] ?kks"k.kk djuk vkSj Li"V mPpkj.k djukA ekuoh; U;k;k/kh‘kx.k us] blds vfrfjDr psrkouh Hkh nh fd ^^dHkh Hkwrdky esa mPpkj.k fd, x, fookg&foPNsn dk fyf[kr dFku esa vfHkokd~ ek= iRuh dks fyf[kr dFku dh çfr fd, tkus dh rkjh[k dks çHkkoh rykd ugha ekuk tk ldrkA fyf[kr dFku esa iwfoZd fookg&foPNsn dk fd;k x;k vfHkokd~ ifr }kjk iRuh dks fyf[kr dFku Qkby fd, tkus dh rkjh[k dks mldh çfr iRuh dks nsus ij rykd dk mPpkj.k fdlh Hkh çdkj ugha ekuk tk ldrkA** ¼2002½7 ,l lh lh 518 vuqlfjrA nkafMd iqujh{k.k Ø-341 lu~ 2001 rFkk 200 lu~ 2000 vuqeksfnrA ¼iSjk 12 ,oa 13½
Jain, J. -- 1. All these matters arising out of the proceedings initiated by Muslim wives against their (former) husbands for grant of maintenance allowance or recovery of the amount already awarded, under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the CrPC'), by the order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, have been placed before us for resolution of following questions:
(i) Whether the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, (for short, 'the Act of 1986'), can be given retrospective effect so as to cover the claim for maintenance instituted by a divorced Muslim Woman under section 125 of CrPC, prior to coming into of the Act of 1986 ?
(ii) Whether a Muslim divorced woman is entitled to institute the proceeding for recovery of arrears of allowance for maintenance u/s 125(3) or 127 of CrPC in respect of the order of maintenance passed u/s 125(1) (a) CrPC prior to the enforcement of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 ?
(iii) Whether a non-divorced Muslim Woman is entitled to continue the proceedings u/s 125(1) (a) CrPC instituted after the enforcement of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, if during the pendency of the said proceedings, she is divorced by her husband simply to avoid the liability of maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure? and,
(iv) What decision has to be followed by the subordinate Courts in case of conflicting decisions of the Benches consisting of same number of Judges on the same point of Law?
2. The first question is referred by a Single Bench of this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 1527/1988, while the remaining questions are referred under a Reference (No. 112000) made by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manawar. Other matters (M.Cr.C. Nos. 1733/1988, 153/] 989, 2001/1990, 1326/1992 and 2141/1993), have been referred by the Division Bench of this Court. Although no specific question as such is formulated by the Division Bench while referring these five matters, however, decision of these cases would also depend on the answer to the questions already extracted hereinabove.
3. We have heard learned counsel for parties: Shri Girish Desai, learned Dy. Advocate General; as also learned senior counsel Shri H.S. Uberoi, Shri B.L. Pavecha and Shri Jaisingh, who addressed the Court at our request.
4. Taking the last question (No. iv) first, at the outset it may be stated that the answer to this question is contained in a recent Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators' Association and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another [2003(1) JLJ 105], wherein it is held:
"With regard to High Court, a Single Bench is bound by the decision of another Single Bench. In case he does not agree with the view of other Single Bench, he should refer the matter to Larger Bench. Similarly, Division Bench is bound by the judgment of earlier Division Bench. In case it does not agree with the view of the earlier Division Bench, it should refer the matter to Larger Bench. In case of conflict between the judgments of two Division Benches of equal strength, the decision of earlier Division Bench shall be followed except when it is explained by the latter Division Bench in which case the decision of latter Division Bench shall be binding. The decision of Larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches."
Needless to say that what is said about the decisions of Division Bench shall also apply in case of conflict between judgments of two Single Benches. So in case of conflict between two decisions of the High Court rendered by the Benches of equal strength (be it a Full Bench, Division Bench or Single Bench), the decision earlier in time shall hold the field unless it is referred and explained in the latter decision in which case the latter one shall be binding. The question No. (iv), thus, stands answered accordingly.
5. Answers to other questions (No. i to iii) depend on the interpretation of various provisions of t
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