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2000 Supreme(MP) 491

2001 (1) JLJ 192
V.K. Agrawal, J.
Laxmi Gudakhu Factory v. Avinash Gudakhu Factory
Misc. Appeal No. 62 of 2000: against the order of District Judge, Raigarh,
passed in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1999; Decided on 12.5.2000.

Advocates:
Satish Agrawal for appellant; Ravindra Shrivastava for respondent.

Headnote:(1) Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 -- S. 27(2) -- plaintiff not only alleging infringement of its registered trade marks but also an action for passing off -- has to establish prior user -- proof of actual damages or fraud is not necessary.

       For an action for ‘passing off‘, the plaintiff has to establish user of the mark prior in point of time than the impugned-user by the defendant. Proof of actual damage or fraud is not necessary in case of ‘passing off‘ action. Where the name of one particular individual firm has gained wide reputation in connection with a particular class of goods and another person entering the same trade under a name, which is same or similar and is likely to cause confusion in the minds of the intending purchasers, then obviously, such harm would be caused for which there may not be proper assessment of compensation. [Para 12

       (2) Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 -- Ss. 28 and 29 -- gist of an action for infringement of trade mark -- is comparison of two trade marks -- approach should be from the point of view of an average intelligence.

       So far as infringement of trade mark is concerned, in order to decide the question of similarity between the two marks and to come to the conclusion as to whether one mark is deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the two are to be considered. It would be enough if the impugned-mark bears such an overall similarity to the registered mark as is likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one, to accept the other, if offered to him. The question as above has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection and it has to be considered as to whether to such a man, the overall structural and phonetic similarity of the two marks would reasonably cause confusion between them. AIR 1965 SC 980 followed. [Paras 13 & 14

       On a glance at the two labels, the two appear to have deceptive similarity. It may be noted in the above connection that there are points of dissimilarity which can be deciphered when the two labels are placed side by side and then differences are noticed between the two. However, it is clear that a consumer of the merchandise does not normally have an opportunity to keep the two labels side beside in order to compare the two and find out the dissimilarities between them. It may be noted that an unawary customer never thinks of doing so; and the mischief is done, as the consumer assumes that he is purchasing the article as that of a particular manufacturer, while it is, in fact, not so. [Para 16

       (3) Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 -- Ss. 29 and 28 -- action for infringement of Trade Mark -- comparison of two marks -- dissimilarities not to be assessed by placing two side by side -- deceptive similarities are to be seen.

       In order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the two are to be considered. They should not be placed side by side to find out if there are any differences in the design and if so, whether they are of such character as to prevent one design from being mistaken for the other. It would be enough if the impugned-mark bears such an overall similarity to the registered mark as would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other if offered to him. AIR 1972 SC 1359 followed. 2000 (1) MPLJ 33 relied on. [Paras 19 & 20

       (4) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 39 R. 1 and 2 and O. 43 R. 1(r) -- appeal and refusal of temporary injunction in trade mark cases -- trial Court approach from view of dissimilarities -- appellate Court may interfere.

       There was all the possibility of deception and a customer was likely to be misguided in purchasing the ‘Gudakhu‘ manufactured by respondent No. 1 believing the same to be that of the plaintiff-appellant. It may be noted in the above connection that ‘Gudakhu‘ is a product, which is normally used by illiterate persons. AIR 1988 SC 249 distinguished. [Para 21

       It is true that if the trial Court exercises its discretion reasonably and judiciously, the mere fact that the appellate Court could have taken a different view, would not lead to interference in the order of the trial Court. However, in the instant case, the trial Court has adopted an erroneous approach to the whole question in comparing the two labels by keeping them side by side, which is not permissible. (1990) Supp SCC 727 distinguished. [Para 23

       ¼1½ O;kikj vkSj i.; fpà vf/kfu;e] 1958 && /kkjk 27¼2½ && oknh }kjk mlds jftLVªhd`r O;kikj fpàksa dk vfrya?ku gh vfHkdfFkr ugha] ^pyk nsus* dk dk;Z Hkh vfHkdfFkr && iwoZ mi;ksx LFkkfir djuk gksxk && okLrfod uqdlkuh vFkok diV dk lcwr vko‘;d ugha gSA

       ^pyk nsus* ds dk;Z ds fy, oknh dks izfroknh }kjk vkf{kIr mi;ksx ls iwoZrj le; esa fpà dk mi;ksx LFkkfir djuk gksxkA ^pyk nsus* ds dk;Z ds ekeys esa okLrfod uqdlkuh vFkok diV dk lcwr vko‘;d ugha gSA tgk¡ fdlh fof‘k"V i`Fkd~ QeZ dk uke fdlh eky ds fof‘k"V oxZ ds fy, lqfo[;kr gks x;k gks rFkk dksbZ vU; O;fDr ml O;kikj dks ,sls uke ls vkjaHk djs tks ogh gS vFkok mlds leku gS rFkk mlls vk‘kf;r Øsrkx.k ds eu esa Hkzkafr dkfjr gksus dh laHkkouk gks rc] izR;{kr%] ,slh gkfu ls igq¡psxh ftlds izfrdj dk mfpr fu/kkZj.k ugha gks ldsA ¿ iSjk 12

       ¼2½ O;kikj vkSj i.; oLrq fpà vf/kfu;e] 1958 && /kkjk 28 rFkk 29 && O;kikj fpà ds vfrya?ku ds fy, dkjZokbZ dk vk/kkj && nksuksa O;kikj fpàksa dh rqyuk gS && :[k] vkSlr cqf) ds n`f"Vdks.k dk gksuk pkfg,A

       tgk¡ rd O;kikj fpà dk vfrya?ku lac) gS] nksuksa fpàksa dh lekurk ds iz‘u dk fofu‘p;u dj bl fu"d"kZ ij igq¡pus ds fy, fd ,d fpà nwljs ds bruk le:i gS vFkok ugha ftlls /kks[kk gks tk,] nksuksa dh eq[; rFkk lkjoku~ fof‘kf"V;ksa ij fopkj fd;k tkuk gksxkA vkf{kIr fpà jftLVªhd`r fpà ds dqy feyk dj brus le:i gksuk i;kZIr gS fd lkekU;r% ,d dk O;kikj djus okys O;fDr }kjk] mls fn, tkus ij Hkzeo‘k vU; dks Lohdkj fd, tkus dh laHkkouk gksA mi;qZDr iz‘u ds izfr :[k vkSlr cqf) rFkk =qfViw.kZ Lej.k okys O;fDr ds n`f"Vdks.k dk gksuk gksxk( rFkk bl ij fopkj fd;k tkuk gksxk fd D;k ,sls O;fDr dks] bu nksuksa fpUgksa dh dqy lajpukRed rFkk /oU;kRed lekurk ls ;qfDr;qDr :i esa Hkzkafr gks ldrh gSA , vkb vkj 1965 ,l lh 980 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 13 ,oa 14

       nksuksa yscyksa ij n`f"Vikr djus ls nksuksa esa bruh le:irk izrhr gksrh gS ftlls /kks[kk gks tk,A mi;qZDr laca/k esa /;ku fn;k tk, fd vlekurk ds fcanq gSa tks yscyksa dh vxy&cxy esa j[k dj fudkys tk ldrs gSa] rc nksuksa ds chp ds varj ij /;ku tkrk gSA rFkkfi] Li"V gS fd i.; oLrq ds miHkksDrk dks lkekU;r% nksuksa esa rqyuk djus ds fy, nksuksa dks vxy&cxy j[k dj mudk varj irk djus dk volj izkIr ugha gksrkA /;ku fn;k tk, fd vlko/kku miHkksDrk ,slk djus dk dHkh ugha lksprk vkSj fjf"V gks tkrh gS D;ksafd miHkksDrk mi/kkj.kk dj ysrk gS fd og fdlh fof‘k"V fuekZrk dh oLrq Ø; dj jgk gS tcfd okLro esa ,slk ugha gksrkA ¿ iSjk 16

       ¼3½ O;kikj vkSj i.; oLrq fpà vf/kfu;e] 1958 && /kkjk 29 rFkk 28 && O;kikj fpà ds vfrya?ku ds fy, dkjZokbZ && nksuksa fpà dh rqyuk && nksuksa dh vxy&cxy j[k dj vlekurkvksa dk fu/kkZj.k ugha fd;k tk,xk && ,slh le:irk,¡ ns[kh tkuk gksaxh ftuls /kks[kk gks tk,A

       bl fu"d"kZ ij igq¡pus ds fy, fd D;k ,d fpà nwljs ds brus le:i gS ftlls /kks[kk gks tk,] nksuksa dh eq[; rFkk lkjoku~ fof‘kf"V;ksa ij fopkj fd;k tkuk gksxkA ;g irk djus ds fy, nksuksa dks vxy&cxy ugha j[kk tkuk pkfg, fd mudh :ijs[kk dks HkzkafriwoZdj nwljk le>s tkus dk fuokj.k gksA vkf{kIr fpà jftLVªhd`r fpà ds dqy feyk dj brus le:i gksuk i;kZZIr gS fd lkekU;r% ,d dk O;kikj djus okys O;fDr }kjk] mls fn, tkus ij] Hkzeo‘k vU; dks Lohdkj fd, tkus dh laHkkork gksA , vkb vkj 1972 ,l lh 1359 vuqlfjrA 2000 ¼1½ ,e ih ,y ts 33 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 19 ,oa 20

       ¼4½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && vk- 39 fu- 1 rFkk 2 vkSj vk- 43 fu- 1 ¼n½ && O;kikj fpà ds ekeyksa esa vihy rFkk vLFkk;h O;kns‘k ls bUdkj && fopkj.k U;k;ky; dk :[k vlekurkvksa ds n`f"Vdks.k dk && vihy U;k;ky; }kjk gLr{ksi fd;k tk ldrk gSA

       izoapuk dh iwjh laHkkouk Fkh rFkk izR;FkhZ Ø- ƒ }kjk fufeZr xqM+k[kw Ø; djrs le; xzkgd dks xqM+k[kw oknh&vihykFkhZ dk gksus dk fo‘okl djus dk Hkze gksus dh laHkkouk FkhA mi;qZDr laca/k esa /;ku fn;k tk, fd xqM+k[kw ,slk mRikn gS tks lkekU;r% vui<+ O;fDr;ksa }kjk mi;ksx fd;k tkrk gSA , vkb vkj 1988 ,l lh 249 izHksfnrA ¿ iSjk 21

       ;g lR; gS fd ;fn fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk viuh vf/kdkfjrk dk iz;ksx ;qfDr;qDrr( rFkk _tqrkiwoZd fd;k x;k gks rc ek= bl rF; ds dkj.k fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds vkns‘k esa gLr{ksi ugha fd;k tk ldrk fd vihy U;k;ky; }kjk fHkUu n`f"Vdks.k viuk;k tk ldrk FkkA rFkkfi] izLrqr ekeys esa] nksuksa yscyksa dks vxy&cxy j[k dj rqyuk dj ds] tks vuqKs; ugha gS] fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk iw.kZ iz‘u ds izfr xyr :[k viuk;k x;k gSA ¼1990½ lIyh- ,l lh lh 727 izHksfnrA ¿ iSjk 23

ORDER

1. This miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order dated 14th December, 1999 in civil suit No. 32-A 1999 by District Judge, Raigarh, whereby the plaintiff/appellant's application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 r/w section 151 of the CPC, marked as IA No.1, was dismissed.

2. Undisputably, the plaintiff/appellant is a manufacturer of 'Gudakhu', which is being used as toothpaste. It carries on business in the name and style of 'Laxmi Gudakhu Factory' and sells, its product under the registered trade-mark 'Saraswati Chhap Gudakhu'. The label of the said product is at the top of 'Annexure-C', which is marked as "1" for the purpose of convenience. The above trade-mark was registered with the Registrar of Trade Mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the 'Act' for short) on 17.4.1967. It is also not in dispute that the registration as above has been renewed by the plaintiff/appellant, from time to time, and is still in force. Subsequently, the plaintiff/appellant received information in September, 1999 that the defendant/respondent No. 1 is also selling its product under the trade name 'Ma Saraswati Chhap Gudakhu'. The label used by the defendant/respondent No. 1 is at Sl. No. 2 of 'Annexure-C'. It also appears that subsequently on the protest being raised by the plaintiff/appellant regarding the use of label, as per SI. No.2 at 'Annexure-C', the defendant/respondent No. 1 changed the trade name as 'Ma Saaraswati Chhap Gudakhu', the label thereof is at Sl. No.3 of 'Annexure-C'.

3. The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit, copy of plaint is 'Annexure-E', alleging that the trade-name and label used by the defendant/respondent No.1 are deceptively similar to the trade-name and label used by the plaintiff/appellant. Therefore, the plaintiff/appellant prayed that the defendant/respondent No.1 be restrained from using the above trade-name and label for selling its product and token compensation of Rs. 5,000/- be granted to the plaintiff. An application for grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 r/w. section 151 of the CPC (Annexure-F) was also filed.

4. The defendant/respondent No. 1 resisted the above application. Its first reply to the application is 'Annexure-G'. It further filed an additional reply (Annexure-H). In the first reply (Annexure-G), the objection raised on behalf of the defendant No. 1 was that the respondents Avinash Agrawal and Subhash Agrawal are not the owners of defendant No.1. It was also alleged that the label being used for selling of Gudakhu under the trade-name 'Ma Saaraswati Chhap Gudakhu' is substantially different from the label 'Saraswati Chhap Gudakhu' used by the plaintiff/appellant. It was also alleged in the reply that Ashok Kumar Agrawal, who had brought the suit for the plaintiff/appellant, was not the partner of the plaintiff firm, Laxmi Gudakhu Factory. In their second reply (Annexure-H), the defendants alleged that respondent No. 2 Subhash Agrawal has no concern and relationship with the business of defendant/respondent No. 1. Mahesh Kumar Garg is the sole proprietor of defendant/respondent No.1. It has been submitted that the respondent No.1 is using a label, which is substantially different from the label used by the plaintiff/appellant. It was further averred in their reply in 'Annexure-H' that on the plaintiff's partner Pramod Kumar Agrawal requesting the defendant No. 1 to change the trade name and label, so that the difference in label used by the plaintiff/appellant may become more noticeable, the defendant No. 1 has started using the trade name and label 'Ma Saarswati Chhap Gudakhu'. Thus the trade name being used as above and label at SI. No. 3 of Annexure-C' is being used with the consent of the plaintiff/appellant and permission in that regard has also been obtained from the Central Excise Department. Therefore, the trade name being used as above by the Re. No. 1 does not in any manner infringe the right of the plaintiff-appellant. It was






















































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