2001 (1) JLJ 401
(SUPREME COURT)
Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J.J., R.C. Lahoti and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
Civil Appeal No. 1117 of 2001; against the judgment of M.P. High Court
passed in Second Appeal No. 314 of 1995; Decided on 8.2.2001.
(2) Civil P.C., 1908 -- Ss. 100 (3), 100 (4) and 100 (5) -- appellant should propose substantial question of law in memo of appeal -- High Court may formulate proposed or any other question -- respondent may object and show that no such question is involved.
An obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the High Court. The High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. Such questions or question may be the one proposed by the appellant or may be any other question which though not proposed by the appellant yet, in the opinion of the High Court arises as involved in the case and is substantial in nature. At the hearing of the appeal, the scope of hearing is circumscribed by the question so formulated by the High Court. The respondent is at liberty to show that the question formulated by the High Court was not involved in the case. In spite of a substantial question of law determining the scope of hearing of second appeal having been formulated by the High Court, its power to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not earlier formulated by it, is not taken away subject to the twin conditions being satisfied: (i) the High Court feels satisfied that the case involves such question, and (ii) the High Court records reasons for its such satisfaction. [Para 10
(3) Civil P.C., 1908 -- Ss. 100 (4) and 100 (5) -- formulation of substantial question of law under sub-section (4) -- no reasons need be recorded -- if such question of law is formulated under sub-section (5) -- reasons have to be recorded. [Para 11
(4) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 100 (1) -- phrase ‘substantial question of law‘ as occurring under -- means having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. [Para 12
(5) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 100(1) -- substantial question of law -- need not be of general application -- it should be involved in the case between the parties. AIR 1928 PC 172 and (1962) Supp. 3 SCR 549 relied on. ILR 1952 Mad. 264 (FB) approved. [Para 12
(6) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 110 (since repealed) -- a question of law of importance to the parties -- is a substantial question of law entitling appellant to certificate under. AIR 1953 SC 521 relied on. [Para 13
(7) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 100 (1) -- substantial question of law -- nature of.
A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be ‘substantial‘, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the‘ parties before it, are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case, there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. [Para 14
(8) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 96 -- first appeal -- is valuable right of parties -- case is open to rehearing on both facts and law.
First appeal is a valuable right pf the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. [Para 15
(9) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 96 -- appellate Court agreeing with the view of trial Court -- need not reiterate reasons given by trial Court. AIR 1967 SC 1124 relied on. [Para 15
(10) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 96 -- first appellate Court -- when entitled to interfere in the judgment of trial Court.
As a matter of law, if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. AIR 1983 SC 114 relied on. [Para 15
(11) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 96 -- first appellate Court -- when should not interfere in finding of fact.
When there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses then, unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge‘s notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. AIR 1951 SC 120 relied on. [Para 15
(12) Civil P.C., 1908 -- Ss. 96 and 100-- additional obligation has been cast on first appellate Court after substitution of new section 100 -- first appellate Court has now become final Court on law also.
We need only remind the first appellate Courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law. [Para 15
(13) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 100(3) -- no proposed substantial questions of law formulated in memo of appeal -- High Court should give opportunity to frame the same unless previously given opportunity was not availed of.
The High Court having noticed failure on the part of the appellant in not discharging the statutory obligation cast on him by sub-section (3) of section 100 of the Code on account of the substantial question of law involved in the appeal having not been stated, much less precisely, in the memorandum of second appeal ordinarily an opportunity to frame such question should have been afforded to the appellant unless the deficiency was brought to the notice of the appellant previously by the High Court Registry or the Court and yet the appellant had persisted in his default. That was not done. [Para 16
(14) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 100 (4) and 96 -- suit decreed by trial Court -- plea of defendant of acquisition of title by adverse possession not found proved -- finding reversed by first appellate Court and suit dismissed -- substantial question of law is involved. [Para 16
¼1½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100¼1½ && f}rh; vihy && fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u izfrikfnr fd, fcuk lquokbZ ugha gks ldrhA ¼1997½ 5 ,l lh lh 438] ¼1997½ 4 ,l lh lh 713 rFkk ¼1999½ 3 ,l lh lh 722 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 9 ¼2½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100¼3½] 100¼4½ rFkk 100¼5½ && vihykFkhZ dks vihy ds Kkiu esa fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u izLrkfor djuk pkfg, && mPp U;k;ky; }kjk izLrkfor vFkok dksbZ vU; iz‘u izfrikfnr fd;k tk ldrk gS && izR;FkhZ vk{ksi dj n‘kkZ ldrk gS fd ,slk dksbZ iz‘u varoZfyr ugha gSA vihy ds Kkiu esa] vihy esa varoZfyr fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u] ftls vihykFkhZ mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k crkus dk izLrko djrk gS] lqli"Vr% dfFkr djus dh ck/;rk vihykFkhZ ij vf/kjksfir dh xbZ gSA mPp U;k;ky; dk lek/kku gksuk pkfg, fd ekeys esa fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u varoZfyr gS( rc mPp U;k;ky; }kjk og iz‘u izfrikfnr fd;k tkuk gksrk gSA og iz‘u vihykFkhZ }kjk izLrkfor gks ldrk gS vFkok ,slk dksbZ vU; iz‘u gks ldrk gS tks ;|fi vihykFkhZ }kjk izLrkfor ugha gks] rFkkfi mPp U;k;ky; dh jk; esa ekeys esa varoZfyr gksus ds dkj.k mn~Hkwr gksrk gS rFkk lkjoku~ Lo:i dk gSA vihy dh lquokbZ esa] lquokbZ dh ifjf/k mPp U;k;ky; }kjk bl izdkj izfrikfnr iz‘u rd lhfer gksrh gSA izR;FkhZ dks ;g n‘kkZus dk Lokra=~; gksrk gS fd mPp U;k;ky; }kjk izfrikfnr iz‘u ekeys esa varoZfyr ugha FkkA mPp U;k;ky; }kjk f}rh; vihy dh lquokbZ dh ifjf/k vo/kkfjr djus okys fof/k ds lkjoku~ iz‘u dh izfriknuk fd, tkus ds ckotwn] mPp U;k;ky; }kjk igys izfrikfnr ugha fd, x, fof/k ds fdlh vU; lkjoku~ iz‘u ij vihy lquus dh mldh ‘kfDr bu nks ‘krksZa ds iwjk gksus ds v/;/khu fNurh ugha gS %
¼3½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100 ¼4½ rFkk 100 ¼5½ && mi/kkjk ¼4½ ds v/khu fof/k ds lkjoku~ iz‘u dh izfriknuk && dkj.k vfHkfyf[kr fd, tkuk vko‘;d ugha && ;fn ,slk iz‘u mi/kkjk ¼5½ ds v/khu izfrikfnr fd;k tk, && dkj.k vfHkfyf[kr fd, tkuk gksaxsA ¿ iSjk 11
¼4½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100 ¼1½ && esa ;Fkk iz;qDr okD;ka‘k ^^fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u** && dk vFkZ gS lkjHkwr] eeZHkwr] okLrfod] Bksl egRo dk] vko‘;d vFkok fopkj.kh;A ¿iSjk 12
¼5½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100¼1½ && fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u && lk/kkj.kr% ykxw gksus okyk vko‘;d ugha && i{kdkjksa ds e/; ekeys esa varoZfyr gksuk pkfg,A , vkb vkj 1928 ih lh 172 rFkk ¼1962½ lIyh- 3 ,l lh vkj 549 voyafcrA vkb ,y vkj 1952 enzkl 264 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ vuqeksfnrA ¿ iSjk 12
¼6½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 110 ¼vc fujflr½ && i{kdkjksa ds fy, egRoiw.kZ fof/k dk iz‘u && vihykFkhZ dks rn~/khu izek.ki= ds fy, gdnkj cukus okyk fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u gSA , vkb vkj 1953 ,l lh 521 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 13
¼7½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100¼1½ && fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u && Lo:iA
fof/k dk fcanq ftlesa nks jk; laHko ugha gks] fof/k dh izfriknuk gks ldrk gS] fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u ughaA ^lkjoku~* gksus ds fy,] fof/k dk iz‘u fooknLin gksuk pkfg,( ns‘kfof/k vFkok ck/;dj iwoZ fu.kZ; }kjk igys gh r; fd;k gqvk ugha gksuk pkfg,( rFkk] tgk¡ rd mlds le{k i{kdkjksa ds vf/kdkj lac) gSa] nksuksa esa ls fdlh ds Hkh i{k esa mÙkj fn, tkus ij ekeys ds fofu‘p; ij mldk egRoiw.kZ izHkko iM+uk gksxkA ^ekeys esa varoZfyr* fof/k dk iz‘u gksus ds fy, izFker% mldk vk/kkj vfHkopu esa fn;k x;k gksuk gksxk rFkk iz‘u] rF; ds U;k;ky; }kjk fudkys x, iqf"V;ksX; fu"d"kksZa ls fudyuk pkfg,] rFkk ekeys ds _tq vkSj mfpr fofu‘p;u ds fy, fof/k ds ml iz‘u dks fofuf‘pr djuk vko‘;d gksuk gksxkA mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k izFker% mBk;k x;k iw.kZr% uohu fcanq] ekeys esa varoZfyr iz‘u ugha gS tc rd fd og fo"k; ds ewy rd ugha tkrk gksA ¿ iSjk 14
¼8½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 96 && izFke vihy && i{kdkjksa dk ewY;oku vf/kdkj gS && ekeys dh iqu% lquokbZ rF;ksa rFkkk fof/k] nksuksa ij gks ldrh gSA
izFke vihy i{kdkjksa dk ewY;oku vf/kdkj gS rFkk tc rd fof/k }kjk fucZaf/kr ugha gks] mlesa laiw.kZ ekeys dh iqu% lquokbZ rF; rFkk fof/k] nksuksa ds iz‘uksa ij gks ldrh gSA vr%] vihy U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; esa mldk lpsru euksfu;ksx izfrfcafcr gksuk gksxk rFkk vihy U;k;ky; ds fofu‘p;u ds fy, i{kdkjksa rFkk izLrqr vkSj vkxzg fd, x, izfrfojks/kksa ds lkFk&gh lc mn~Hkwr fook|dksa ij dkj.kksa }kjk lefFkZr~ fu"d"kZ vfHkfyf[kr gksuk gksaxsA ¿ iSjk 15
¼9½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 96 && vihy U;k;ky;] fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds n`f"Vdks.k ls lger && fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk fn, x, dkj.kksa dh iqujko`fÙk djuk vko‘;d ughaA , vkb vkj 1967 ,l lh 1124 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 15
¼10½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 96 && izFke vihy U;k;ky; && dc fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; esa gLr{ksi djus dk gdnkjA
fof/k esa] ;fn fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk lk{; dk vadu egRoiw.kZ vfu;ferrk ls xzLr gks vFkok vxzkg; lk{; ij ;k vuqekuksa vkSj vVdyksa ij vk/kkfjr gks] rc vihy U;k;ky; rF;kRed fu"d"kZ esa gLr{ksi djus dk gdnkj gSA , vkb vkj 1983 ,l lh 114 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 15
¼11½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 96 && izFke vihy U;k;ky; && dc rF;kRed fu"d"kZ esa gLr{ksi ugha djuk pkfg,A
tc fdlh fooknxzLr fo"k; ij i{kdkjksa ds ekSf[kd lk{; esa fojks/k gks rFkk fofu‘p; lk{khx.k dh fo‘oluh;rk ij fuHkZj gks rc] tc rd fdlh fof‘k"V lk{kh ds lk{; dk ,slk fo‘ks"k igyw ugha gks tks fopkj.k U;k;k/kh‘k ds ;ku ls pwd x;k gks vFkok fo‘oluh;rk fdl vksj gS] bl ckjs esa mudh jk; foLFkkfir djus ds fy, vlaHkkO;rk dk iyM+k i;kZIrr% Hkkjh ugha gks] vihy U;k;ky; }kjk rF; ds iz‘u ij fopkj.k U;k;k/kh‘k ds fu"d"kZ esa gLr{ksi ugha fd;k tkuk pkfg,A , vkb vkj 1951 ,l lh 120 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 15
¼12½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 96 rFkk 100 && ubZ /kkjk 100 dh izfrLFkkiuk ds i‘pkr~ izFke vihy U;k;ky; ij vfrfjDr ck/;rk Mkyh xbZ gS && izFke vihy U;k;ky; vc fof/k ds iz‘u ij Hkh vafre U;k;ky; gks x;k gSA
gesa izFke vihy U;k;ky;ksa dks lafgrk esa izfrLFkkfir orZeku /kkjk 100 dh ;kstuk }kjk mu ij Mkys x, vfrfjDr Hkkj dk dsoy Lej.k fnykus dh vko‘;drk gSA izFke vihy U;k;ky;] iwoZor~] rF;ksa dk vafre U;k;ky; cuk gqvk gS( rF; ds ‘kq) fu"d"kZ] mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k f}rh; vihy esa vk{ksi ls mUeqDr gSaA vc izFke vihy U;k;ky; fof/k dk Hkh vafre U;k;ky; gSA ¿ iSjk 15
¼13½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100¼3½ && vihy ds Kkiu esa fof/k dk dksbZ izLrkfor lkjoku~ iz‘u izfrikfnr ugha && iwoZ esa fn, x, volj dk Qk;nk ugha mBk;k x;k gks rc mPp U;k;ky; }kjk mls fojfpr djus dk volj fn;k tkuk pkfg,A
f}rh; vihy ds Kkiu esa vihy esa varoZfyr fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u] Li"Vr% rks nwj] dfFkr gh ugha fd, tkus ds dkj.k lafgrk dh /kkjk 100 dh mi/kkjk ¼3½ }kjk ml ij Mkyh xbZ dkuwuh ck;rk dk fuoZgu ugha djus esa vihykFkhZ dh foQyrk ij mPp U;k;ky; dk /;ku tkus ij lkekU;r% vihykFkhZ dks ,slk iz‘u fojfpr djus dk volj fn;k tkuk pkfg, Fkk] tc rd fd mPp u;k;ky; dh jftLVªh vFkok U;k;ky; }kjk igys gh vihykFkhZ dk /;ku bl deh dh vksj vkd`"V ugha fd;k x;k gks rFkk rc Hkh vihykFkhZ vius O;frØe ij vM+k ugha jgk gksA ,slk ugha fd;k x;k FkkA ¿ iSjk 16
¼14½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100¼4½ rFkk 96 && fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk okn fMØhr && izfroknh dk izfrdwy dCts }kjk gd ds vtZu dk vfHkokd~ lkfcr fu"df"kZr ugha && izFke vihy U;k;ky; }kjk fu"d"kZ myVk x;k rFkk okn [kkfjt fd;k x;k && fof/k dk lkjoku~ iz‘u varoZfyr gSA ¿ iSjk 16
Lahoti, J. -- 1. Leave granted.
2. On 4.3.1983, the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession and issuance of permanent preventive injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property described as khasra No. 41/1 area 1.09 acres (0.441 hectares) situated in Village Patharia, District Damoh. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had illegally dispossessed the plaintiff from his possession over 110x80 ft. area of land out of the suit property on 20.8.1981. The defendant, in his written, statement denied all material averments and in addition submitted that the defendant has been in possession of the suit property since 1940-41, i.e. since the time of his grandfather. The suit filed by the plaintiff was alleged to have been barred by limitation in view of the same having been filed more than 12 years after the date of dispossession of the plaintiff. A plea of the defendant having acquired title by adverse possession was also raised in the written statement.
3. The trial Court, on an evaluation of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, found that ownership in the suit property vested in the plaintiff and the defendant had forcibly occupied the disputed area of 110x80 ft. sometime in the year 1980-81. The defendant's plea of adverse possession was negatived and the suit filed by the plaintiff was held to have been filed within the period of limitation. On these findings, the suit was decreed in its entirety.
4. The defendant preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge held that insofar as ownership over the suit land is concerned, the same vested in the plaintiff. However, he found that the possession of the land was given to the plaintiff by the State Government on 6.11.1968 but the plaintiff has not shown to have taken any step for dispossessing the defendant and the plea raised by the plaintiff of the defendant having forcibly occupied the land in dispute on 20.8.1981 did not appear to be tenable. On these findings, the appeal was allowed and in reversal of the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the suit was directed to be dismissed.
5. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal which has been dismissed in limine by the High Court passing a brief order that the mailer stood concluded by findings of fact and no substantial question or law arose for determination. The aggrieved plaintiff has filed this appeal by special leave.
6. On 4.5.1999, this Court directed a notice to he issued to the defendant-respondent on the limited question as to why the matter should not be remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal after framing the question of law.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments of the trial Court and the first appellate Court. We have also perused the application dated 12.1.2001 filed in this Court on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant setting out the substantial questions of law which, in his submission, arose in the case and on which the High Court ought to have heard the appeal.
8. What is a substantial question of law involved in the case ? Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1905 (hereinafter, 'the Code' for short) as substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1970 (104 or 1076) w.e.f. 1.2.1977, reads as under:-
"100. Second Appeal -- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to tile High Court, if tile High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substa
9. Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai Ors.] = [AIR 1983 SC 114].
2. Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami = [(1997) 4 SCC 713]
4. Guran Ditta and Anr. v. T. Ram Ditta
7. Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, In-charge Court of Wards
1. See Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and ors. = (1997) 5 SCC 438
3. Kondila Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribat Sopan Gujar and Ors. = [(1999) 3 SCC 722]
8. Girijanandini Devi and Ors. v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary = (AIR 1967 SC 1124).
10. Serju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ors.
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