2000 (2) JLJ 340
(SUPREME COURT)
K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi, JJ.
State of M.P. and another v. Pradeep Kumar and another
Civil Appeal No. 4994 of 2000; against the order of the M.P. High Court
passed in Misc. Appeal No. 449 of 1996; Decided on 12.9.2000.
If the memorandum of appeal is filed in such appeal without accompanying the application to condone delay, the consequence cannot be fatal. The Court can regard in such a case that there was no valid presentation of the appeal. In turn, it means that if the appellant subsequently, files an application to condone the delay before the appeal is rejected, the same should be taken up along with the already filed memorandum of appeal. Only then the Court can treat the appeal as lawfully presented. There is nothing wrong if the Court returns the memorandum of appeal (which was not accompanied by an application explaining the delay) as defective. Such defect can be cured by the party concerned and present the appeal without further delay. Order of High Court reversed. [Para 10
(2) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 41, R. 3A (1) -- use of the word ‘shall‘ -- would indicate the requirement is peremptory in tone -- but such peremptoriness does not foreclose a chance for appellant to rectify the mistake.
No doubt subd`rule (1) of Rule 3A has used the word ‘shall‘. It was contended that employment of the word ‘shall‘ would clearly indicate that the requirement is peremptory in tone. But such peremptoriness does not foreclose a chance for the appellant to rectify the mistake, either on his own or being pointed out by the Court. [Para11
(3) Legal Maxims -- vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura sub veniunt -- law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights -- but even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes.
It is true that according to the pristine maxim "Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura suhveniunt" (Law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights). But even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes. As the aphorism "to err is human" is more a practical notion of human behaviour than an abstract philosopby. the unintentional lapse on the part of a litigant should not normally cause the doors of the judicature permanently closed before him. [Para 12
(4) Statute -- question as to whether it is mandatory or directory -- depends upon the intent of Legislature and not upon the language in which it is clothed.
The question as to whether a Statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also while considering its nature. its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other. Crawford on "Statutory Construction. "1940 Edn. Art. 261 and AIR 1976 SC 263 relied on. [Paras 13 & 14
(5) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 41 Rr. 1 and 3 -- defectively filed appeal -- appellant should he required to remedy the defect. AIR 1961 SC 832 relied on. [Para 15
(6) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 41 R. 3A (1) and 3(2) -- purpose of insertion of the provisions -- appellant cannot insist or having his appeal heard without first deciding application for condonation of delay. AIR 1981 Kerala 240, AIR 1986 Kar. 199 and AIR 1983 Patna 189 approved. [ Paras 17 & 18
(7) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 41 R.3A -- object is two fold -- first to inform appellant that his time barred appeal would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by application explaining delay -- second is to inform respondent that he need not be ready to meet grounds of appeal.
The object of enacting rule 3A in Order 41 of the Code seems to be two-fold. First is, to inform the appellant himself who filed a time-barred appeal that it would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining the delay. Second is, to communicate to the respondent a message that it may not be necessary for him to get ready to meet the grounds taken up in the memorandum of appeal because the Court has to deal with application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent. Order of High Court reversed. [Para 19
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Thomas, J. -- 1. Leave granted.
2. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madbya Pradesh held that an appeal filed out of time unaccompanied by an application to condone the delay is liable to be axed down at the threshold and hence, the situation cannot be rectified by filing an application at any later stage. Learned, Single Judge rejected a second appeal on the sole ground that the delayed appeal was presented without accompanying an application to cond6ne the delay. An order so passed by the High Court is now being assailed before us by special leave.
3. A suit was filed by the respondents against the State of Madbya Pradesh and one of its sales Tax Officers for a decree of declaration of their title and consequential injunction in respect of a residential building. The suit was dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs tiled an appeal before the District Court against the dismissal and the District Judge reversed the decision of the trial Court regarding jurisdiction and remanded the case to the trial Court for disposal of the suit on merits.
4. On 10.12.1996, the appellants tiled a second appeal before the High Court challenging the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in the first appeal. There was some delay in filing the said second appeal but when it was presented, no application for condoning the delay was filed by the appellants along with the appeal. However, appellants filed such an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 6.1.1997.
5. On 31.1.1997 the High Court issued notice to the respondents on the appeal, without deciding the delay application. Long the rafter the respondents moved the High Court for disposal of the appeal on the ground that it is barred by limitation.
6. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the said motion of the respondents and dismissed the second appeal med by the appellants by observing thus:
"A perusal of provision of Order 41 Rule 3-A shows that when an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor. it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relics to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period."
7. The appellants cited before the learned Single Judge a decision of the Karnataka High Court in State of Kamataka v. Nagappa (AIR 1986 Karnataka 199) but he declined to follow the dictum therein, on the premise that another Single Judge of the M.P. High Court had taken a different view earlier. regarding the legal consequences of not tiling an application for condoning the delay along with the tiling of the appeal. Learned Single Judge has stated the following for the purpose of meeting the aforesaid contention advanced by the appellants.
"Similar question had arisen he fore this Court in First Appeal No. 107/95. decided on 3.8.95 and this Court took the view that as the appeal was not accompanied with application for condonation of delay and affidavit. stating the fact, the appeal was not competent. In view of this specific finding of the learned Single Judge, the decision of the Karnataka High Court cannot help the learned Counsel for the appellants."
8. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court has placed a very narrow construction on Rule 3A of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') which resulted in pre-empting the right of appeal conferred by the statute, because the Court had the power to condone the delay on showing reasonable explanation for it. In order to decide the said question we have to make a short survey of the relevant Rules in the Code.
9. Order 42, Rule 1 of the Code says that the Rules in Order 41 shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from appellate decrees. Order 41, Rule 1 says that every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader
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