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1998 Supreme(MP) 943

1999 (1) JLJ 217
B.A. Khan and Shambhoo Singh, JJ.
Satish Trading Company v. Divisional Manager, P.P. Khare,
Indore Telephones
L.PA. No. 17 of 1997; against the orders of Contempt Court;
Decided on 26.11.1998.

Advocates:
M.G. Upadhyay and P. Mathur for appellants; S. Bhargava for respondents.

Headnote:(1) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 -- S. 22 -- contempt jurisdiction of High Court -- not conferred by Act -- it provides the procedure and limits the jurisdiction. (1972)1 SCC 651 and (1991)4 SCC 406 followed. [Para 5

        (2) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 -- S. 19 -- appeal lies against punishment order alone -- if contemnor is discharged or proceedings are dropped there would be no appeal against such order. AIR 1974 SC 2255, AIR 1976 SC 1206 and AIR 1978 SC 1014 followed. [Para 6

        (3) Appeal -- is creature of statute -- not claimable as of right unless statutorily conferred. [Para 8

        (4) Letters Patent -- Cl. 10 (prior to amendment in 1928) -- provided general right of appeal -- every judgment passed by Single Bench was appeal-able. [Para 8

        (5) Letters Patent -- Cl. 10 -- order appeal against under -- must amount to a ‘judgment" within the meaning of this clause -- it must decide rights and liabilities of parties or it must result in some injustice to party concerned. [Para 10

        (6) Constitution of India -- Art. 215 -- order of dropping contempt proceedings -- does not fall under this Article -- order of punishment falls within it. 1988 SCC (Cr.) 546 followed. [Para 9

        (7) Letters Patent -- Cl. 10 -- Civil P.C. 1908 -- S. 2(9) -- word judgment" as used In clause 10 -- is wider than defined under S. 2(9) of C.P.C. AIR 1981 SC 1768 followed. [Para 11

        (8) Letters Patent -- Cl. 10 -- order of dropping of contempt proceedings -- even if assumed to have been passed under inherent jurisdiction -- does not amount to ‘‘judgment‘‘ -- such order does not decide any right of parties not it works out injustice to any party -- hence not appeal-able. [Para 12

        (9) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 -- Ss. 12 and 14 -- object of contempt jurisdiction -- is to uphold digity and majesty of Court and Law -- it is a matter solely between contemnor and Court. [Para 13

        (10) Constitution of India -- Art. 215 -- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 -S. 19 -- provisions do not make any distinction between Civil and Criminal Contempt -- third party/informer‘s rights are not effected in any of the case. [Para 11

        (11) Letters Patent -- Cl. 10 -- contempt of Courts Act, 1971 -- S. 19 -order of dropping contempt proceedings not made appeal-able under S. 19 of the Act -- cannot be made appeal-able by overstretching provision of clause 10. [Para 15

       ¼1½ U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 && /kkjk 22 && mPp U;k;ky; dh voeku vf/kdkfjrk && vf/kfu;e }kjk iznÙk ugha gS && rn~}kjk izfØ;k micaf/kr dh xbZ gS rFkk vf/kdkfjrk ifjlhfer dh xbZ gSA ¼1972½1 ,l lh 651 rFkk ¼1991½4 ,l lh 406 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 5À

       ¼2½ U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 && /kkjk 19 && vihy dsoy naM ds fo#) gksxh && ;fn voekudrkZ mUeksfpr dj fn;k x;k gS vFkok dk;Zokgh lekIr dj nh xbZ gS] ,sls vkns‘k ds fo#) dksbZ vihy ugha gksxhA , vkb vkj 1974 ,l lh 2255] , vkb vkj 1976 ,l lh 1206 rFkk , vkb vkj 1978 ,l lh 1014 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 6À

       ¼3½ vihy && dkuwu dh l`f"V gS && vf/kdkj ds :i esa nkok ugha fd;k tk ldrk tc rd fd dkuwuh :i ls iznÙk ugha fd;k x;k gksA ¿ iSjk 8À

       ¼4½ ysVlZ isVsaV && [kaM 10 ¼1928 esa la‘kks/ku½ ds iwoZ½ && vihy ds lkekU; vf/kdkj dk mica/k Fkk && ,dy U;k;ihB }kjk ikfjr izR;sd fu.kZ; vihyuh; FkkA ¿ iSjk 8À

       ¼5½ ysVlZ isVsaV && [kaM 10 && vkns‘k ftlds fo#) vihy dh tk, && bl [kaM ds vFkkZrxZr **fu.kZ;** dh dksfV dk gksuk pkfg, && blds }kjk i{kdkjksa ds vf/kdkj vkSj nkf;Ro fofuf‘pr fd, x, gksa vFkok blds ifj.kke esa lacaf/kr i{kdkj ds izfr dksbZ vU;k; gksrk gksA ¿ iSjk 10À

       ¼6½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 215 && voeku dk;Zokgh lekIr fd, tkus dk vkns‘k && bl vuqPNsn ds v/khu ugha vkrk && naM dk vkns‘k bl vuqPNsn ds varxZr vkrk gSA 1988 , lh lh ¼fØ-½ 546 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 9À

       ¼7½ ysVlZ isVsaV && [kaM 10 && flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 2¼9½ && [kaM 10 esa ;Fkk iz;qDr ‘‘kCn **fu.kZ;** && flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 2¼9½ d v/khu ifjHkkf"kr ls vf/kd O;kid gSA , vkb vkj 1981 ,l lh 1786 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 11À

       ¼8½ ysVlZ isVsaV && [kaM 10 && voeku dk;Zokgh lekIr fd, tkus dk vkns‘k && Hkys&gh varfufgZr vf/kdkfjrk ds v/khu ikfjr fd, tkus dh /kkj.kk dh tk, && **fu.kZ;** dh dksfV esa ugh vkrk && ,sls vkns‘k }kjk i{kdkjksa ds fdlh vf/kdkj dk fofu‘p; ugha gksrk vkSj fdlh i{kdkj ds izfr vU;k; Hkh ugha gksrk && blfy, vihyuh; ugha gSA ¿ iSjk 12À

       ¼9½ U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 && /kkjk 12 rFkk 14 && voeku vf/kdkfjrk dk mn~ns‘; && U;k;ky; vkSj fof/k dh xfjek cuk, j[kus ds fy, gS && ;g iw.kZr% voekudrkZ vkSj U;k;ky; ds e/; dk fo"k; gSA ¿ iSjk 13À

       ¼10½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 215 && U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 && /kkjk 19 && mica/kksa }kjk flfoy vkSj nkafMd voeku esa foHksn ugha fd;k x;k gS && ijO;fDr eq[kfcj ds vf/kdkj buesa ls fdlh ekeys esa izHkkfor ugha gksrsA ¿ iSjk 14À

       ¼11½ ysVlZ isVsaV && [kaM 10 && U;k;ky; voeku vf/kfu;e] 1971 && /kkjk 19 && voeku dk;Zokgh lekIr fd, tkus dk vkns‘k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 19 ds v/khu vihyuh; ugha && [kaM 10 ds mica/kksa dks vf/kd [khap dj vihyuh; ugha cuk;k tk ldrkA ¿ iSjk 15À

ORDER

Khan, J. -- 1. These two appeals are directed against orders passed by the Contempt Court dismissing contempt applications of appellants and discharging the rule against respondents. The short controversy raised is whether these two appeals were competent and maintainable under Clause X of the Letters Patent as no appeal was available against such orders u/s 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1975.

2. Appellant's case is that such an appeal was in order because the orders passed by the Trial Judge were in exercise of his original jurisdiction and "Judgment" within the meaning of Clause X of Letters Patent. But the other version was that such appeal would not lie because the impugned orders fail to satisfy the test of 'judgment' as contemplated by Clause X.

3. According to Shri Vpadhyay, L.C. for first appellant a distinction was required to be drawn between a civil and criminal contempt. In the first case, order passed by the contempt Court discharging rule was inter-parties and, therefore, applicant in such a case could not be treated as a mere informer on the specious plea that contempt was a matter between the Court and the contemnor. In this case his right" were at stake in the enforcement of the order allegedly breached and if he was turned away, it would tantamount to non-exercise of jurisdiction by the contempt Court and rendering his remedy less, besides contributing to lowering of the majesty and dignity of the Court. He buttressed all this by explaining that such like order passed by the trial Judge was in exercise of his inherent original jurisdiction and also qualified to be 'judgment' under Clause X.

4. Shri P. Mathur, representing the second appellant went a step further. He contended that an order discharging rule against an alleged contemnor was envisaged and recognised u/s. 12 and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act and, therefore, was as much an order/decision as an order or decision to punish conceived u/s. 19. Therefore, such an order could not be treated differently for purposes of availability of appeal against it. According to him import of the provisions of Sec. 12 and 14 had gone unnoticed in some judgments of the Supreme Court holding that only punishment orders were appeal-able u/s. 19 He alternatively argued that even if an appeal was excluded u/s 19 against an order dropping contempt proceedings, it would still be available under Clause X of the Letters Patent as such order was passed in exercise of original contempt jurisdiction of the Court and was also a 'judgment', thus satisfying all requisite requirements.

5. It is no more res-integra that contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is a special and inherent jurisdiction. Article 215 of the Constitution declares that High Court shall be the Court of record and shall have the power of such Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. It would be useless to rake up the controversy whether such jurisdiction was inherent in it because of being Court of record or whether it was conferred on it under Article 215, so long as it was not disputed that it possessed such jurisdiction. But it surely requires to be made clear that this jurisdiction was not conferred on the High Court by Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Act only limited the jurisdiction and regulated the procedure for its exercise which finds support not only from statement of its objects but also from provisions of Section 22 which declares that it would be in addition and not in derogation of any other law relating to contempt of Court (See 1972(1) SCC 651 and 1991(4) SCC 406).

6. This Act amongst other things provides remedy of appeal u/s. 19 against any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The provisions of Section 19 have, however, been interpreted by the Supreme Court to confer limited right of appeal against orders of punishment only and no other order including the one dropping proceedings or discharging the rule














































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