1. The defendant/applicant feels aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court where under an application filed by it under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), for return of the plaint has been dismissed holding that the consent of the parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of a Court to try a suit if under the law the said Court is vested with such a jurisdiction.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant/defendant as well as the learned counsel representing the respondent/plaintiff, and have carefully perused the record.

3. The facts in brief, shorn, of details, and necessary for the disposal of this revision lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff/respondent had filed the suit out of which the present revision has arisen praying for a declaratory decree declaring the letter dated 1st February, 1996, issued by the defendant whereby the plaintiff s dealership had been terminated to be illegal and legally ineffective. The plaintiff had further prayed for a decree of prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from prohibiting or interfering with the continuance of the plaintiff s business as a dealer of Mahindra Tractors. This suit had been filed on the allegations that the plaintiff had been appointed as a dealer by the defendant under a 'Dealership Agreement' which had been executed in Shivpuri, Madhya Pradesh. It had been further alleged that the letter dated 1st of February, 1996, terminating the dealership of the plaintiff had been received by the plaintiff at Shivpuri, therefore, the cause of action for the suit had arisen at Shivpuri where he was carrying on his business as a dealer of Mahindra Tractors manufactured by the defendant.

4. The defendant had moved an application on 29th January, 1997, under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code praying that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff so that it may be tried by a civi1 Court of competent jurisdiction at Bombay. In the aforesaid application, the defendant had asserted that the plaintiff had been appointed as a dealer under an agreement which had been executed at Bombay. In Clause 23 of the said agreement, the parties to the agreement had agreed that in case there was any dispute, the same shall be triable in a Court of competent jurisdiction at Bombay indicating that the agreement had in fact been executed at Bombay and the plaintiff was bound by the ouster clause as indicated in Clause 23 of the agreement.

5. The defendant had further urged that the suitat Shivpuri could not proceed, and in fact, the Courts at Shivpuri had no jurisdiction to try the same.

6. It may be noticed that in Clause 23 of the agreement relied upon by the contesting defendant, it had been stipulated that for any legal purpose the said agreement shall be considered to have been signed in Bombay and any legal proceedings arising out of the said agreement or relating thereto or in any manner connected with the dealership shall be instituted in Bombay Courts only.'

7. A persual of the copy of the agreement placed on the record shows that it was executed on 19th April, 1988. In paragraph 2 of the said agrement it was stipulated that the dealership was to continue to remain effective only till December 31, 1988.

8. The learned counsel for the defendant/applicant has assailed the finding of the Court below on the question regarding the stipulation contained in Clause 23 of the agreement holding that by mutual consent neither a jurisdiction can be conferred on a civil Court not vested in it by law nor a Court of competent jurisdiction could be ousted of its jurisdiction by mutual consent of the parties to the suit. In other words, it is urged that the trial Court erroneously came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction could not be vested in a Court with the consent of the parties, and the Clause 23 of the agreement relied upon by the defendant was legally ineffective and could not be taken to be binding on the plaintiff and had the