1. This appeal is directed against the order, dated 10.8.94, passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Labour Court) Sagar, in Workmen's Compensation Case No. 3/93.

2. The respondent Ratan Lal alias Rattu had filed an application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). He claimed in this application that he suffered an injury to his left arm on 22.5.87 while he was working on a Expeller Machine. The result was that due to accident, there was an amputation of his arm. This application was filed on 8.10.87.

3. It appears that the respondent filed an application, dated 29.11.90, claiming that he was entitled to interim compensation amounting to Rs. 25,000/-. The applicant filed a reply opposing the grant of interim compensation on the ground that under 'the Act' and the Rules made thereunder, there is no provision for making an interim compensation. For this reason, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation had no jurisdiction to grant an interim compensation on the application filed by the respondent on 29.11.90.

4. By the impugned order, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Labour Court), Sagar has granted award to the extent of Rs. 12,000/-.

5. It appears that initially the appellant had preferred a revision against the order. By the order, dated 22.7.96, it was pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellant that the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation had passed an order under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with section 143 thereof. In view of a Full Bench decision reported in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chintaman and others (1995 JLJ 4 = 1995 MPLJ 259), the revision did not lie and, therefore, an oral prayer of counsel for the applicant, the revision was converted into a Misc. Appeal.

6. After the revision was converted into a Misc. Appeal, on 27.9.96 this appeal was admitted and it was directed that this appeal should be treated as an appeal u/s. 30 of 'the Act'.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the appellant has not complied with the provisions of section 30 of 'the Act'. Moreover; the revision itself was filed beyond 60 days and, therefore, the appeal was barred by time.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, urged that even though the appeal has been admitted on the basis that the impugned order is appealable u/s. 30 of the 'the Act', the order is appealable under the Motor Vehicles Act as was held by this Court in the order-sheet, dated 22.7.96, relying on the Full Bench decision reported in 1995 JLJ 4 (supra).

9. In the opinion of this Court, the learned counsel for the respondent is entitled to raise the objection and, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the impugned order is appealable under section 30 of 'the Act. If it is held that the appeal lies u/s. 30 of 'the Act' then only the question of deciding the preliminary objection would arise.

10. It is clear from the impugned order that it has been passed under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with section 143 thereof. Therefore, the appeal shall lie under the Motor Vehicles Act against the interim award as per decision reported in 1995 JLJ 4 (supra). It is the considered opinion of this Court that the forum has to be determined on the basis of order which is made expressly by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. This proposition of law is well established in Goverdhan Badrilal Mahajan and another v. Ganesh Balkrishna Deshmukh (1962 JLJ 760 = 1962 MPLJ 325) wherein it was laid down that in case a Court purports to act under any specific provision of law, the decision has to be judged with reference to that provision and the forum which examines the correctness of that decision has also to be determined with reference to that provision. It was also stated in that case that what a Court actually does which determines the forum and gives