1995 JLJ 167
U.L. Bhat, C.J. and Tej Shankar, J.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Pratibha Rathi and others
Misc. Appeal No. 260 of 1994; against the award passed by Shri L.S. Suman 1st Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shivpuri in Claim Case No.
44 of 1989 Decided on 17.11.1994.
(2) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 110C (2A) -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- S. 169 -- collusion between claimant and insured adjudged by the Tribunal during enquiry -- insurer may be allowed to contest the case on every ground.
The provision enables the Tribunal to implead the insurer as a party to the proceeding in case it is satisfied that there is collusion between the claimant and the person against whom the claim is made or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim and upon such impleadment, the insurer shall have right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the insured. The order to be passed by the Tribunal has to be supported by reasons to be recorded in writing. The reasons relate to the grounds contemplated in clauses of (i) and (ii) of sub-section (2A). This statutory provision will apply even in cases where initially the insurer has been impleaded. At appropriate stage, where the Tribunal is satisfied, it may record its satisfaction to enable the insurer to raise defences available to the insured. [Para 9
(3) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- Ss. 110D and 96 (2) -- restrictions imposed under S. 96 (2) -- are applicable in appeal also -- insurer cannot maintain an appeal on the ground of quantum of compensation alone. 1990 ACJ 888 distinguished. [Para 11
¼1½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 96 ¼2½ && eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 149 ¼2½ && chekdrkZ dh izfrj{kk && og gSa tks bl /kkjk ds v/khu izxf.kr gS && chekdrkZ ikfylh esa chek—r ds leLr vf/kdkj vkjf{kr dj ldrk gS && ;fn og dqN ckr ds fy, lank; djrk gS ftlds fy, og vkc) ugha gS] og chek—r ls mls olwy dj ldrk gSA , vkb vkj 1959 ,l lh 1331] 1970 , lh ts 239] 1983 Vh , lh 249 rFkk , vkb vkj 1982 xqtjkr 116 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 6À
¼2½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110x ¼2d½ && eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 169 && nkosnkj vkSj chek—r ds chp nqLlaf/k] tk¡p ds nkSjku vf/kdj.k }kjk vf/kfu.khZr && chekdrkZ dks izR;sd vk/kkj ij ekeys dk izfrokn djus ds fy, vuqKkr djuk pkfg,A
vf/kdj.k dk ;g lek/kku gks tkus ij fd nkosnkj vkSj ml O;fDr dh ftlds fo#) nkok fd;k x;k gS] nqLlaf/k gks xbZ gS vFkok og O;fDr ftlds fo#) nkok fd;k x;k gS] nkos dk izfrokn djus esa vlQy jgk gS] bl mica/k }kjk micaf/kr dks lkeF;Z iznku dh xbZ gS fd og chekdrkZ dks i{kdkj ds :i esa la;ksftr djs vkSj ,sls la;kstu fd, tkus ij] chekdrkZ dks nkos dk izfrokn chek—r dks miyC/k leLr vFkok muesa ls fdlh vk/kkj ij djus dk vf/kdkj gksxkA vf/kdj.k }kjk ikfjr fd, tkus okyk vkns‘k vfHkfyf[kr fd, tkus okys dkj.kksa ls lefFkZr gksxkA dkj.k] mi/kkjk ¼2d½ ds [kaM (i) vkSj esa (ii) esa vuq/;kr vk/kkjksa esa lacaf/kr gSA ;g dkuwuh mcia/k mu ekeyksa esa Hkh ykxw gksaxs vkSj tgk¡ izkjaHk esa gh chekdrkZ la;ksftr fd;k x;k gSA leqfpr izØe ij] tgk¡ vf/kdj.k dk lek/kku gks tkrk gS] og viuk lek/kku vfHkfyf[kr dj ldrk gS fd chekdrkZ chekd`r dks miyC/k izfrj{kk izLrqr dj ldsA
¿ iSjk 9À
¼3½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110 ?k rFkk 96 ¼2½ && /kkjk 96¼2½ && ds v/khu vf/kjksfir izfrca/k && vihy esa Hkh ykxw gksrs gSa && chek—r vihy dsoy ifjek.k ds vk/kkj ij ugha pyk ldrkA 1990 , lh ts 888 izHksfnrA ¿ iSjk 11À
U.L. Bhat, C.J. -- 1. Bhagwandas Rathi sustained fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident in 1987. His heirs filed a claim application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal claiming Rs. 18,69,600/- as compensation from the owner and insurer of the vehicle. The owner and the insurer filed separate objections. The Tribunal held that the accident was a result of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle which was insured. The Tribunal passed an award for Rs. 2.5 lacs and directed the insurer to pay the same. The insurer has filed this appeal challenging the quantum of compensation awarded.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of maintainability of appeal in the light of section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, corresponding to section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
3. The provisions of the two Acts are almost identical. Sub-section (1) of section 96 states that if a judgment is obtained against the insurer, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of section 96, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree, any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder as also costs and interest, as if he were the judgment-debtor.
4. Sub-section (2) of section 96 reads thus:
"(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the Court of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceeding is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:
(a) that the policy was cancelled by mutual consent or by virtue of any provision contained therein before the accident giving rise to the liability, and that either the certificate of insurance was surrendered to the insurer or that the person to whom the certificate was issued has made an affidavit stating that the certificate has been lost or destroyed, or that either before or not later than fourteen days after the happening of the accident the insurer has commenced proceedings for cancellation of the certificate after compliance with the provisions of section 105; or
(b) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:
(i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle-
(a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contact of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or
(b) for organised racing and speed testing, or
(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or
(d) without side-car being attached, where the vehicle is a motor cycle;
(ii) a condition excluding driving by a named 'person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or
(iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or
(c) that the pllicy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular." (Emphasis supplied)
5. Sub-section (2) bars the insurer from raising any defence to the claim for compensation except in the circumstances permitted by the provisions in clauses (a) to (c). Clauses (a) to (c) provide the grounds which can be raised by the insurer in defending an action. The ground that compensation claimed is excessive is not one permitted by clauses (a) to (b). The clear and unambiguous language of section 96 (2) prevents the insurer from raising any defence not permitted by clauses (a) to (c) ther
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