S.K. Chawla, J. -- 1. An order of termination of service of a clerk is under challenge in this writ petition.

2. The petitioner Mahesh Bhargava was given appointment as a casual clerk ¼uSfefRrd fyfid½ by M.P. Vidhik Sahayata Tatha Vidhik Salah Board (M.P. Legal Aid and Legal Advice Board, hereafter referred to as "Board), for 89 days by order dated 16.12.1988 (Annexure P-1). He was posted to work in the office of Tehsil Legal Aid and Advice committee, Sheopurkalan in Morena District. He continued to work as Clerk even after the expiry of 89 days stipulated in the appointment order. Ultimately, by order dated 8.12.1989 (Annexure P-2), said to have been served on the petitioner on 22.12.1989, his services were terminated with immediate effect. It, is that order which is under challenge in this writ petition.

3. The challenge was made on different grounds mentioned in the writ-petition, but the only ground canvassed before us was that activities of the Board are 'industry' within the meaning of section 20) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the termination in question being retrenchment not fulfilling the pre-requisites viz one month's notice or pay , in lieu thereof, payment of retrenchment compensation and notice to Government or an authority specified by it, mentioned in section 25-F of the Act, the same was invalid and liable to be quashed.

4. The writ petition is contested by the Board. Its defence is that employment of the petitioner was for a fixed period of 89 days only. Even that appointment, given as it was by the then Secretary of the Board, Premji Shrivastava, was in violation of the directions of M.P. Government (Annexure R-I) that no new post by the Board shall be created without prior sanction of the Government. There was no post or vacancy to which the petitioner could have been validly appointed. After expiry of 89 days, the service of the petitioner was never extended. He was allowed to work without authority by respondent No.3, i.e. Tehsil Legal Aid Officer, Sheopurkalan. Departmental action is being taken by the Board against him for unauthorisedly allowing the petitioner to work. It is also the defence of the Board that when the fact about invalid appointment of the petitioner came to the knowledge of the Board, the impugned order of termination was passed. It was denied that the activities of the Board are 'industry' or that the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 arc attracted to the present case. It is, however, not challenged that if the Board is held to be an 'industry' and provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 arc held to be attracted, the termination in question was without fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in section 25-F of the Act.

5. The definition of 'industry' is given in section 2 (j) of the Act. This clause as it originally stood, may be reproduced here:

"(j) 'Industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or a vocation of workmen." It may at once be stated here that a new definition of, industry' has been given by Act No. 46 of 1982, whereby a new clause 0) has been substituted for the above Clause, by section 2 (c) of the said Act, from a date to be notified for the enforcement of that provision. That date of enforcement, even after a lapse of more than 10 years, has not yet been notified. More will be said about it in the sequel. The only point worth mentioning here is that the original definition of 'industry' still holds the field.

6. Turning to the case law bearing on the definition of 'industry', it may be mentioned that concept of 'industry' followed a zig-zag course until a Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court gave the decision in the case of Banglore Water Supply v. Rajappa in AIR 1978 SC 548. The concept until then suffered modification, shrinkage and application from time to time. However, from th