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1991 Supreme(MP) 430
1992 JLJ 180
S.K. Jha, C.J. and K.M. Agarwal, J.
Munnawar Jahan Begum (Smt.) and another v. Union of India and others
M.P. No. 2184 of 1991; Decided on 27.9.1991.
V.S. Dahir, A.G. Dhande with S.S. Agarwal for petitioners; B.K. Rawat for intervenor; L.S. Singh for respondents.
Headnote:(1) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- S.80 -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 47 (1) & (3) -- S. 80 of the new Act -- not invalid on the ground that it does not provide right of representation and hearing opportunity to the existing operators -- provision is the same as it was in the old Act. AIR 1970 SC 1542 followed. [Para 3
(2) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- S. 80 -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 57 (3) & (5) -- provisions under S. 80 of new Act -- not invalid for the reason that they do not provide publication of application, representation and hearing as provided in S. 57 (3) & (5) of old Act -- fundamental right of profession, occupation, trade or business has not been violated. AIR 1975 SC 389 followed. AIR 1991 AP 11 (FB) relied on. [Para 5
(3) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- S. 80 -- provisions have been made by legislative enactment -- they are neither void nor ineffective -- not liable to be struck down on the ground that they are not in conformity with old provisions. AIR 1983 SC 383 explained. [Para 7
(4) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- Ss. 80 (2), 71 (3) and 88 (5) -- provisions under S. 80 (2) -- are not nugatory in absence of similar provisions as contained in Ss. 71 (3) and 88 (5). [Para 8
(5) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- S. 80 -- provisions under -- best serve the public interest -- removal of bar from permits limit -- would result in large number of buses operating on various routes -- would also necessarily eliminate or minimise long hours of waiting at bus stands. AIR 1975 SC 389 followed. AIR 1969 SC 1130, AIR 1974 SC 1174 and AIR 1975 SC 123 distinguished. [Para 9
(6) Constitution of India --Arts. 19 and 21 -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- Ss. 80 and 217 (2) (b) -- fundamental right of business etc. has not been taken away by S. 80 of the Act -- nor the fundamental right under Art. 21 to earn livelihood has been affected in any way. [Para 11
¼1½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 80 && eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 47 ¼1½ rFkk ¼3½ u, vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 80 && bl vk/kkj ij vfof/kekU; ugha gS fd og vH;kosnu dk rFkk orZeku vkijsVjksa dks lquokbZ ds volj ij vf/kdkj micaf/kr ugha djrk && mica/k iwoZ vf/kfu;e esa tSlk Fkk oSlk gh gSA , vkb vkj 1970 ,l lh 1542 vuqlfjrA ¿ in 3À
¼2½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 80 && eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 57 ¼3½ rFkk ¼5½ u, vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 80 ds v/khu mica/k && bl dkj.k ls vfof/kekU; ugha gS fd os iwoZ vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 57 ¼3½ rFkk ¼5½ esa ;Fkk micaf/kr && vkosnu dk izdk‘ku] vH;kosnu rFkk lquokbZ micaf/kr ugha djrs && o`fÙk] mithfodk] O;kikj vFkok dkjckj ds ewy vf/kdkj dk vfrØe.k ugha gqvk gSA , vkb vkj 1975 ,l lh 389 vuqlfjrA , vkb vkj 1991 , ih 11 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ voyafcrA ¿ in 5À
¼3½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 80 && mica/k fo/kk;h vf/kfu;fefr }kjk cuk, x, gS && os u ‘kwU; gS u gh izHkkoghu gS && bl vk/kkj ij vfHk[kaMuh; ugah gS fd iwoZ mica/kksa ds vuq:ir% ugha gSA , vkb vkj 1983 ,l lh 383 Li"Vh—rA ¿ in 7À
¼4½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 & /kkjk 80 ¼2½] 71¼3½ rFkk 88 ¼5½ && /kkjk 80 ¼2½ ds v/khu mica/k && /kkjk 71¼3½ rFkk 88 ¼5½ esa ;Fkk varfoZ"V oSls gh mica/kksa ds vHkko esa fujFkZd ugha gSA ¿ in 8À
¼5½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 80 && mica/k && yksd fgr dh loksZÙke iwfrZ djrs gSa && ijfeV dh ifjlhek ds otZu dk fujkdj.k && vusd ekxksZa ij vf/kd la[;k esa clsa pyus esa ifj.kkfer gksxk && cl&vÏksa ij yacs le; rd izrh{kk dks vko‘;d :i ls gVk,xk vFkok de djsxkA , vkb vkj 1975 ,l lh 389 vuqlfjrA , vkb vkj 1969 ,l lh 1130] , vkb vkj 1974 ,l lh 1174 rFkk , vkb vkj 1975 ,l lh 123 izHksfnrA ¿ in 9À
¼6½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 19 rFkk 21 && eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 80 rFkk 217¼2½ ¼[k½ && vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 80 rFkk dkjckj vkfn dk ewy vf/kdkj Nhuk ugha x;k gS && u gh vuqPNsn 21 ds v/khu thfodksiktZu dk ewy vf/kdkj fdlh izdkj ls izHkkfor gqvk gSA ¿ in 11À
K.M. Agarwal, J. -- 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, two Bus Operators of Manasa, district Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh are challenging the constitutional validity of section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (in short, the "new Act"), on the ground that it over-looks public interest and confers uncanalised and arbitrary powers to Regional Transport Authorities in the matter of grant of stage carriage permits for regional routes. It is further said to be bad, because it does not recognize any right of hearing to the existing operators before making any fresh grant.
2. Referring to sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (in short, the "old Act") the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority was bound to consider the various matters enumerated in sub-section (1), as also to "t1ke into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies", and that he could "limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region" in exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) and having regard to the matters specified in sub-section (1). Absence of similar safe-guards and restrictions rendered the provisions of section 80 of the new Act invalid.
3. The argument has no substance. As held by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. S.T.A. Tribunal, Madras (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1542), at the stage of limiting the number of permits under section 47 (3) of the old Act, the existing operators had no legal right of making representation, or that of hearing. To reproduce the Supreme Court :-
"section 47 (3) of the Act, on the other hand, speaks only of the matters mentioned in sub-section (1) which a Regional Transport Authority may have regard to while limiting the number of stage carriages. The total absence in section 47 (3) of the Act of any reference to representations mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act indicates that a Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act is not required to take into consideration any representations of the nature mentioned in Sec. 47 (1) of the Act. Representations mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act are referable to representations contemplated in section 57(3) of the Act. These representations are those made by operators to the Regional Transport Authority after the publication of an application for a stage carriage permit. In view of the provisions of the Act and, in particular, section 48 of the Act which enacts that a Regional Transport Authority subject to the provisions of section 47 may grant a stage carriage permit, it is manifest that representations contemplated in sections 47 (1) and 57 (3) of the Act are representations subsequent to the application for grant of permit, and, therefore, these representations do not at all enter the field of determination of number of stage carriages under section 47 (3) of the Act. Representations mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act relate to representations by and between the competitors and contenders for grant of a permit. These individual representations raise rival contentions between operators. When the Regional Transport Authority acts under S. 47 (3) of the Act it does not deal with any dispute between operators. The Regional Transport Authority is required to arrive at its decision under S. 47 (3) of the Act having regard to matters mentioned in S. 47 (1) of the Act independent of any re
