Dr. T.N. Singh, J. -- 1. This is a hopeless appeal and it merits a short order.

2. Appellants are impugning an order passed under Section 263, the 'Act'. They had obtained probate, which has been revoked by the impugned order. For simple and short reasons to follow, the appeal is held to be misconceived and meritless.

2A. What is manifestly clear is that revocation of a Will is contemplated when "proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance". Illustrations (i) and (ii), appended to the Section, further amplify the scope of the provision. They contemplate that when the Court making .the grant had no jurisdiction and when the grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited, that would be deemed to be "just cause" within the meaning of the term employed in Section 263. In the instant case, the admitted fact is that the Will of which probate has been granted contained a lethal statement. In the Will itself it was stated that an earlier Will had been executed in favour of respondent/Peer Mohammad. That being the position, as per Section 283 of the Act, the District Judge was required to issue notice to him and in the instant case, on oath, Peer Mohammad stated that no notice had been served on him and that of the probate granted on 10-10-1980 he acquired knowledge through other sources and he obtained copy of the order on 15-2-1982. The application for revocation was filed indeed on the same date, namely, 15-2-1982. The objector/applicant Peer Mohammad admittedly was a resident of an interior village Gram Bercha of Tahsil Seondha in District Datia and he stated that in his village, there was no circulation of any newspaper. He also claimed that the, non-applicants, namely, Rasheed Khan and Sanna Mohammad, who had obtained the probate, were aware of the fact that the applicant/objector was the real beneficiary of the deceased Lal Khan and he was entitled to deceased's property.

3. The undisputed fact in this case is that no special citation has been issued though general citation was published in a newspaper. I have no doubt that the Probate Court could exercise its jurisdiction to probate the Will only when the person "interested", namely, the respondent/Peer Mohammad, had been noticed. It cannot be disputed that ex-facie, he had "interest in the estate of the deceased" as in the Will of which probate was obtained, his name had been referred and it was stated that a Will had been earlier executed in his name. He had a right to oppose the probate and to prove that the Will propounded was not validly executed or it was forged Will. Of that opportunity, he was deprived and the proceedings in the matter of grant of the probate to the instant appellants, were palpably and grossly defective; and not only defective in substance. I have no doubt that the trial Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass any order in the probate proceedings initiated by the appellants without hearing respondent/Peer Mohammad.

4. Shri Katare who has very competently and forcefully argued the appeal, has cited this Court's Division Bench decision in Rajeshwari Devi's case (1978 JLJ 570 = AIR 1978 MP 201). I do not think if that at all helps him. Indeed, this Court observed therein that where citation had not been ordered, the party impugning the Will on the ground of his non-citation must first show that he ought to have been cited, before the burden of proof is shifted to the executor to show that the defect in the proceedings was not one of substance and that no just cause for revocation exists. In the instant case, on facts, the burden from the very beginning rested on the propounder/appellants. There was no question of any burden at all to be shifted to them because the Will which they themselves propounded mentioned the fact that in Peer Mohammad's favour, an earlier Will had been executed. It is true that this Court has also held that jurisdiction under Section 263 is a discretionary one and the trial Court may refuse