K.M. Pandey, J. --1. This second appeal has come up before this Court against the judgment and decree dated 19.3.1976 passed by Shri Ravi Varma, Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No. 12-B of 1974.

2. The brief facts are that the respondent filed a suit for damages against the State of Madhya Pradesh and the appellant alleging that he was owner of the disputed land and had constructed 4 flush latrines in the land and an amount of Rs. 4,000/- was spent by him for the said construction. The Tahsildar treating the said construction to be an encroachment started proceedings u/s 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the aforesaid constructions were demolished on 29-7-68. The plaintiff's contention was that he was the owner of the property and the constructions could not have been treated as an encroachment on Government land. Besides this, other legal pleas of jurisdiction, limitation, section 80 C.P.C. were also taken. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit holding it as time barred. An appeal was preferred against that judgment and decree and the learned first appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and has decreed the suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 4,000/- against the appellant.

3. The appeal before me was pressed on two legal points :-

(1) The suit was barred by time; and

(2) The suit is liable to be dismissed for want of any notice against the appellant u/s 80 C.P.C.

Consequently no decree can be passed against him for damages for an action which was lawfully conducted as Tahsildar.

4. Point No. (1)

It is common case that the impugned construction was demolished on 29.7.1968 and the present suit for damages was filed on 1.10.1971. It was contended before me that Art. 72 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable in this case and the limitation for the suit was only one year. Art. 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes a limitation of one year for compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this Act extends. The starting point of limitation is the time when the act or omission takes place.

5. It cannot be denied that the Tahsildar who initiated the proceedings for the removal of the encroachment acted in exercise of his statutory powers. The object of Art. 72 is the protection of public officials who, while bona fide purporting to act in the exercise of a statutory power, have exceeded that power and have committed a tortious act [AIR 1936 Pal 513 (DB)]. In another case AIR 1932 All 16 (DB) it was held that an act may be done maliciously yet under the honest belief that it is authorised by the enactment. In such cases this article will apply. The result is that the Tahsildar who acted in exercise of his powers under an enactment i.e. the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, is to be governed by Art. 72, Art. 113 of the Limitation Act is a residuary article and it will apply only in such cases wherein no period of limitation has been provided elsewhere in this Schedule (Limitation Act). The learned first appellate Court committed an error in holding that the limitation in this case is to be governed by Art. 113. The statute itself provides a limitation in such cases and consequently the assistance of Art. 113 is not available.

6. Point No. (2)

It has been vehemently argued before me that the suit is barred u/s 80 C.P.C. because no notice was served on the appellant before bringing the suit. In para 13 of the plaint which has been introduced by an amendment dated 15.3.1974 it has been said that notice u/s 80 C.P.C. was sent to the Collector and the Chief Secretary on 14.6.71 which was received by the Collector on 17.6.71. It is significant to note that there is no mention of any notice having been sent to the appellant. It may be pointed out that the suit against the State Government has been dismissed even by the first appellant Court. The suit stands decreed only against the