S.K. Jha, C.J. -- 1. This application is directed against the order dated 9.8.1989 passed by the Ist Additional District Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1989. The applicant was the defendant No. 1 in the suit having alleged to have taken a loan from the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 the Union Bank of India, and the original defendant No.2 was one Narayan Prasad Goswami, who is said to be the guarantor and the mortgagor of the secured property. The suit by the respondent No.1 Bank was instituted for recovery of the aforesaid loan alongwith the interest against both the applicant and the deceased Narayan Prasad Goswami (original defendant No.2).

2. By the impugned order, the Court below has merely in one sentence said that the application for substitution of the heirs of deceased defendant No. 2 is allowed since he is dead and the delay is condoned. It is this order which is the subject matter of attack before this Court.

3. The admitted facts are these:

The suit was instituted on 20.1.1988. During the pendency of the suit, on 20th Oct., 1988, the aforesaid Narayan Prasad Goswami, defendant No.2, died. Admittedly again, the plaintiff, respondent No.1, got knowledge of the same on 10.1.1989. After that date, the plaintiff, respondent No. 1, went on taking adjournment after adjournment from the trial Court for purposes of taking steps for substitution of the heirs of deceased defendant No.2, who have been impleaded as respondent No. (2) (i) to (viii) in the present civil revision. Such adjournments were taken orally by the counsel for the respondent No.1 plaintiff on 16.2.1989, 8.3.1989, 6.4.1989, 2.5.1989, 4.7.1989 and 19.7.1989 to take steps for substitution. Ultimately on 9.8.1989, an application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C. was filed along with an affidavit for condonation of delay under section 5, Limitation Act. No application was filed under Order 22, Rule 9, C.P.C. for setting aside the abatement after condonation of delay at any point of time. And the Court below has curiously enough, simply in one sentence, allowed the application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C. and for condonation of delay under Sections, Limitation Act without assigning any reason therefor and without taking any notice of the fact that no application for setting aside abatement was made at all at any time.

Incidentally, it may also be mentioned that the present applicant's petition dated 6.4.1988 making a prayer for dismissing the suit on account of in competency has also been dismissed by the same order. It seems the learned Additional District Judge does not seem to have sufficient knowledge and appreciation of the law with regard to abatement and substitution as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.

4. It would bear repetition to highlight the point that the only application that had been filed by the plaintiff, respondent No.1, was that dated 9.8.1989 which was an application for substitution simpliciter under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C. without any prayer for setting aside the abatement and bringing the LRs on record under Order 22, rule 9, C.P.C. and that, obviously, could have been done only if the delay would then have been condoned under Section 5, Limitation Act. The law is well settled that no specific order for abatement of a proceeding under one or the other provision of Order 22, C.P.C. is envisaged by the Code of Civil Procedure. The abatement takes place on its own force by passage of time. In fact, a specific order is necessary under Order 22, Rule 9, C.P.C. for setting aside the abatement for which a period of 60 days from the date of knowledge is laid down under the law of Limitation. Obviously, is this case, the defendant No.2 having died on 20.10.88, abatement of the suit as against his heirs took place automatically by passage of time which is 90 days from the date of the death or if the party applying had no such knowledge, then within 60 days from the date of the knowledge on which the part