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1991 Supreme(MP) 427

1993 JLJ 467
R.C. Lahoti and K.M. Pandey, JJ.
Brijraj Singh and others v. Smt. Bitto Devi and another
S.A. No. 114 of 1990; Decided on 24.9.1991.

Advocates:
U.K. Jain for appellants; P.O. Agarwal for respondents.

Headnote:(1) Civil P.C. ,1908 -- O.1, R. 3.B and O.6 R. 4-A (as inserted in M.P.) -object is to prevent collusive civil litigation to circumvent provisions of Ceiling Act -- saving of public interest from such litigation. [Para 9

       (2) Interpretation of Statutes -- object behind a legislative provision -- has a role to play in its interpretative process -- it is useful for the purpose of understanding the background -- for utilising the same for determining the scope and ambit of the relevant provision of statute. AIR 1984 SC 458, AIR 1969 SC 530 and AIR 1985 SC 4 followed. [Para 15

       (3) Civil P.C., 1908 -- Ss. 99 and 21 -- rules embodied under -- is to promote justice -- cannot be used to prolong litigation -- concluded trial cannot be rendered abortive unless the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court are affected. AIR 1937 PC 233 and AIR 1954 SC 340 relied on. [Paras 13 & 14

       (4) Civil P,C., 1908 -- O.1 R. 3-B (as inserted in M.P.) -- omission to imp-lead the State as party -- cannot be ‘used as a tool to get remand of case -- State to be joined as party at the stage when omission is detected.

       The ends of justice and the spirit of law would be satisfied by directing the State to be joined as a party to the case at that very stage and before that very Court when and where the defect is detected or pointed out. The State would then be noticed and afforded an opportunity of participation at the proceedings. The State may then avail the opportunity to point out that merits of the case have been adversely affected on account of non-compliance with the provisions at an earlier stage. In that event if the matter be before the trial Court, it may exercise its jurisdiction to reopen the trial to the extent warranted so as to protect the interest of the State; if the Court be an appellate Court, it my exercise its jurisdiction conferred by Rules 23, 23-A and 25 or 27 of Order 41 C.P.C. and may either proceed to frame an issue and try itself or may remit the case to the trial Court retaining seisin of appeal to itself or may if necessary make a remand of the case if satisfied that prejudice has resulted to the State affecting the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the . Court on account of failure to join the State as party to the case at an earlier and appropriate stage of the proceedings. 1986 JLJ 777 Approved. 1989 (II) MPWN 22, 1989 MPLJ 134, S.A. 113/88, S. A. 30/89 and M.A. 90/88 overruled. [Para 17

       (5) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 1, R. 10 and 3,B -- State not joined as provided under R. 3 B -- decree passed ,would be binding between the parties -- it would not be a nullity or without jurisdiction -- State is free to contend that decree was secured for defeating the provisions of Ceiling Act. 1976 JLJ 84 (FB) relied on. [Para 19

ORDER

R.C. Lahoti, J. -- 1. Judges must be beware of hard constructions and strained inferences; for there is no worse torture than torture of laws -- said Francis Bacon. Should the law be so interpreted and implemented as to let the litigation go into a circuitous and torturous path of journey or should it be so interpreted as to cut-short litigation keeping in view the purpose and object behind its enactment, is the question staring at the Court hearing this reference.

2. The Code of Civil Procedure (M.P. Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 29 of 1984) introduced Rule 3-B in Order 1 and Rule 4-A in Order 6 in the body of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applied to the State Of Madhya Pradesh. Of late, it has come to the notice of this Court that the provision is being utilized by the appellate Courts as a tool for earning easy disposal of appeals by making orders of remand unmindful of the fact that a convenient resort to that provision has the result of setting at naught the concluded decrees of competent Courts, well merited otherwise, and thereby throwing down the litigants to retread the arduous path of tiresome litigation.

3. The facts in brief: The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for declaration of title and partition relating to an agricultural holding. The suit was instituted on 20.10.76 and came to be decided on 28.8.80. The suit was decreed on 2.9.80. The defendants preferred an appeal before the lower appellate Court which was heard on merits and dismissed by the lower appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 17.4.90. In between, on 14.8.84, had come into force the Amending Act of 1984. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. were not complied with by the defendant as appellant before the lower appellate Court nor did that Court advert its attention at securing compliance therewith. The losers in litigation, i.e. the defendants, have come up to this Court now seriously complaining of jurisdictional incompetence in the lower appellate Court for failure of compliance thereat with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A suggesting that the decree passed in appeal was vitiated and forcefully pressing for a remand so as to secure a rehearing of the appeal at the hands of the lower appellate Court after compliance with the said provisions of law. This Court admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following question.

"Whether the judgment and decree of the Court below are vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C."

4. It is clear that if the contention raised on behalf of the appellant canvassing mandatory character of the two provisions and jurisdictional incompetence in the Court below in hearing and disposing of the appeal without securing compliance with the two provisions were to be accepted the appeal has to be simply allowed with consequent order of remand setting aside the impugned decree and directing a rehearing .of the appeal at the hands of the lower appellate Court. Forceful reliance was placed on Mohanlal v. Ramlal (1989-11 MPWN 22); Shakoor Khan v. Yogi Dulichand (1989 MPLJ 134) and three unreported decisions of this Court in Shankarlal v. Shankarlal (S.A. No. 113/88, decided on 22.3.90); Smt. Dhanakju v. Smt. Sukhrani (S.A. 30/89, decided on 16.10.90) and Alfoo Khan v. Lateef Khan (M.A. No. 90/88, decided on 20.2.91).

5. The effort of the defendant/appellants at securing the remand was seriously opposed by plaintiff/respondent submitting that though the lower appellate Court should have secured compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. yet the primary responsibility of imp-leading the State as party-respondent in the appeal before the lower appellate Court laid with the appellant thereat who having failed in discharging own obligation, cannot now be heard to complain of non-compliance with the provisions to their own advanta



























































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