Back
1994 JLJ 486
(SUPREME COURT)
K. Ramswamy and N. Venkatachala, JJ.
Anar Devi v. Nathuram
Civil Appeal No. 4358 of 1994; Decided on 13.5.1994.
No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. LR 6 Ch.D. 1 relied on. [Para 12
Ever since, the accepted position is that section 116 of the Evidence Act applies and estops even a person already in possession as tenant under one landlord from denying the title of his subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as his landlord by attornment or conduct. Therefore, a tenant of immovable property under landlord who becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting him to be the owner who had derived title from the former landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter‘s title, even when he is sought to be evicted by the latter on a permitted ground. AIR 1976 SC 2355 and AIR 1937 PC 251 relied on. [Para 13
(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) -- Ss.23-A (b) and 12 (1) (f) -- words "if he is the owner thereof‘ used in S. 23-A (b) -- do not require landlord to plead and prove his title over the tenanted premises.
When a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord‘s title to accommodation, whether he was there either from the beginning of the tenancy or had become a tenant subsequently by acknowledging the landlord‘s title, it is difficult to think that the words ‘if he is the owner thereof used in clause (b) of section 23-A are intended to require the landlord to plead in his application for recovery of possession made under the clause, his ownership of accommodation, and establish the same by evidence aliunde, to succeed in recovery of possession of such accommodation from the tenant. It would be so, particularly, when he was not so required to plead or establish on an application if had been made by him for recovery of possession of the accommodation on the self same ground under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. [Para 16
¼1½ lk{; vf/kfu;e] 1872 & /kkjk 116 & ds v/khu vfHk/kkjh dk foca/k & vfHk/kkjh vius Hkw&Lokeh dk gd vk{ksfir ugha dj ldrk ftlus vfHk/kkjh dks dCtk fn;k & Ik‘pkrorhZ Hkw&Lokeh dk gd Hkh vk{ksfir ugha fd;k tk ldrk tc vfHk/kkjh mls ,d ckj viuk Hkw&Lokeh vfHkLohdkj dj ysA
LFkkoj laifÙk ds fdlh Hkh vfHk/kkjh] vFkok ,sls vfHk/kkjh ds ek/;e ls nkok djus okys O;fDr dks vfHk/k`fÙk ds nkSjku] bl ckr dk çR;k[;ku djus dh vuqKk ugha nh tk,xh fd ,sls vfHk/kkjh ds Hkw&Lokeh dk] vfHk/k`fr ds vkjaHk eas] ,slh LFkkoj laifÙk ij gd FkkA ,y vkj 6 lh,p Mh 1 voyafcrA ¿iSjk 12
rc ls LohÑr fLFkfr ;g gS fd Hkw&Lokeh ds v/khu igys ls gh vfHk/kkjh ds :Ik esa dCtk j[kus okys O;fDr dks Hkh] tc og Lo;a dks mldk vfHk/kkjh eku dj vFkok vius vkpj.k }kjk mls ,d ckj Hkw&Lokeh vfHkLohÑr dj ys] lk{; vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 116 ykxw gksrh gS rFkk mls vius Ik‘pkrorhZ Hkw&Lokeh ds gd dk çR;k[;ku djus ls focaf/kr djrh gSA vr% Hkw&Lokeh ds gd dk çR;k[;ku djus la focaf/kr djrh gSA vr% Hkw&Lokeh ds v/khu LFkkoj laifÙk ds ftl vfHk/kkjh us vU; Hkw&Lokeh dks iwoZorhZ Hkw&Lokeh ls gd çkIr djus okys Lokeh ds :Ik esa Lohdkj dj Lo;a dks mldk vfHk/kkjh cuk fy;k gks] mls Ik‘pkrorhZ Hkw&Lokeh ds gd dk çR;k[;ku djus dh rc Hkh vuqKk ugha nh tk ldrh tc Ik‘pkrorhZ Hkw&Lokeh }kjk mls vuqKkr vk/kkj ij csn[ky fd, tkus dh ek¡x dh xbZ gksA , vkb vkj 1976 ,l lh 2355 rFkk , vkb vkj 1937 ih lh 251 voyafcrA ¿iSjk 13
¼2½ LFkku fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 1961 ¼e-ç-½ & /kkjk 23&d ¼[k½ rFkk 12 ¼1½ ¼p½ & /kkjk 23&d ¼[k½ esa ç;qDr ‘‘kCn ^^;fn og mldk Lokeh gS** & ;g visf{kr ugha gSa fd Hkw&Lokeh vfHk/k`r ifjlj ij Lo;a dks gd dk vfHkopu djs rFkk mls lkfcr djsA
vfHk/kkjh ogk¡ vfHk/k`fr ds vkjaHk ls gks jgk vFkok Hkw&Lokeh dk gd vfHkLohÑfr dj rRi‘pkr~ vfHk/kkjh cuk gks] çR;sd n‘kk esa tc mls LFkku ij Hkw&Lokeh ds gd dk çR;k[;ku djus ls focaf/kr fd;k tkrk gS rc ;g lkspuk dfBu gS fd /kkjk 23&d ds [kaM ¼[k½ esa ç;qDr ^^;fn og mldk Lokeh gS** ‘‘kCnksa dk vk‘k; Hkw&Lokeh ls ;g vis{kk djuk gS fd vfHk/kkjh ls ,sls LFkku ds dCts ds çR;q)dj.k esa lQy gksus ds fy,] [kaM ds v/khu fd, x, dCts ds çR;q)dj.k ds vkosnu esa og LFkku ds LokfeRo ds fy, vfHkopu djs rFkk vU;= ls çkIr lk{; }kjk mls LFkkfir djsA ,slk fof‘k"Vr% rc gksrk] ;fn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12 ¼1½ ¼p½ ds v/khu blh vk/kkj ij LFkku ds çR;q)j.k ds fy, vkosnu esa mlls vfHkopu djus vFkok LFkkfir djus dh vis{kk u dh tkrhA ¿iSjk 16
Venkatachala, J.-- 1. Learned counsel for parties were heard by us.
2. Whether clause (b) of section 23A of the Madhya Pradesh Accomodation Control Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act'), which confers a right on the landlord to seek recovery of possession of non-residential accommodation from his tenant. on the ground specified thereunder, requires him to plead in his application to be made therefore, that he is also the owner of such accommodation and establish such ownership to succeed in that application, being a question of importance arising for our consideration in the Special Leave Petition, the Special leave to appeal sought for therein is granted.
3. Facts needed to decide the appeal are just a few. The respondent was a tenant of a shop, to be referred to as the 'the accommodation' under one Banarsidas who was his landlord being the owner of that accommodation. The respondent sent a notice on 23rd September, 1985 to Banarsidas calling upon him to effect certain repairs in respect of the accommodation. But, Banarsidas gave a reply to that notice telling the respondent that the appellant, his widowed daughter-in-law has since become the owner of that accommodation, she was his landlord, and as her tenant thereof, it was for him to seek the relief he wanted as regards accommodation from her.
4. However, as a notice had been issued by the appellant to the respondent in the meantime, calling upon him to put her in possession of the accommodation on the ground that it was required bona fide, for starting of a business by her sons, that that notice of the appellant was replied to by the respondent by issuance of a counter notice, Ex. P-4, which read thus:
"Your notice has been received and your notice is wrong and mala fide. I had given notice on 23.9.1985 to your father-in-law for repair of your shop and he gave the reply on 3.10.85 that you are the owner of the shop. I had to give notice to you but you already gave notice to me and the same is given for peshbandi and the shop needs repair and same cannot be used fully without being repaired. Therefore, the notice is given that you should do necessary repair in the shop within 15 days of receipt of the notice, so that the shop may be utilised fully, otherwise necessary legal action shall be taken in the competent Court and you shall be liable for all cost."
5. Since the respondent's demand made to the appellant in the said counter notice failed to evoke the required response, he filed a suit, Case No. 2/86-A/Civil in the Civil Court at Bhind seeking a decree against the appellant for payment of compensation on account of non-repair of the accommodation. The plaint filed in that suit on 23rd December, 1985 is Ex. P-5. The claim in that plaint, proceeded on premise that the appellant, who was arrayed as defendant therein, was the owner of the accommodation by stating thus:
"At present defendant has become its owner."
6. Another statement in the plaint was to the effect that the respondent had sent rents to the appellant by money-orders.
7. However, during the pendency of the said suit, the appellant submitted an application under section 23A (b) of the Act in the Court of Bhind Sub-Divisional Officer and Rent Controller, for short 'the Rent Controller', which was registered as Misc. No. 65/86-87/A-90. By that application, the appellant sought recovery of possession of the accommodation from the respondent on the ground that the accommodation was required bona fide for starting of a business by her sons. But the grant of that application was resisted by the respondent, denying both the appellant's bona fide requirement of the accommodation for starting of business by her sons and her ownership of the accommodation. The Rent Controller who recorded the evidence adduced by parties, on consideration of such evidence allowed the appellant's application by his order dated 1st June, 1990. As becomes clear from that order, the findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller were that t
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
