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2001 Supreme(MP) 573

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
S.P. Khare, J.
Ram Sewak
Versus
Chakresh Kumar Jain
SECOND APPEAL 885 of 1998 Of
Decided On : Sep 18,2001

Advocates Appeared:
Deepak Okhade, S.P.KHIRWADKAR, V.S.SHROTI,

Judgment

( 1. ) THIS is defendants second appeal under Section 100, CPC. The following substantial question of law was formulated by this Court by order dated 13-8-1999 at the time of admission of this appeal:-

"whether the Courts below have erred in passing the decree for eviction on the grounds under Sections 12 (1) (c), 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (g), of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ?"

( 2. ) THE facts relevant for the decision of the question referred to above are that defendant No. 1 Ramsevak was tenant of Konsabai in the suit accommodation. She has bequeathed this house to plaintiff Dr. Chakresh Kumar Jain by registered Will dated 14-5-1991. Thus the plaintiff has become the owner of this house after the death of the testator on 3-6-1991 and defendant No. 1 Ramsevak became his tenant.

( 3. ) THE plaintiffs suit for eviction has been decreed under Section 12 (1) (c), (f) and (g) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act ). The plaintiffs case was that the defendant No. 1 has denied his title to the suit accommodation and, therefore, he has become liable to eviction. It has been further pleaded by the plaintiff that he requires the suit accommodation, which had been let out to the defendant No. 1 for non-residential purpose, for starting his dispensary and for this purpose he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city. He has stated that at present he is running his dispensary in a rented accommodation. It has also been pleaded that the suit house has become unfit for human habitation and it requires reconstruction.

( 4. ) THE case of the defendant No. 1 is that he had denied the derivative title of the plaintiff and this does not constitute a ground for eviction. It is pleaded by the defendant No. 1 that the alleged need of the plaintiff is mere a pretence to get the suit accommodation vacated as it is only a small shop and it cannot be used for running a dispensary. The defendant No. 1 has also denied that the suit accommodation requires extensive repairs or the construction.

( 5. ) THE Trial Court decreed the eviction suit on three grounds mentioned above and that decree has been affirmed by the First Appellate Court.

( 6. ) THERE is a concurrent finding of fact of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court that the plaintiff requires the suit accommodation for running his dispensary therein. It is not disputed that at present he is running dispensary in a rented accommodation. Therefore, if the plaintiff wants to shift his dispensary to a house owned by him, there is nothing wrong in the predilection shown by him. His need is genuine. Legally he cannot be forced to run his dispensary in the rented accommodation. He has a choice to shift his dispensary to the suit accommodation. The finding of the two Courts regarding the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff is based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and it cannot be said even remotely that it is perverse or unreasonable. The plaintiff is a qualified doctor and his requirement is bona fide. He has objectively demonstrated that his need is genuine.

( 7. ) IT has been argued on behalf of the appellants that earlier Konsabai had instituted eviction proceeding against the defendant No. 1 in the year 1983 on the ground mentioned in Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act and that was dismissed and, therefore, that constitutes res judicata in the present suit. A certified copy of the judgment dated 5-10-1985 (Ex. D-2) of the Appellate Court has been filed. It shows that the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was held to be not established because Dr. Chakresh Kumar Jain was not the son of plaintiff Konsabai. He is her daughters son. Therefore, Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was held as not available to plaintiff Konsabai to seek eviction for the requirement of her grand-son. Now Konsabai has died. She has executed a Will in favour of present plaintiff







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